
CONDUCT IN SOCIETY:

A TREATISE ON MORALS.



BY

JOGENDRA CHANDRA GHOSH.

"Be it my will that my mercy overpower my justice.

The Talmud.

Calcutta:
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1889.

There are many things of which we must all be ignorant, many of which we may be ignorant because there are other studies which we prefer to follow: but there are two things of which, unless we wholly go out of the world, we may not be ignorant without great blame, our duties as men and as citizens.

DR. ARNOLD: *On the Divisions and Mutual Relations of Knowledge.*

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PREFACE.

In the Proceedings of the Government of India, dated the 18th of June, 1888, on the Progress of Education in British India, His Excellency the Viceroy in Council is said to have observed that the difficulty in introducing moral teaching into State Colleges (where no religious instruction is given) "does not seem to have been hitherto seriously faced by Education Departments generally; and until failure follows an earnest effort at imparting moral instruction in Colleges, he is unwilling to admit that success may not be secured." One of the recommendations made in pursuance of this opinion is "that an attempt should be made to prepare a moral text-book" "such as may be taught in all Government Colleges and non-Government Colleges." But it is incidentally suggested that such moral text-book should be "based upon the fundamental principles of natural religion." (*The Gazette of India*, July 14. 1888.) This suggestion, I must confess, made me hesitate very much in writing this little book.

I cannot think of entering into a controversy on the subject of Natural Religion; but I may be allowed to observe, that what is natural religion to a European may not be the common basis of such religions for instance, as Vedantism or Buddhism. After all, the expression "natural religion" would at best be imperfectly understood except as correlated to revealed religion or perhaps to the revealed religion of Christ.

It appears that the subject of Natural Religion was previously referred to in the Elementary Education Act of 1870 which is now in force in England. "The 14th Section of that Act which forbids any denominational catechism or formulary being taught in schools * * * does not exclude from schools, instruction in the religion of Nature—that is the existence of God and of natural morality.' And the passage in question then runs on to say further that natural morality "cannot be nationally taught or understood" "apart from the belief in the existence

of God." (*The Times, weekly edition*, June 29. 1888.) It would probably have been more precise to say—apart from belief in the existence of certain attributes in God. In other words, in a Christian country natural morality must count more or less upon the nature of the Christian God; but India cannot be regarded as a Christian country.

The Royal Commission upon Education, who sent in their Report at about the same time when the question was being considered in India, have recorded the following paragraph clearly pointing out the fundamental principles of natural morality in the curriculum of English schools. "While," say the majority of the Commission, "differing widely in our views concerning religious truth, we are persuaded that the only safe foundation on which to construct a theory of morals, or secure high moral conduct is the religion which Jesus Christ has taught the world." Accordingly the Bible is looked to for "instruction in morals, and for the sanctions by which men may be led to practise" morality, (*The Times, weekly edition. do.*)

Before the Director of Public Instruction was appointed in Bengal the Calcutta School Book Society published text-books in English, for the lower forms, and it would appear that the Society was very attentive to moral teaching and derived every assistance from the Bible, although the sanction of Biblical authority was carefully withdrawn from the Hindu reader's notice. The times are changed now; and the education department is not only more strictly secular, but does not publish any text-books at all.

Meantime the Brahmo society has come into existence and grown up so as to be in open religious conflict with other Indian creeds. Its history, however, will show that it has always been most anxious to lay down principles of sound morality. But it is well-known that while Raja Ram Mohun Roy began with a controversy with Missionaries of the Christian faith and relied upon the Vedantist scriptures of India, his successors have had to renounce those books for any complete guide or sanction of faith and conduct, and to rely instead upon intuitive truths and some kind of eclecticism. In the present attempt, reliance is placed upon certain assumptions regarding human nature, which are claimed to possess general acceptance, quite apart from the nature of Intuitions and the origin of Innate Ideas. And to make a similar approach to Christian morality these assumptions are checked with reference to conditions of

man's social life such as the Government of British India insists upon, consistently with its neutrality in matters of religion.

Our greatest difficulty is, I believe, really one of theory. The theoretical problem discloses its supreme practical importance only in some of those nicer questions in which society as now constituted generally agrees to differ ; but for those same nice questions a book on practical morality must nevertheless suggest a consistent line of conduct. Peccadiloes may be only peccadiloes in life ; but the thought or want of thought underlying them, may not be trifled with. For the springs of conduct are the same for light as for grave immoralities : for the peccadiloes as for the seven capital sins. Indeed the well-known maxim—take care of the pence and the pounds will take care of themselves—is probably as true of sterling morality as it is of the house-holder's conduct in material affairs. And what we are really in quest of are fixed sanctions of conduct and definite first principles in matters of belief or theory. Hence, where the principles of Vedantism for instance : the belief in a quiescent God, perfectly neutral to man's happiness or unhappiness and to abstract goodness and badness, as the world conceives the former, and as Christian Europe accepts the latter—where even these fundamental questions of happiness and duty are at issue, practical morality has to be referred more or less to the systematised opinion of society. At least I submit, this is the only course open for the purposes of State-education in British India.

The problem is deep and vast ; and I need not commit the folly of posing as if I thought myself equal to offering an original solution for it. But to mention my authorities would raise a host of questions ; and without presenting myself as an apologist for this or that philosopher, I may, considering the practical question before us, be allowed to submit my case to be tried on its own merits.

J. C. G.

POSTSCRIPT TO THE PREFACE.

The letter No. 105 T. dated the 28th October 1888 from the Director of Public Instruction to the Government of Bengal could not be referred to in the preface, because all but the fourteenth chapter of this book had been sent to the press in September last year. Sir Alfred Croft has taken, I fear, a too despondent view of his question. I do not know whether my line of argument will meet with his approval. But I am quite sure that I could not have adduced in support of my humble effort, facts more cogent than some of those which he has discussed in the letter mentioned above.

J. C. G.

March 20th, 1889.

CONDUCT IN SOCIETY:

A TREATISE ON MORALS.

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY.

Limits of Law and Religion.

MORALITY stands midway between Religion and Law in regulating our conduct. It is liable to be neglected when men of different religions have to live together in society, and are allowed to deny the foundations of each other's creed. But it is nevertheless an indispensable part of sound education. The religious sources of morality stand excluded from the province of State-Education in India. Hence it becomes all the more necessary to look to other sources. Law takes cognizance only of omissions and commissions which require reform by the strong hand of power. Morality as source of human law looks to right conduct beyond the reach of that law and also calls forth one's own effort towards such conduct from sense of duty instead of fear of punishment.

Conditions of Society and Man.

It can be made to rest on the conditions of our social life; and if while so resting it is found to agree with obvious truths about the inner nature or natural character of man as an individual being, its imperativeness may be regarded as established with no less authoritativeness than that of Religion. For obvious reasons, the tests of Religion which are of the utmost value, cannot be largely applied to the principles set forth in the following pages. Insufficiency in that regard cannot be helped and has to be endured. But it is hoped that the rules of morality set forth here will be found to coincide generally, at least, with the dictates of the principal religions prevailing in British India.

Duty and Happiness: their reconciliation.

Morality looks to voluntary effort in the path of right conduct. Hence to observe its rules must be regarded as a point of duty; and it must be matter of happiness to do so. One must regard it to be his own peculiar business to act in the way recommended in this book, and must also take some sort of pleasure in doing so, or the conditions of effort and volition would necessarily fail. In other words, the true social problem in regard to morality is the reconcilement of Virtue with Happiness. Virtue is ordinarily connected with the dictates of Religion and happiness is the most powerful motive of man. And our problem would be solved if the duties of social life point to virtuous conduct; and if in such conduct a man may from his nature find reasonable promise of happiness.

To know, to practise and to feel for Duty.

Education requires that all men should know their moral duties, should practise them and should also look upon the observance of duty as a matter of sincere satisfaction to themselves. The duties to man have become quite imperative, even apart from duty to God. To compare these points with the requirements of Religion, it may be said that it should be matter of Faith, to know what the moral duties are: of Love, to be impelled with pleasure to those loving duties: and of Hope, that the habitual observance of duty is within the power of every man. Supposing then the social problem as to morality is solved, all these three elements must be rolled into one to constitute sound moral education. Hope is the Way; Truth is the object of Knowledge and Faith; and Life and Love are inseparable in morality.

Education and Rules of morality.

But all the elements which, as named above, constitute moral Education cannot be furnished by means of a book on morality. Such a book can at best mention what are the rules of morality. It may even show how hope for true merit could rest upon those rules. But to observe them in life, to be habitually fond of them, and to be hopeful about them in one's own heart: these two matters—to do the

work and to have the sentiment: these which are of far greater importance than knowledge of the rules: these are entirely confined to the exertions of the Individual himself. Between the truths of morality and the exertions of the learner, stand the services of the educationist: he may be the teacher at school: the guardian at home or the priest in charge of men's religion. Then there exists also the Public or the Society, whose opinion where a social basis of morality is being looked for, must also be counted upon in some shape and measure as an educational instrument. Criticism serves to unite moral sensibility with public chastisement. A treatise on morality might with benefit be availed of by any of these its human adjuncts: of itself a book is but an extremely poor resource at best.

Help to advanced students and teachers.

Situated as we are in British India, it is somewhat hard, for all that has been said before, to lay down definite rules of morality which would nowhere jar with any of the creeds in prevalence. But should the people of British India come to accept a uniform code of morals as complete guide of conduct, it would be possible in future to simplify such code in order to help the education of infants also. For the present, however, the rules founded on the conditions of society and the nature of man, must seek to be convincing (not controversial) and to be complete as a guide to conduct. The readers sought for, will therefore belong to the class who understand at least the leading abstract ideas already established in general literature. To go into the rudiments of the subject: to point out all the relations between society and the individual: to indicate how society is an organism; and where history affects it with the force of law, and where individual man is capable of modifying that law: or to dwell on natural law as connected with matter, mind and society, these questions so cognate to the subject have to be entirely passed over. For the rest, again, it must be left to teachers and guardians to point out to infants at each step of their hourly life what they ought or ought not to do, and how and why the duties have to be performed. Such

instructions, moreover, may have to be supplemented by inducements based on love and fear. And these inducements must be varied according to the peculiar circumstances of each learner. Very few indeed can be trusted with the police of the rod. No book on morality can ever take charge of such matters. Above all, however, there must be the teachable heart to learn morality, And that is a thing which not even guardians, teachers and priests can supply.

CHAPTER II. THE DATA AND PROBLEM OF MORALITY.

In three Sections: The Individual: The Society: Bond of Union between the two.

§ 1. The Individual.

Thought, feeling and activity.

Morality is more or less imperfect unless it springs from man's inner nature. The inner nature of man comprises three elements: thought, feeling and activity. Feeling is termed Instinct when it tends to action apart from conscious thought. When feeling evokes thought, and the thought is of the act which follows, then the inner state of the agent is called volition. There is also an inner activity of man governing equally his good and bad morals, *i. e.*, to say either his thought and feeling both, or his volition only. And for the purposes of this treatise, this internal activity is said to possess an independent place of its own in the mind. The word thought is used in its ordinary signification.

Goodness and badness.

Goodness and badness of action in point of morality is traceable to instinct first, and next to thought and volition, *i. e.* to thought binding feeling and action, and last of all it is traceable to that inner activity which manifests itself in constancy or inconstancy of purpose; and in the speed or slowness of the feeling or will in coming to outward action.

Goodness in the instincts is the hardest to reach by education. Self-help, however, must not despair of success even in this matter.

Instinct amenable to education.

The greatest reliance is, however, placed upon the services of intelligence and activity: Intelligence or thought in introspecting the particular feeling or instinct which is in activity at any moment; in judging of its goodness and badness according to principles previously imbibed, and in determining the particular Act by which the inner man will manifest himself in the outer world.

Morals chiefly connected with thought and volition.

[The above remarks have an obvious bearing upon a well-known psychological question: the one about free-will and necessity. That question is here avoided by making certain assumptions which are presented below in order to disarm criticism.

The free-will controversy.

1. Man has the power to accelerate or retard speed and frequency in the activity of his instincts and thus to modify the character of his outward action.

Modifying agency of man.

2. As a moral being and a responsible member of society every man is bound to have reasons for what he does or is going to do: has to answer for his conduct, to himself first of all and always; and to society as well whenever necessary.

Responsibility to Society.

3. One has to exercise, and rely on, his introspection, at least in so [illegible] required by the above mentioned assumptions.]

L[illegible] intros-pe[illegible]ion.

The activity of thought and [illegible]ling and consequently also its morality depend in [illegible] [illegible]mall measure upon habit. Frequency of any kind of th[illegible]ght, feeling or action, and the rapidity with which feeling and th[illegible]ht, volition and action follow each other are governed by hab[illegible] whatever other physiological or spiritual antecedents may be su[illegible]sed for the phenomena in question. According to Morality as [illegible]t is now regarded, one has to be sparing in adjudging goodness o[illegible] [illegible]adness to matters of habit and even of activity. But useful habits— [illegible]ose

Habit.

conducive to happiness and morality are of much consequence, even apart from the corresponding instincts or volition.

[In order to get reconciled with certain conflicts between the Hindu and the Christian Religion it may be mentioned that some of the requirements of pious life according to Hinduism have to be judged from their results as habitual conduct quite apart from the inner springs of the conduct in question.]

Analysis of mental functions.

The following analysis of eighteen functions constituting the inner nature of man is adopted for the purposes of this treatise. It is based upon the triple division of I. Instincts or Emotional functions, II. Intellectual functions and III. Activity of both of these, or Practical functions. Our problem is to discover what would satisfy the inner nature of man and generate voluntary effort, the discovery being subject to certain restrictions imposed by society and insisted on as duty. And we hope to solve this problem by showing that those same external restrictions emanate from and are reflected in the inner nature of man. Everything depends upon the facts about Man and Society. Morality is only the bond which as it unites the Man with Society, unites also facts about the Man himself. But the facts of Man's individual nature have first of all to be arranged in a way so as to disclose their bearings with the facts about Society. And the liberty of making the following analysis will be justified by how the social problem of morality comes to be solved by it.

I. Emotional Functions.

(Instincts.)

Personal Instincts.	Interest ...	Instincts of Preservation.	Of the Individual: Nutritive Instinct......	1
			Of the race or: Sexual Instinct...	2
			Desire of progeny..	3
		Instincts of Improvement	By Destruction: Military Instinct..	4
			By Construction: Industrial Instinct..	5
	Ambition...		Pride: Desire of Domination.........................	6
			Vanity: Desire of Approbation............................	7
Social Instincts.	Special......		Attachment or mutual regard between Equals........	8
			Veneration or voluntary regard for Superior.......	9
	General........		Benevolence or Universal love (Sympathy).......	10

II. Intellectual Functions.

Conception ...	With objective materials...	Synthetic, as relates to Beings.........	11
		Analytic, „ Events.........	12
	By means of subjective construction.	Comparison or Generalization.........	13
		Coordination or Systematization.....	14
Expression :..		Communication...........................	15

III. Practical Functions.

Activity of the Intellectual and Emotional functions in speed and change.	As to feeling: Courage, rashness hesitancy, cowardice &c................	16
	As to thinking: Prudence, thoughtlessness &c................................	17
Their Activity in constancy and uniformity.	Firmness, Perseverance or Fickleness......	18

Pleasure and Pain.

The foregoing analysis should be judged not so much with regard to simplicity and complexity of the mental phenomena as with regard to Man's relation to Society: the various kinds of action which proceeding from the individual man affect others around him, actions which in so doing give rise to pleasure and pain not on in

himself, but also in others. The Emotional functions aim at the gratifications indicated in the tabular view and also lead to pain when they are resisted or defeated in any way. The Intellectual functions come naturally between the emotional ones and the corresponding external action, and thus they affect man's happiness according to the emotions to which they are accessory. But occasionally there is a pleasure or pain even in abstract thinking; that however, may be conveniently attributed to the law of habit.

Habit.

Habit of every kind affords a certain pleasure or mental ease from its continuous play and a pain from its intermission. It not only affects all the first fifteen *i. e.* the emotional and intellectual functions, but has a further bearing upon the practical ones also. These last are peculiarly amenable to the effects of habit, although they may also be regarded as its source. A man may repeat acts of domination, destruction or any other by virtue of his natural perseverance &c.; and thus he may generate in himself a certain habit: but this very perseverance &c. may also be an object of self-directed habit. The action is identical in both cases; but in the one it is part of activity: an instance of the practical functions of perseverance courage, prudence or firmness; and in the other, it is habit of some emotional intellectual or practical function. In either case again, there may be pleasure or pain. But as in the case of intellectual pleasures, the most convenient [illegible] would be to connect the pleasures and pains of [illegible] ivity or pursuit only [illegible] ith the emotional functions and their [illegible] ied habits.

It is not only that H[illegible] it has to be viewed in relation to the origin and growth [illegible] he practical functions, and understood to carry certain plea[illegible] ures and pains of itself, but note must also be taken of one f[illegible] most law which governs it: a law which is closely allied to [illegible] ws of the science of physiology. This law is that use tends to [illegible] crease, and disuse to diminish, the strength of all our functions. [illegible] There is in our mental functions as in all phenomena a vari[illegible] e element along with the invariable relations of antecede[illegible] and sequence. That variable element is said to be one of

intensity and speed in regard to the succession of phenomena. Habit affects the intensity, speed, and recurrence of mental functions in the way mentioned above.

The social aspect.

A man's pleasure and pain as derived from his emotional functions or habitual conduct are, according to the analysis, to be next viewed as either personal or social *i. e.* as centered in himself or as relating to the pleasure or pain of others. They are indiscriminately termed Instincts, Desires, Affections &c. In the gratification of personal or self-regarding instincts, the man becomes unmindful of the pain of others; whereas when the pleasure and pain of others respectively give rise to pleasure and pain in one's self, the sympathetic feeling is called social or altruistic. The sympathetic pleasure or pain is equally with the case of self-regarding feelings, the man's own concern, but it is qualified by social conditions of the kind alluded to.

Self-regarding Instincts.

The self-regarding instincts are viewed as cravings connected with other people's adhesion to one's self or as devoid of such concern. In the former case they are termed *Ambition*, but in the latter, the cravings being still more concentrated in the self are termed *Interest.* Ambition craves for power and fame. Power working on other men's fear excites *Pride* in its possessor, and our desire for praise is... the name of *Vanity,* co-ordinated with pi... to constitute ambiti... and to show. the sort of concern which an ambitious man fee... in others. And self-interest is again sub-divided into regard ...r *Preservation* of self and *Improvement* of self. As interest pro...cts itself into others, in the shape of ambition; as ambition m...ts into social feeling by gradual suppression of its peculiar ...rsonal cravings, even so preservation of self, when it develop... into the instinct of selfish improvement, impinges on objects ...ing outside of self and more or less belonging to society and soci... matters. And this interest is felt either in *destroying* other men a... their belongings or in *constructing* things for one's self out of p... ...ns

and things in the outer world. Similarly also preservation is either of the race or of the individual's self alone. And race-preservation again is split into the *Sexual instinct* and the *Propagating instinct*; and in these three forms of self-preservation there is shown as well a gradual increase in the number of persons concerned as a progress from the lowest forms of organised existence—vegetal and animal. Lastly, self-preservation in its grossest form is presented as more self-seeking than the society of the primitive couple. It is called *Nutritive* instinct in order to indicate all its varied phases bearing upon the existence and fuller life of the individual.

Social Instincts.

In the analysis of social instincts, too, the same advance will be observed from narrower into larger human relations of an unselfish kind. Man spontaneously attaches himself to some other, either, from Affection or from Veneration, as also he seeks to attach others to himself by means of their opinion or fear. In affection or *Attachment* of the genuine kind again, there is on the one hand a relation of equality and on the other, one of mutual regard. But this mutual regard between affectionate persons is peculiar. In ambition, a man would selfishly seek the passive approbation or active subordination of others, and conversely the latter would either fear or resist the power of the superior or otherwise remain dissociated from him in conduct for all their praise. But in affection the requital or reciprocity occurs spontaneously: and when it does not, one-sided love dispenses with looking for it, and thus testifies the perfect disinterestedness of its typical condition. Hence too mutuality of affection is never a matter of self-interest. The true self-regarding analogue of affection is vanity, while the social analogues of pride and timorous subordination are respectively *Kindness* and *Veneration* or loyal obedience. But in affection as in veneration the action is the same as what proceeds from kindness, namely an effort to make others happy. And reverence, while it makes the inferior conscious of his own insignificance makes him also anxious to exercise his gratitude by making the superior happy in every way. He then anticipates the wishes of the venerated one;

and would do anything which he could conceive to be grateful to his feelings. Pride and vanity also may be seen to procure the happiness of the inferior and thus to secure their regard, but in these cases the motive is different and the results—the praise, service and fear—are consequently more or less uncertain. On the other hand, the practical manifestations of Affection and Reverence are the same as in Benevolence, except that benevolence is more general and less discriminative than the two others in the choice of its objects: Benevolence is universal for its regard to inferiors, superiors and equals, each and all of them. Hence too all the three altruistic instincts are virtually but different phases of one and the same impulse of Sympathy. And the pleasures or pains of altruistic kind admit of extension from the individual as center into ever widening spheres as far as universal sympathy.

Superior intensity of Egoism as compared to Altriusm.

It should not however be overlooked that with the gradual extension of the sphere of these emotive incidents the pleasures and pains, there is a gradual decrease in the intensity of the impulses and their gratifications. Particularly, the self-regarding instincts are so powerful that there is, as a rule no chance of their being superseded in actual life by the altruistic instincts. There have been cases, it is true, in which affection or sympathy has so far got the better even of the nutritive instinct as to make people die of starvation for instance, for the sake of some person other than self: a son, parent wife husband, friend or any other. But these cases are extraordinary; and they are further qualified by the self-abnegation in question being restricted to individual objects of sympathy, and to peculiar forms of beneficence. As a whole, the altruistic instincts succumb more or less to each of the self-regarding ones. And this is by no means undesirable for regulating the labours of altruism.

Application of the rule of Habit.

But the important practical question arising from the fact last mentioned is how to regulate our efforts at morality in view of our intense egoism. And the obvious answer is that we must [illegible] to cultivate as Habit what the rules of morality may direct us to

do. And intelligent habits are certainly better than mechanical ones. But do what we will habit will never override the natural preponderance of self-regard over sympathy. As the sequel will show, sympathy is the basis of morality. But there is nevertheless no danger of our habits having to oscillate between sympathy and any kind of self-regard. We can never go to excess with sympathy; and our efforts in that direction need not be divided with any egoistic aims. Egoism will always take care of itself.

I pass over the intellectual and practical functions as being of comparatively minor importance but more full of controversial matters.

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§ 2. THE SOCIETY.

Society an organism.

Society is an aggregate of human beings held together by certain relations, morality forming one most important element in those relations. Society like the individual is now recognised to possess a life and a growth of its own and to be governed by law like Life, Matter, Motion and Number.

The Family.

The simplest form of society is the Family composed of the married couple and such children as are held to or by the parents. The Hindu Joint-family presents features of more complex kind. They are allied to those larger organizations, viz. the village, caste, or community of four classes. But the conditions of family life in its simple form underlie those of the Hindu joint family.

Country.

Of other forms of society the most important one, for our purposes is the State, Country or Nation.

Larger groups.

Between different nations again there may be a bond which when secular is called international comity; and when it is of a higher kind it is their common Religion. To these we shall have rarely to refer.

Equals, Superiors and Inferiors.

In every form of society the individual members are related either as equals or as superiors and inferiors.

Society as a whole.

Society exists and grows. It does so as a whole *i. e.* quite apart from the facts that all men are animals and will ever remain human beings, and that every man is more or less the builder of his own character. Society exsits apart from its members, for every man is more or less a creature of the times, however much a man may do to mould his society. But the essential conditions of its existence could not be clearly understood until time and history had disclosed those of its growth. The two sorts of action are otherwise indicated by the qualities termed *solidarity* and *continuity* of society. It is by observing the continuity of society for generations after generations that we have now come to understand the true conditions of its compact existence in each generation *i. e.* its solidarity.

Solidarity and Continuity.

Solidarity and continuity of society are correlated to one another: the latter is purely a development of the former when each is of the genuine kind. The continuity of the society is concerned with changes in the condition of society. But the changes are wholesome only when consistent with certain conditions of permanence or compact existence. Progress is never worth the name if no continuity is traceable between the original and changed conditions of any particular society.

Progress.

So again no change deserves the name of Progress by which society loses its compactness and tends to break up within itself; as also, the compactness or solidarity of society, if it endures, can never fail to secure for the society and its members all the essentials of true Progress.

Love and Fear.

Society is known to be held together by Love or Fear: by voluntary or coerced union. But it is now obvious that in some way or other the union must grow to be voluntary or it will break and the continuity of the society will fail. It may be that the fear and the coercion would be unfelt and unnecessary, or it may be that kindness will

come into play and promote voluntary union. But in any case convergence must be the condition of solidarity.

Convergence.

This convergence affects all the three departments of human character: activity, opinion and sentiment. Solidarity has to reckon with all these elements; otherwise there is a discordance. Continuity or growth of society, as it heals such discordance, effects also an increase of convergence in each and all of these elements.

Government.

Social union is between equals and equals and superiors and inferiors. But convergent action is impossible without special organs to regulate activity *i. e.* without some form of Government of which the members are in concert and for which there has to be a further co-operation between the ruler and the ruled. Thus inequality of relations is a prominent feature of social life.

Social activity.
War: offensive, defensive and civil.

Government fails when there is civil war. Divergence tends to civil dissensions. War in general is either offensive or defensive. But civil war is wholly offensive. Aggressive war is calculated to subvert a society and is therefore as a rule obnoxious to social life and culpable. Defensive war seeks to maintain the compact life or solidarity of society and to promote its growth and continuity. Hence defensive war is always just and laudable.

War and industry.

The growth of society thus tends to diminish war. And with the decline of military activity, industrial activity comes more largely into play, as with the advance of industrial activity, destructive activity is more and more retarded. Again as social growth is towards industry from war, so also industrial co-operation advances from mutual struggle and divergence to voluntary convergence upon utilitarian basis. So much I should say for the nature and progress of social activity.

Social opinion.

In the sphere of thought, society subsists by a certain uniformity of opinion between its members; and its progress is towards more of definiteness, congruity permanence in the public opinion on all subjects. The

advance is from other opinions which are more vague or inconsistent, as oscillating between imagination and experience; more incongruous as regards different parts of man's experience; and which are more uncertain for their proneness to purposeless change. But a continuity between the past present, and future is indispensable to intellectual growth of society.

Public opinion.

Public opinion in fact constitutes for society, what the totality of a man's good sense does for the individual. The wonderful power of public opinion becomes intelligible only in the light of science.

Social sentiment.

In the sphere of sentiment, social growth develops the vital element of voluntary union. Now, leaving aside for purposes of this union, the obvious importance of the social feeling of attachment between equals, the growing convergence of superiors and inferiors would be best indicated by the maxim: Reverence of the weak for the strong: Devotion of the strong to the weak. The normal condition of collective feeling in society is betokened by its morality; and the growth of society in regard to sentiment or morality is of the utmost importance to the social organism.

Filiation of groups in regard to growth of society.

All these phases of social growth advance again gradually from the smaller group of the family to the next larger groups of the city, country or human race; a reverse course is abnormal and indicates some defect of solidarity *i. e.* some kind of moral disease. Between the conditions of Society and Man there is only a parallel at best. And the unit of society is not the individual but the family. Convergence between mere individuals and convergence between members of a family are variable in so far as the latter kind of convergence extends to activity, sentiment and opinion—all of them; whereas in such collective groups as an army, a commercial company, a literary or social club, the convergence of members is confined to special features of these three elements. The convergence of the city or nation must be modelled upon the convergence of the

family, and not upon that of a club or bureau, an army or a manufactory. True progress in the family is indispensable to lasting progress in the nation. Similarly what will be shown further on by a different line of argument, progress of the family and of the nation depends upon improved morality of the individual. When philanthropy apparently precedes or supersedes patriotism or domestic morality, or when patriotism supersedes domestic feeling, *i. e.* conjugal, filial, or parental love: there is reason to doubt the genuineness of some or all of the feelings supposed to be manifest in the pretentious cosmopolitan or patriot.

[Note.—It may be acknowledged at the outset that the whole of my argument is based upon the truth or assumption that convergence is the condition of social growth and existence both. The morality discussed later on for individual man is only a homologue of the same social condition. The truth in question is to be inferred from history as well as derived from ordinary experience. But no doubt there are things to be said on the opposite side of the question. All controversy however, is for obvious reasons avoided here. And after all, the converse doctrine about compromise between convergence and divergence in society is an instance of convergence only.]

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§ 3. Bond of Union between Individual and Society.

All for each and Each for all.

Society exists, and the individual man can never do without it. Therefore he must not seek to have done with it. What is good for the society must hence be acknowledged to be binding on the individual as Duty. Society would live and grow though the best of men died. It does not at all depend upon any one individual. But yet it cannot dispense with the services of *all* its individual constituents. The individual must submit to society as the superior: society as the superior must be devoted to the happiness of all. The normal character of man and the conditions of his happiness should be the chief concern of society. Hence the rule: All for each and Each for all. Society depends on mutual service: mutual service must therefore be the duty and motive of the individual man, and altruism the ultimate guide of his morality.

The disposition of any one to serve another, or all others, springs from several sources. First, voluntarily, or spontaneously from the well-doer; and secondly, without voluntary effort, in which case, the service becomes more or less servile.

Voluntary service altruistic. Compulsory service due to self-regard.

It has been shown in § 2, that social convergence tends to grow voluntary, otherwise growing divergence would ultimately end in civil war. An absolutely stationary condition, an everlasting compromise between divergence and convergence, is impracticable owing to the collective character of society, the spontaneity of the individual and the effects of Science and History, Knowledge and continuous Experience.

Where society is maintained through the varied action of self-regarding instincts in the individuals, the social relation tends to mutual struggle, discord and ultimate breach of social union. Where the altruistic instincts are in operation the result is an increased convergence or solidarity. Moreover the individual members of a society being altruistic, the society as a whole becomes similarly disposed to other societies.

Solidarity due to altruistic instincts.

Thus the principle of social solidarity no less than mutual service points to the altruistic instincts as the guide of moral conduct.

Hence altruistic Instincts should guide morality.

So again true peace of mind in the individual is best secured by his attempt to give to those instincts, as far as practicable, predominance over the self-regarding instincts.

Peace of mind also [illegible] thereby.

Illustration.—The foregoing observations are matter of experience: so much so, that like sweetness, light, sound and such other matters, the peace of mind alluded to, can hardly be explained by argument. The following considerations, however, may help to bring into focus the light of facts of a somewhat more tangible kind.

The analysis given before may for the best portion of [illegible] self-regarding instincts be paralleled in the following way with [illegible]at

have been regarded in European literature as six out of the seven capital sins of man.

Nutritive Instinct:	... ...	Gluttony
Sexual Instinct	... ...	Lust
Military Instinct	... ...	Anger
Industrial Instinct	... ...	Avarice
Pride	... ...	Envy
Vanity	... ...	Pride

The foregoing parallel omits only two patent questions: The Desire of Progeny and Sloth. But Sloth, being obviously opposed to Industry and Avarice, must be brought under some other name in order to maintain the logic of the analysis. I would treat it as a form of the Nutritive Instinct. On the other hand Desire of Progeny is clearly a form of the sexual instinct and was overlooked in the list of capital sins obviously from immaturity of public opinion on the question of population.

Now looking to these six capital sins, as an ancient and exhaustive analysis, it would be easy to note their mutual conflict or divergence in several ways. In other words, we may thus arrive at the rule which is otherwise derivable from social solidarity, that convergence is the essence, as divergence is the bane, of morality and society both. If a man is actuated by all these sins or instincts, and all equally and at one and the same moment, the several forms of self-gratification becomes physically impossible. If you omit the element—simultaneous gratification, and insist upon equal gratification but at different times, then the requisite interruption might jar with any impulse which happened to sway at the preceding moment. Equality and simultaneity being out of the question, a certain order for unequal gratification might be proposed. Now, what may be thus proposed for one man, would apply also to some or all other men. And then two men simultaneously actuated by the same propensity would collide and give rise to fresh troubles. In each of these cases there would thus be disturbance of mental peace and happi-

ness and powerful occasion for mutual struggle; and there would be little or no room for the gratification of the altruistic instincts, such as, Benevolence or voluntary Obedience. On the other hand the altruistic instincts when acting as between different individuals are open to unresisted gratification, and as within the mind of the same individual they also leave fair room for moderate gratification of the self-regarding instincts. For instance: Gluttony and Lust however obnoxious when purely self-regarding are in their moderate forms respectively, of preservation of the individual, and that of the race, allowed to be gratified, if only for preserving the lives or race of benevolent, obedient or affectionate men. Moreover a man actuated by higher moral feelings however anxious to restrain his own lower appetites is most forgiving to others who are subject to those appetites, and there is in such cases far less strife than would happen if for instance, Benevolence were subordinated to Gluttony as a rule of morality. But Anger and Avarice when subordinated to Benevolence might be reasonably gratified as springs of industry and frugality, for resistance to or protection from harm; and so on.

Unity of the three altruistic instincts.

Turning next to the three several, altruistic instincts, it appears that in each case, the desire is to gratify persons other than one's self. So that although the mental attitude is slightly varied when looking to an equal, a superior or an inferior, yet the good and happiness of others is a common element in them all; and thus they have been justly grouped under one same head of sympathetic spirit.

[Note. For the destructive, and therefore socially fatal tendencies of "the works of the Flesh" and for the unity of "the fruit of the Spirit" upon which two facts the bond of union between society and the individual is here sought to be founded, the Christian will refer to St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians Ch. IV. verses 13-26. And if the universal experience about the binding influence of charity on society requires to be coroborated by authority, the Christian and the Hindu may compare Ch. XIII of St. Paul's 1st Epistle to the Corinthians with a Sanskrit verse such as *paropakararartham yo jivati sa jivati* He lives that lives to do good to others. Kasi Khanda Ch. 47, verse 36.]

Utility.

It should be noticed that the bond of moral union between the Individual and Society which is suggested above in the shape of charity, is generally consistent with the requirements of the doctrine of Utility, which is the only other important principle offered by philosophers to supplement the religious sources of morality. Utility lays down as rule of morality and motive of conduct, the greatest happiness of the greatest number; and after all, benevolence or altruism seeks nothing short of it. There is only one exception, *i. e.* where the special forms of sympathy, namely, personal attachment or reverence happen to give a certain priority of claim to the happiness of the family group and to the happiness of smaller and nearer ones over that of larger and remoter groups. In these cases the happiness of the greatest number may apparently jar with the claims of a wife, a son or a parent and with those of the family or even the nation. But we have also to bear in mind, the correction required for the dogma of utility, I mean the one about the quality or intensity of happiness which has to be consulted. Though the language of the dogma may involve a wrong inference, the reasoning about utility does not certainly point to the conclusion that one should sacrifice the life of one such person as a wife or husband, a father or son to save the life of any half-a-dozen people who may be only fellow-citizens, countrymen or human beings. For such cases the quality of happiness within the inner and smaller group as determined by qualified experience, is held to [illegible] its quantity as denoted by the number of happy men belonging to the larger groups. Hence there is no essential difference between utility and altruism. Utility in fact only denotes the practical test, Altruism the social test, and Benevolence the moral test of one same line of conduct.

Spencer's doctrine of compromise.

There is a third principle of morality, which has been called a compromise between Egoism and Altruism. But if closely examined its result will prove to be same with the rule of morality, uniformly subordinated to altruism. Only there would be two important

defects. The rule of compromise would often leave us uncertain about the relative importance of egoism and altruism in any juncture of circumstances. The suspension of judgment thus required, may be a very good intellectual exercise, but for a rule of morality we are in quest of a less variable guide. In the second place, the practical application of the rule of morality however determined, must be sought for in the training of our habits. And to subordinate our natural impulse, sympathy, habitually to the complicated intellectual process required by the rule of compromise, would seriously affect the intensity and speed of the emotional functions.

Altruistic unity.

Thus the true bond of union between individual and society is the instinct of sympathy. It is by the play of this instinct that the well-being of society can be ensured conjointly with the happiness of the individual. And hence morality should seek to point out the requirements of that one constant principle under the varied circumstances of life and society. All our egoistic instincts should be looked after for control by the altruistic principle. At each step of our life we must look for the altruistic aspect of our contemplated acts and try to yield our conflicting egoism to the definite call of altruism. And we ought to do so with all our heart, and all our good sense and all our energy.

CHAP. III.

THE NUTRITIVE INSTINCT. (1)

General remarks.

The data for laying down the rules of moral conduct as previously discussed amount to the following principles :

1. The altruistic instincts should have priority over the self-regarding ones in all our conduct.

2. In spite of all our efforts to the contrary we must be prepared to find the self-regarding instincts more or less predominant.

3. A single-minded and persevering effort to form habits marked by preference of the altruistic instincts and sympathetic conduct is the guiding principle of morality.

Our thought and activity should both be controlled in the manner mentioned above, as well as our different emotional functions. Thought must point out the moral and immoral bearings of each feeling and action: it must be stimulated in the cause of morality and also restrained for the same purpose. Action must keep us from barren sentimentalism, and help on to form a second nature of sound Habits. The maxim is, the Head must be servant of the Heart, not its slave. The heart or sympathetic emotion rules, the head or intelligence ministers to it, and activity completes the work.

We shall now proceed to consider the mental functions separately and try to lay down the line between morality and immorality in respect of each. It will be observed that the narrowest personal instincts have often a social side; and moral conduct in regard to them will consist in advancing the social ends of life, while permitting ourselves a measure of personal gratification. We begin with the first of them, the Nutritive instinct. The expression covers a variety of self-regarding conduct which will be considered below in three several heads. As a whole this instinct stands at the top of our vicious propensities and too much care can never be bestowed upon its moral regulation.

The impulse as an end and as a means.

The self-regard which characterises the personal [illegible] it has two general bearings: (1) The self-regard may be an end in itself. And then the quality of the emotion would admit of degrees; it would admit of the inquiry how frequently and on each occasion how intensely the gratification of the impulse was desired. (2) The self-regard may also be only a means to other ends, those other ends being either altruistic or self-seeking. And then the moral character of the means will be determined by that of the end, as also th character of the latter will be from its position in the tabular analysis given before. But these two bearings are really

allied, for the question of apparent moderateness or immoderateness in an instinct depends generally on its connection with ulterior ends.

No doubt a man may be more prone to anger than to gluttony. There may also be natural differences as between a greedy and an angry man. But in the majority of cases the more powerful impulse makes an instrument of the less powerful one or the converse case occurs. Gluttony excites anger for the sake of the eating. The angry man would be the worse for his anger if his violence vented itself in gluttony or lust rather than in avarice or in pure destruction even. Thus the remoteness of the ulterior ends as compared to benevolence and the requirements of society, must determine the morality of each impulse.

Moderation.

What is called moderation signifies not only a variation in the intensity of an instinct, but suggests also the help of allied impulses as means to that variation.

Eat to Live, not Live to Eat.

The most prominent principle of morality in regard to the Nutritive instinct is summed up in the maxim *Eat to Live, do not Live to Eat.* Only the word *Eat* should be changed to suit the conditions of each case. For with this change the maxim beautifully suggests that we should endeavour to moderate all the varied forms of this terrible instinct by calling into aid the more comprehensive end, namely that of Life as a whole.

(a) *Food, Drink and Physical comforts.*

Violent outbreaks of hunger, how repressed by civilization.

The Nutritive instinct presents itself as the most violent of all human impulses in Hunger and Thirst. Their real nature however is not perceived except on occasions of scarcity or famine. These calamities have grown rare with the progress of society; and civilization has helped largely to temper the natural violence of these instincts. The regularity imposed by custom in regard

to the time and number of our meals is another instance of wholesome social influence. And the toleration shown by society to this regularity is a third instance of the same kind. We are often as brutish as the worst glutton over our everyday meals and in our expectancy as to their prescribed hours. People do not repress such cravings by punishment or censure. They are supposed to understand and sympathise with us in the weakness and never stand in the way of any body's hours of refreshment. But the craving is not the less beastly, and it should not be disguised by the glory of punctuality. The tolerant action of society is not to carry a commendation.

"Bridle thy appetite."

Indeed the desire for food and drink no less than other appetites requires our constant effort at repression. "Bridle Gluttony," says Thomas á Kempis, "and thou wilt the more easily bridle all inclinations of the flesh." And the foremost rule of morality is to exert one's self against this perrennial source of temptation; taking care that as one advances in his self-control in food and drink, he should call up for similar repression also the other cravings to which he is subject. Nay, our self-control in this respect is fit to be made the type of all our moderation.

Epicureanism.

The violence of the appetite is shown not only in the quantities of food taken but also in respect of its quality and variety; and self-control must be directed to all these matters. But it is to be hoped that any detailed examination of Epicureanism is not necessary.

Intoxicants.

A Hindu is told from his infancy almost, that all desires indicate a sort of inebriety; consequently the objection to intoxicating substances, needs only to be mentioned to suggest that they should be sedulously avoided from motives of morality. The Hindu argument against inebriety is deemed sufficient, because it points out the evil of all conflict between the inebriating impulse and any principle of [illegible] altruistic or other, which may be adopted to regulate our

conduct. The moral tradition in question as well as its logic are of the utmost value. To the Mahomedan the religious objection to intoxicating liquors is perhaps still more imperative than to some of the Hindu sects. But the objection should be extended to all intoxicants. There is however a plea raised in favor of one class of intoxicants, on grounds such as, protection from cold, stimulus to activity or good fellowship, and finally hygeinic and medicinal purposes. But the climatic plea is unsuited to India; activity from the artificial stimulus does not last; it was never needed in one most active phase of human history—the Saracenic predominance; and good fellowship over the bottle, if it is not counterbalanced by violent drunken brawls, is certainly hollow so far as sober social union is in requisition. As for the hygeinic purposes, when honest they serve only to raise the question of fact already noticed, *viz.*, whether the eating, drinking and smoking are not at the moment, ends in themselves proposed by and for the man himself. If self-seeking, the desire would stand condemned; if intended for health, the support of medical advice would be needed.

Vows: Subordination to a mentor.

The worst drunkard will find it easy to get out of his habit (if it is duly hated) by calling in the aid of some other control powerful enough to cope with his passion. He should place himself loyally under the subordination of some one else. Vows of temperance are of serv[illegible]ere vows happen to be held sacred. But the sanctity of a friend's direction ought obviously to be of wider efficacy. As a rule when men with seeming pitiableness plead that they have become "slaves" to the vice, they seldom think or mean that their so-called "slavery" might be removed, if a human and friendly mentor would take the place of his drink-craving and become his guide and master at table. The truth is the demoralization of this self-indulgence gains over one's judgment so far that ultimately all voluntary effort at self-improvement becomes impossible; and the self-delusive plea of despondency means only that morality is being further [illegible]ut

out, with whatever of persevering imprudence or rashness, the unmanned creature happens to be then capable of.

Tobacco.

It may be said that the rule of suppressing all self-indulgence in regard to intoxicants would overshoot its mark by being applied to tobacco. But the logical contradiction between self-control and addiction to intoxicants is too real; and I am not prepared to say that the wide prevalence of the use of tobacco is sufficient to disprove the soundness of the moral rule about egoism and self-control. Indeed the craving for tobacco for the very moderateness of its intensity, affords a most eligible opening for the exercise of self-control. And what is true of this comparatively less attractive pleasure applies with greater force to all pleasures of the table, in order to draw the line for moral cultûre as between the delicacies which are not tempting and those which are. Since the latter are fit to be more stoutly resisted as temptations, the plea for tobacco becomes the less tenable as it is the more strongly urged from within. Tobacco is so tolerated because the consequences of its use upon society are apparently insignificant. Bût since repression of self-indulgence is the moral instrument of social well-being, this tolerance of society is no guide to the rule of morality.

Physical comforts to be balanced by altruism.

Food and drink are not the only matters pursued by self-indulgence in and for the individual. Protection from starvation is needful; but it unconsciously leads to Epicureanism. Even so, privations due to inclemencies of the weather, climate, and like other incidents call for a certain amount of physical comforts, because they are legitimate and instrumental to a life of morality. But as these comforts grow, whatever self-regard was a motive or accessory to their indulgence also grows with them. This should be repressed. What are luxuries to some, may indeed be necessities to others. But a certain compensation is necessary. Civilization as evidenced by keener sense of comforts ought to be borne out also by a proportionate increase in moral sensitiveness. And unless this was the case there would be reason to doubt whether a so-called civilization

was moving society in forward or backward direction. Happiness is a relative term; and more depends upon its quality than upon its quantity as they are called. Now, good quality in happiness is really indistingushable from morality. The problem of life as already mentioned is to reconcile virtue with happiness. And the happiness associated with civilization, or in other words, with superior standards of comfort prevailing in any spheres of society may not be rightly estimated without reference to the intensity and constancy of sympathy and mutual well-doing prevailing in those spheres. It thus becomes a point of morality to beware that the greater the extent of physical comfort which is needed by an individual in comparison to any class of men, the greater may be his altruism as compared to that class of men. Physical comforts are valuable in so far as they set free people's time and energy which would otherwise be occupied with sustaining their life. But the social end of morality requires that the leisure thus obtained—and all leisure is provided by society—should be justified by occupation serviceable to society. And hence it is not without reason that poets and philosophers have been so profuse in their condemnation of luxury and luxurious men. Political economy in commending industry and art does not propose to pamper any sort of self-indulgence.

(*b.*) *Sloth.*

[illegible] glutton, the epicure and the voluptuary are actively bent upon personal gratifications, the slothful man is no less vicious in his inactive parasitic existence. His peculiarity is not only that he does not work as much as others do and as much he himself could in order to keep his own body and soul together, but that he deliberately foregoes the exertion, facing whatever privations follow in consequence, all within his own knowledge. It is by far the most dangerous form of selfishness so far as the question of education is concerned; so much so that an increased self-regard for physical comforts might be serviceable merely to get people out of this vice. However, as

the inactivity of this class of men saves society from direct molestation, their immorality ought to be held lighter than that of the glutton and the epicure.

Communistic indolence.

It may be incidentally mentioned that the question has a special bearing upon the life of the Hindu. The joint-family system, the village communities, and even the caste-system of India seem to be governed by conditions which are allied to those of the communists and socialists of the West. But the perversely slothful, those who deliberately omit to work, would be actively sought out and ejected from Western communities, whereas in the East like precautions on the part of society are conspicuous by their absence. For aught that is known, this fact rather than active individuality may have led to the development of private property in Hindu society, thus presenting us with various anomalous conditions of private property and communism. Clearer ideas than what now exist might serve to mitigate our supineness.

Sleep.

Hinduism recommends, and I think rightly recommends, as part of moral culture a power to resist sleep. The requirement taxes in no small measure a man's self-control over his energies. And society has always declared itself as much against the sleepy sluggard, as in favor of the vigilant watch who has the strength of will to keep awake when nature itself gets tired and secures this most indispensable recreation.

Physical exercise.

As intellectual and devotional exercises are requisite if only for high culture in intelligence and sentiments, it would not be hard to recognise a moral virtue also in physical exercise. Physical exercise is only an art of preserving one's life and health, which are themselves so indispensable to the sympathetic instinct. And it is also needful as well to repress our normal cravings for comfort and indolence, as to extend our powers of endurance. And it is barely necessary to observe that a capacity for physical exercise renders a man ser-

viceable to society in so far as it renders him an efficient member thereof. Only athletic exercises for sport or use should never be confounded with acrobatic performances, which are at times positively noxious.

As a rule man left to himself does attain sufficient self-control to surmount in some measure his inborn sluggishness. And he exerts himself not only for his own preservation but also for that of his family. The invincible egoism of the nutritive instinct is thus transformed unconsciously into labor of more or less altruistic kind. And every addition to that capacity by such means as physical exercise eventually leads to general welfare. Hence physical exercise comes to have a moral worth of its own, though only for its bearing upon social welfare.

(c.) *Hygiene.*

Health and sacrifice of health.

Regard for one's own health *i. e.* physical health fairly includes the rule about physical exercise. Nay, the question of health presents a beautiful test of the whole law of morality. Health which literally means the condition of the whole man is in fact deeply appreciated by all though moral health is far more neglected than physical health. Physical health however, should be appreciated only for its utility in making the individual useful to society. While men condemn suicide without qualification, they also praise that moderate form of suicide which occurs as sacrifice of health, for the good of others. But neglect of health is almost as much culpable as suicide, when carried to the extreme suicidal extent, whether for sloth or self-indulgence or for ordinary social, political or domestic requirements.

Cleanliness.

Even if regard for physical exercise and yearning for health may occasionally have a selfish-side, there is absolutely no question that cleanliness is a genuine and a most important virtue, though it is obviously founded upon self-regard. If any austere aberrations of religious fervor do at times lead to disregard of cleanliness, it is no

true so far as we are aware, that the fact is not really traceable to religious tenets with which such austerity may be erroneously connected. " Cleanliness" says the proverb, ' is next to godliness," and the saying of a modern philosopher is equally true that it forms " the first step in civilization." But I fear, it requires to be pointed out that the taint of selfishness becomes very marked when cleanliness is, as at times it is absurdly made, a despicable plea for foppish finery or display. The moral value of cleanliness entirely depends upon the fact that it is indispensable to life and health both of the man himself and of all his surroundings.

CHAP. IV.

THE SEXUAL INSTINCT. (2.)

Premature development of the Instinct.

The subjects of this chapter and the next come under the general name Instincts of Preservation of the Race. And the object indicated by that name has an obvious social aspect. While in the case of the nutritive instinct, preservation of the individual is never lost sight of in the diverse purposes of one's self, a regard for the race clearly looks to human beings other than the self. But nevertheless the sexual instinct is extremely self-seeking in its character and is justly looked upon as the source of one of man's foremost vices. As compared to hunger and wrath, the subject of this chapter has this peculiarity, that less than the first but more than the second, it is closely connected with man's physical rather than his mental condition. The occasions for anger grow with the age of the child and his intelligence, but hunger is so constant in its demands that it never bears an endless repression. Nay too much repression of hunger would kill the mortal through starvation. Lust and procreation though brutishly physical are capable of complete suppression in man and still more in woman. And apart from marriage, such complete suppression is the condition of ial purity in the moral character of man and woman both. The

sexual instinct however, begins to grow at an age when preservation of the race is out of the question, and when it may not be argued out like anger or the still less unsocial instincts. Puerile intelligence is too immature to catch the varied bearings of the question, but it is sufficiently active to unconsciously nourish the noxious power even if repression happened to be its object. This noxious activity like certain cerebral actions of the animal organisation is a decided symptom of weakness. And the weakness thus caused by imagination may remain or develop despite the growth of the child into the man.

Social restrictions upon discussion of the subject.

It is therefore not only all impurity is vicious but it is also more or less venturesome to try to guide immature intelligence towards sound education or repression of the instinct in question. Society has set its face against such attempts. The subject is prohibited from polite conversation; and the injunction has been wisely made all the more stringent in the case of children and women. The subject therefore has to be left to the teacher and the domestic guardian to be thought out and arranged for, in connection with the pressing and peculiar necessities of each concrete case. I cannot do more than offer some general considerations.

Prevention better than cure.

The first requisite in regard to this instinct is to bear in mind that the maxim—prevention is better than cure—applies to it with peculiar force for the reason explained above. This rule applies not only in the case of children as individuals, but also in that of society. A vice becomes all the more noxious when people congregate together to indulge in it. And hence it is wise of society to hold up its finger against prurient conversation generally and also particularly where woman is present.

The sex-relation as a whole.

As the question comes distinctly within the range of prevention of immorality, it may be observed that there are two ways of preventing a collective body from running into courses opposed to the ends of society or morality. One is to allow each individual the liberty of imposing a check upon any of his fellows within the same group

And the other course is to recognize a privilege in one section of the group or society to oversee the conduct of another section, in some sort of gradation, so that each section may help to impose its check upon another in collective form, by reason of the organisation and upon the basis of what is called a hierarchy. But after all both these means—individual effort and rule of organisation, equality and hierarchy—have to be availed of in the affairs of life. Hence if pruriency is treated as a graver fault in woman than in man, it is not to be inferred that there is any difference in the rule of morality for either, but that the custom is due to and upheld by important principles of social organization. There is first of all the necessity to differentiate into groups all human beings, who are admittedly more or less impure, for purposes of mutual check. Concerted vice is a greater evil than the immorality of a single individual; and an admixture of the sexes is all the more dangerous in regard to the vice under consideration. Then there is the question that if classes have to be differentiated for purposes of example and censure, in regard to purity of mind, the higher degree of purity must be associated with the class whose distractions are the fewer in the coarse bread-winning avocations of life and society.

The question of subjection of woman and woman's rights—which is now a matter of controversy only in Europe—has such obvious tendency to a revolution of rules of morality that at least for the present and for the European connections of this Asiatic country, it should be more or less avoided. It would be simply absurd to think of a moral code which might suit the women of India, when their position in society came to be like that of their European sisters. But it is sad to find that some people recommend the foreign modes of European life to be introduced into Indian Society now, when in point of fact Europeans and Indians are known never to mix in social life in this country. Morality may not be rendered independent of Society and Religion both.

Upon the hierarchical principle then, woman's morality may fitly be required to be raised to a higher level than man's, even

as man's responsibility to work out all morality practically in the wide world may be raised above that of the woman. To put the two classes on a level in both respects—activity and sentiment—would only tend to unsettle the sense of responsibility of each, in their mutual relations as individual men and women. The sphere of sentiment and that of activity however inseparable in the individual, must be specially assigned to separate groups in society for more exalted culture. The existing order of this social arrangement is really due to physical disabilities occasioned by maternity. And the novel opinion announced to deny the superior responsibility reposed in woman, in respect of moral sentiment, is due to the fact that with the advance of human civilization, the preservation of the race has ceased to be the great public concern that it used to be in the infancy of man's social existence. It is no longer a glory or an evidence of altruism as once it must have been, to have a house full of children. Consequently woman's special function to form the family and uphold domestic morality has come to be less thought of now than before. And with this change, her practical function *i. e.* the prime bread-winning requisite of life, has also come to be magnified—thus unsettling all time-honored restrictions imposed upon the various departments of life. But when woman comes to understand the true social and moral bearings of the instincts of Race-preservation, the wisdom of ages will be all the more firmly upheld by herself, for a more nice observance of the rules of sexual life and morality.

Marriage in relation to debauchery generally.

Pursuing the line of argument faintly sketched above, the purposes of preventing sexual excess and violence would appear to be best subserved by marriage and monogamy. But it should be understood that the restrictions imposed by law upon adultery are not only due to the legal obligations of Marriage, but that both moral and legal incidents of the conjugal relation are indispensable to prevent in society the violent consequences of

debauchery in all its forms. The law simply follows up the moral requirement, and in its own way regulates the course of society.

Marriage as constituting the social unit.

On the other hand Marriage has a deeper purpose than mere prevention of debauchery or licentiousness. It constitutes the family, thus presenting a type of human organization which is the simplest and most concentrated form of society. The union of two persons in marriage is thus the unit of society not only for their sexes and the minimum number united, but also because society is an organization composed, not of individuals, but of families. And the harmony of thought, feeling and activity which is so indispensable to individual well-being and also the ideal of social progress is altogether an essential condition of domestic life. The man or woman who has any character must think, feel and act with consistency. The Nation can never do better than to try to approach the ideal of a happy Family. The family proves that the internal harmony which characterises the individual has a further outer existence in collective life. Marriage enjoins a rule against infidelity and adultery, not only for a private and mutual arrangement but also in order to establish the model and test of social and personal harmony. Marriage then has a social purpose, whatever may be the rule of morality as regards the two instincts of race-preservation. A single life may be unavoidable or desirable in exceptional cases, but it is obviously incomplete for its unsocial character. At the same time the rule of fidelity to the nuptial bed has an independent value besides that of self-control in respect of venery and fornication. That rule touches other conditions of social existence than the requirements of sexual virtue. There is also valid reason why this tie of domestic society has been founded upon solemn vows about the sexual instinct.

Ends of conjugal union.

Before however we can pass on to the immorality of incontinence we must go back for a moment to recall that the sexual instinct is only one step removed from the self-regard which characterises the nutritive instinct. The advance, however, is decidedly to

wards a social connection. Only the more recondite conditions of the union whether legally contracted or not, are apt to be overlooked in the violence of the self-regard which serves to call the united life forth. It is not true and very much a make-belief that the sexes seek each other's society and fall into selfish sexual gratification in consequence. It is necessary to understand that the impulse is sexual first and social afterwards; and that the sexual impulse taken by itself is grossly selfish. Thus the principle of morality is (1) to subordinate the conjugal union to the ends of society at large and (2) to repress the sexual instinct by calling into aid those other ends of conjugal life—the pure family life in short—which may be logically associated with the relation in question.

Further ends: Altruism, chastity and progeny.

In the infancy of human society, the rearing of children must have been wisely hit upon, among other reasons, to mitigate the selfish carnality of conjugal life. Since then, we have got to supplement that wisdom also in other ways. But before we can do so, we must distinguish between the two instincts of race-preservation, and moreover understand the self-seeking excesses of each. Sexual gratification is not only very ignoble but is as a rule tainted by self-regard even as between the pair. This brutality must be kept down for purposes of morality though it lies beyond the reach even of the consort's censure. But this first rule as to repression of the sexual instinct, obviously but gradually points to a second, viz., the observance of a chaste condition, prolonged more or less, according to one's power of self-control. And it is between these two limits that we should put the question of having children to rear and educate for the happiness of the couple no less than for the benefit of society. This however will form the subject of the next chapter.

Incontinence.

Let us now revert to the question of continence. It is directly connected on one hand with the principle of sexual purity in human life, and on the other, with rules of temporary or permanent chastity self-imposed by the

married couple, and it is a rule of this sort which forms the foremost vow of fidelity in the marriage relation. The fact ought to be studied with care, when men venture to call in question the wisdom of the past in having prescribed the bonds of marriage. The wisdom is genuine, though it may have served out its purpose by being crystallized into mere custom.

Incontinence in fact carries with it not only violation of a law imposed by society, breach of a solemn promise made to another, abandonment of a vow consecrated by the wisdom of ages and a reckless self-indulgence of grossest kind, but it argues also culpable inappreciation of the true logic of conjugal fidelity. Society whether domestic or other rests upon mutual confidence, and every little disturbance of that confidence more or less endangers its continuance. But the breach becomes complete when the confidence is knowingly destroyed by one in whom it has been solemnly reposed, and reposed for such grave purposes. Incontinence not only signifies a deliberate breach of confidence of this kind, but also an act which can never occur without a voluntary abrogation of the marriage vow. Indeed, the fact presents an unmistakeable test of how poor the expectations are, that in other matters faith would be kept by the guilty person with his or her consort. In married life it is indispensable to understand when the essential fiduciary relation becomes extinct, and all expectation of help or service having to be given up in consequence, each party has to be prepared for war, or for an unrequited fidelity and allegiance which is above the range of any ordinary attachment between equals.

Divorce Life-long chastity.

Society however cannot permit of protracted war in the domestic circle, and after the experience obtained doubts that a similar promise of fidelity can be safely made to another by the guilty party. One who has failed to keep his vow may not be trusted to pledge his troth again. The sinner may fancy that the guilt was caused inadvertently, but the fact remains that the continuity of the faith was broken voluntarily, however long or short might be the

aberration. The subsequent course is clear. The vow remains and it should be resumed though shorn of the sweetness which originally attended it by reason of reciprocity. A life-long chastity is the only course open to one who claims to have made no more than a serious mistake. And society consequently intervenes with remedies of sorts, such as judicial separation, divorce or any other indefinite arrangements. But it is certainly beyond the sphere of altruistic conduct to call for a social sanction to what dissolution of domestic relation must have already occurred, in short to obtain the divorce *in order* to reopen the path to married life. The rule of moral duty on each side then must be governed by the altruistic principle upon which all morality has been founded. The party who has broken the marriage vow has to judge whether the ground lost by infidelity may be recovered and what is to be done if he or she fails to be taken into confidence again and fails for such powerful reasons.

Re-union.

If by any renewed integrity, the confidence once lost happens to be recovered after a time, the gain ought to be welcome to all. But the purity of character which, in marriage, has to be presumed in man and woman as a rule, could in the case of such re-union be only a matter of exceptional trust and must therefore require exceptional proof to be recognised. Mistrust in such cases may not be resented as unjustifiable.

The sufferer.

For the party who is wronged the case is of course only one of miscalculation as to the character of the frail one. But the miscalculation is of a kind which ought to make him doubt his power of judgment, if his judgment was duly exercised at first. On the other hand his own vow may have been made unconditionally. It is of the essence of domestic, if not of all society, that a constant watch over each other's good faith should not be called for. So that if one party has failed to keep his or her vow, it does not necessarily amount to a release in respect of the other's own vow. And the singleness thus enforced would have to be borne as a just

return for the erroneous judgment originally made. Whoever finds it so easy to get released from one's vow as to seek a new home after such dissolution of an old one, would betray a very poor notion of the home, which he or she originally helped to construct.

Remarriage after divorce.

At the same time it must be acknowledged that society cannot impose the condition that when infidelity leads to domestic divorcement, the sufferer must betake to the same single and chaste life which may well be commended to the wrongdoer. It is in fact a question of morality alone in the case of the sufferer, but in the other party's case the check is required also for society against recurrence of the misconduct. And remarriage, though it might be better to avoid it on moral grounds, must be permitted by society, where the marriage vow has been honestly kept, and where enforced singleness might become so hard to observe after divorce, that divorcement may not be resorted to even when justly needed.

The question of divorce might be passed over so far as certain sections of the Hindu and Christian communities are concerned. But many seem to be unconscious of the fact that by its legal bearings the question is only correlated to remarriage in monogamous society. The error can be rectified only by a careful study of the deep-seated moral conditions of conjugal life.

Polygamy: Widowhood: Premature marriage.

The rule of morality as hitherto discussed—against debauchery, and in favor of marriage: against incontinence and in favor of chastity and mutual regard: against carnal enjoyment and in favor of the social and altruistic bearings of conjugal life will, it is to be hoped, be sufficient to point out the importance of Monogamy, and of conjugal fidelity sustained till death, not of the consort, but of one's self. The moral principle is perfectly clear and may not be disturbed by any latitude permitted in law to suit various standards of domestic society. Polygamy affords room for a laxity of this kind in Hindu and Mahomedan societies. Again in some cases the social restrictions against

remarriage of widows, widowers, and divorced persons, are of such varied character that room is afforded to justify many kinds of immoral conduct. And lastly it should be remembered that infant marriage begets noxious facilities for laxity in the culture of chastity. But in all these social circumstances, the rule of morality stands unshaken and applies unmistakeably to all sorts of cases. The reasoning is plain, neither social nor legal laxity can divert or pervert the purposes of the man who loves morality and moral conduct for its own sake.

Marriage in relation to other feelings,

Before passing on to the next chapter we have to stay for a few words. The question of marriage was taken up in connection with the discipline of the sexual instinct; but in fact the institution affords suitable training for the whole of human character. Indeed we might discuss the constitution of the family along with each of our mental functions and in every succeeding chapter of this book. To avoid this prolixity I offer the following remarks with reference to feelings other than the sexual one.

to the Egoistic ones: the Nutritive instinct,

Marriage helps to discipline the nutritive instinct to such an extraordinary extent, that the cases are simply abnormal where as between man and wife, either would not deny one's self any sort of comfort or necessity to provide the same to or on account of the other. But the truth comes home still more pointedly perhaps, in the sacrifices of parents for their legitimate children.

to defensive war, industry and co-operation.

Again as between the two instincts—military and industrial, marriage serves to stimulate the latter, thus leading to due repression of the former. So again, nothing tends so much to sustain the ardour for just and defensive war as the claims of one's wife and children for protection against the conquering marauder or revolutionist.

But it is in the sphere of industry that the Home offers a field as wide as the Country or the world itself, for the development of human civilization. Avarice is transformed into frugality by means of marriage in a way, which literally transcends even the

proverbial vigor and rapidity of thought. Because here, the social or domestic feeling comes into play and works in complete though unconscious possession of the wisdom of ages; and co-operation advances in all directions ennobled by the altruistic bonds of marriage.

Pride and Vanity.

Next, as to the instinct of Pride, marriage has the highest influence in transforming domination into benevolence and subordination into loyal obedience. The case is probably less clear for marriage, in regard to moral culture of the desire of approbation. Vanity however, when gratified in marriage, excites the least offensive form of antagonism in outside people—humour. But for all the shortcomings of the mutual admiration above alluded to, each may be justly glad to find one at least whose approbation is sure to be genuine. And a still more valuable education is attained when instead of risking such approbation by way-ward rashness, domestic affairs are submitted to the domestic council, and to sober deliberation. Thus Opinion comes into the place of impulsiveness, flattery even being gradually ripened into disinterested attachment; and serves to promote in no small measure, many of the soundest and largest ends of life and altruistic feeling.

Marriage calls forth affection even without courtship.

Even in the region of the self-regarding instincts then, marriage works in the cause of society by slowly helping the altruistic ends to prevail in domestic life over the egoistic; and thus also it is that the institution imparts to the altruistic feeling of attachment that reciprocity which to ordinary minds is the most prominent feature in what is called the lover's pre-occupation. Admitting that attachment and not sexual feeling actuates those who pay their homage to the altar, of hymen in the days of courtship, it may be laid down that all other good feelings are also set in motion, and moved from the very conditions of married life. So that in whatsoever way the domestic union may originate, through courtship or tacit consent, marriage as often leads to affection as it is sought for by affectionate courting; while with growing years of

married life that feeling flows into a pleasant duty to children and into the purest kindness to every member of the domestic circle.

Consanguinity.

Lastly a word on the rules of consanguinity and prohibitted degrees of marriage : They evidently serve to bind different families together. Thus ancient wisdom agrees strikingly with the modern doctrine, that the family is the unit of society. But in spite of the wider spheres of altruistic activity thus secured, it ought to be pointed out that marriage often tends to foster a certain form of collective selfishness which must be repressed in the interests of society at large. The altruism which is confined only to domestic relations is most narrow after all.

CHAP. V.

THE DESIRE OF PROGENY. (3.)

Why not included in the seven sins.

This desire has not till of late been regarded as sinful or noxious to mankind. Indeed it has ever been stimulated by society at a certain stage, and for varied reasons. It is hard to say whether the sexual or the maternal instinct has been most powerful in gathering individuals into that legitimate connection which is called Family. But as between the two instincts named above, the discipline of the first is of importance as much for the sake of the second, as for the benefit of society at large. Accordingly the moral discipline of the desire to multiply must be guided, not by the more self-seeking sexual instinct but, by the altruistic ends of the family and the nation. When a certain knowledge of incurable hereditary diseases and clear ideas of the relations between industry, wealth, and transmission of property gain upon mankind, society becomes alive to those further demands of altruistic discipline which go to restrain even the desire of progeny for all its high appreciation in the past, to

say nothing of the coarser sexual instincts. And thus the very thought becomes pernicious in which discipline of the maternal instinct may be viewed apart from that of the sexual one.

Human nature is too apt to abuse virtue into vice, and the perversion of marriage from its altruistic and even public purposes to personal ends which are not even common to members of the family is a notable instance of this sad truth.

Really an animal propensity.

Thus it is that while in some cases the sexual instinct helps to grow offspring which are in no way connected with real desire for them, in other cases, children come to be desired only as helps to industry or as tools to serve the purposes of undeserved domination. And though man is never devoid of a measure of genuine altriusm, it would be reasonable to understand that that virtue is not an essential feature in the too common desire for progeny. Nay, the life presented by the lower animals may be claimed to justify the opinion that this desire should be regarded only as an animal propensity, however much it may have been spiritualised by society or religion.

Its social value: Human continuity. See p. 17.

It is of the essence of social morality that the convergence which binds man to man should extend from generation to generation: from any one generation to its preceding and succeeding ones. Preservation of the race is obviously instrumental to this end. And to be ennobled by altruism desire of progeny must look not only to the physical and material well-being of the issue but also be governed by their educational conditions and requirements.

Responsibility of the parent.

The age at which a discipline of this instinct ought to begin is not so much after marriage is contracted but previously, when chastity needs to be cultivated for the discipline of the sexual instinct. The responsibility of being a parent ought to be understood and recognised before it is incurred either by man or woman. One prevalent misconception, which must be carefully weeded out, is that because sterility is not always curable by human agency,

therefore God and society rather than the parents should be left to answer for the existence, starvation, ill health and bad education of the children. It is infact a pernicious pretension of piety, which when it really resigns itself to gross sexual self-indulgence claims to have done so out of seeming regard to providential authority. If, for the much debated questions of human free-will and consequent responsibility, any infalliable tests are available in life, they are to be found in the noxious indulgence of the instincts which form the subjects of this and the preceding chapter.

Faults of excess and of defect differently met.

Turning now to the practical application of these principles, it must be admitted that to repress the excesses of this instinct, society has much to do yet in the matters of sound public opinion and healthy social institutions as it has done in the cases of the nutritive and sexual instincts. On the other hand aggravated forms of disregard to the social requirements of this instinct deserve to be as they are actually repressed by penal remedies. In the one case the struggle is with human nature and the remedy is moral and slow of growth. In the other case human nature coincides with social conditions and the penalties against misconduct are severer. But the social end is the same in either case and may be safely relied on for moral guidance.

Che[illegible] opinion needed. Transmission of Disease.

Parents must beware of propagating children when they are expected to transmit to them any serious physical disease. Some sort of social understanding does indeed exist on the subject. People are told more or less plainly that in certain diseases the means of cure are unknown or very uncertain and that some of these diseases are also liable to hereditary transmission. There is however room for public opinion to advance further and for repressing marriage of such diseased persons; and where the fact comes to be known after marriage, it should be no less distinctly notified. But the best way to these ends is to set up the correct moral example. The Nutritive instinct has been regulated by the custom of regular meals; and the sexual by that of marriage,

Similar customs for this instinct would be best initiated by example. Well-disciplined people must make it a point of morality to avoid marriage and, if married, to exercise chastity in order to prevent transmission of incurable disease. And they should do so with so much of uniformity and even of public avowal, as might help to create the much needed custom. There is no other way out of this difficulty.

Poverty.

So again people must beware of the effects of poverty. It is of the utmost importance that men should by their labour, savings or inheritance seek to support more lives than their own. The duties of supporting one's parents in old age and one's self in times of adversity are a social requirement quite apart from any calls of emotional nature. If society had to support all old and disabled people, the work would be much worse managed, the cost would be all the greater and the question of its distribution also a source of unhappy dissension. These burdens are rightly laid upon the family. And charity whether public or private is meant to supply only the inevitable defects of self-help. It is a part this arrangement that people should not themselves contrive to impose upon society further difficulties of public charity. Looking to the moral traditions of people I may say that no Hindu may consistently incur the responsibilities of the husband (*bharta* or supporter) unless he has wherewith to maintain the wife (*bharyya* or the supported.) That relations of such obvious kind and so plainly pointed out by the words alluded to, are overlooked in actual life may be regretted but not justified without a further degradation. So again it may be a point of piety to have offspring to save the Hindu from the effects of what may be rationally interpreted as his hell of oblivion; but it must go against piety in every religion to have children where the wife even cannot be supported and the children are necessarily destined to die of penury or disease, consequences quite as serious as those of infanticide. The desire for progeny in fact, means progeny of the worthy kind; and the Hindu people fully recognise that fact.

Bad domestic education.

Lastly, the parent is responsible for the domestic education of his or her children, and their early moral well-being. The privations required in consequence are as innumerable as they all tend to exalt the character of married life. Children must be brought up so that they may shift for themselves after a time. Nothing is so noxious as a parasite; and people ought always to take care lest they laboriously uprear what are calculated to be at last only parasites of society. Old people too, must beware of having children when the chances are that they must be left to themselves or to society at large to make up as best it may, for the shortcomings of domestic life or rather the parent's improvidence.

Preservation of the Race: Public restraints against abortion, infanticide and child exposure.

Let us now pass on to such healthy exercise of the desire of progeny as is secured by penal measures and ought to be still more binding upon people from moral sensibility. Abortion is a grave crime; infanticide is graver than murder itself. And wilful exposure or neglect of children is deservedly punished by society. The abnormal and hideous cases of human character thus presented go to prove that progeny is desired not as a rule for the sake of the child but is oftener begotten from self-indulgence of the parents. And society justly interposes its authority to ensure a due exercise of this instinct, as it does in regard to the nutritive instinct, in the cases of suicide and culpable neglect of hygeine. Men should dutifully bear the responsibilities of having progeny as much out of regard to children, as for the justly powerful demands of society. Bad as it is to have illegitimate children, it is worse to deny or neglect them.

CHAP. VI. THE MILITARY INSTINCT. (4.)

§ 1. Aggressive or Destructive Propensity as between individuals.

Instincts of Improvement.

We are now passing into a new form of man's Interest for the self. It has been called regard for Improvement, *i. e.* improvement of self-seeking affairs. This Imrovement-division covers a binary group and comprises the entire range of those impulses which come under the terms Military and Industrial. Improvement, it should be understood, is coupled with Preservation in order to constitute Interest, or self-interest, as Interest and Ambition make up between the two, all that Egoism aims at in contradistinction to Altruism. It will be perceived that Improvement stands mid-way between Preservation and Ambition in the tabular analysis so that the term is obviously intended to express some other kind of advancement than ambition ; and the idea is best conveyed by mentioning that whereas ambition looks for Power or Praise, Improvement works by Violence or peaceful Industry. Generally speaking, improvement may lead to Power and Praise ; but technically, its two forms here aim respectively at Destruction and Construction. So again Ambition may employ for its purposes violence and industry as well as other means such as command, persuasion &c. The analysis adopted here only signifies, that Improvement whether by Violence or Industry primarily seeks an advance over Preservation by more extended means to gratify the Nutritive and the Sexual instincts; and that in its secondary forms only, it may be availed of to look for praise or power. Indeed an admixture of these impulses is known to work up even Benevolence into violent or coercive imposition on others of their own good. Improvement becomes less egoistic in ambitious activity, and is proportionally degraded by turning only upon gluttony or lust,

Destruction and Construction.

Improvement as pointed out above may work with violence or only in the sphere of Industry. In the language of ordinary speech however, we are now going to deal with two of our well-known enemies—Anger and Avarice—and to speak of them with reference to how they act within us and what the result is on society. In violent improvement that is Anger, the instrumental action is Destruction, as in the other case, it is Construction. The former seeks to remove obstacles standing in the way of self-gratification, regardless of the means employed; whereas Industrial or constructive Improvement creates resources for the very same end and in its noxious form bears the name of Avarice. In the one case you would deprive a man of his life or his property: you would do so either to be rid of what was standing in your way or to appropriate to yourself the other man's belongings against his wish. In the other case your hankering to procure the enjoyments would exercise your own skill or labor leaving others to their own ways of self-gratification.

Division of the subject:—Individual violence, against Person and Property. Collective violence, offensive and defensive.

It will be seen later on that in one of its forms—civil war,—the gratification of the military instinct is fatal to all social existence. It however occurs only in some collective form and collective violence has to be considered separately from individual violence. In the latter case law and morality are both available for right conduct. In the former, law is of no avail, and political morality is a question of greater intricacy. But to make the distinction more precise, we must include petty rioting and such other forms of concerted crime with the facts relating to the Individual; while collective violence will bear that name only when the violence comes from the whole of any political aggregate like Nation, Country, &c. This distinction between individual and collective action is also called for because collective violence naturally brings into view two sides to the same conduct: the aggressive and the suffering; the offence and the defence. But the dualism of Aggression and

Defence does not occur in Individuals belonging to well-organised society, in which there is as a rule, no right to commit violence from motives of private defence. Individual violence again may go against the person as well as the property of man, and in either case it may also overreach defence. Civilized war is also said to be divested of the guilt of wholesale plundering This distinction however is not of much consequence for it is unquestionable that where the lives of many men are collectively assailed in war, misappropriation of property or in any case some destruction of it, invariably occurs. We shall in the present section take up Individual aggression as being more closely allied to the question of ordinary morality.

Individual aggression. Crime: Immorality.

To understand the importance of the question of individual or private aggression, we have to bear in mind that it practically covers the entire ground of the relation between immorality and crime. Apart from religious sanctions, we have to cultivate morality for the sake of society and also for individual happiness. But in having to voluntarily avoid immorality for what is due to society we must remember that private self-indulgences always tend to grow and encroach on society. Thus when they exceed a certain limit they never fail to expose us to criminal punishment. The pursuit of happiness unless held in some voluntary control comes to trench upon other people's enjoyment. Crime is a particular and aggravated form of this Individual aggression. Society takes up the cause of injured people in its own interest and provides the penal checks. But immoral aggressiveness is more deep seated in the mind of the individual and can be restrained only by public opinion and the individual himself. The penal checks alone would be insufficient. And the reason why society attaches greater importance to crime than to immorality in general, is only the potent fact that but for this arrangement society would fall into pieces. Immorality certainly affects the well-being of society, but crime imperils its very existence. Immorality and crime are both like diseases but crime is like a danger-

ous disease in regard to the social organism whose death ensues as previously pointed out, when the ill-health rises still farther to sedition, treason, civil war, or conquest. And the facts may as well be viewed in this way that society attaches to its own existence the same paramount importance which the Individual does to his own and consequently looks upon treason and sedition very differently from acts of immorality and crime. I have said that crime endangers the social existence of individual men. This occurs in two ways: by breach of the peace and by breach of faith; by force or by guile; by Anger or by want of Candor. And this danger is rightly repelled by society with the systematic enforcement of Criminal law. I say criminal law for civil justice becomes an adjunct to criminal administration in view of the fact, that unless civil rights were defined and upheld, men would fly to open violence and eventually run into insurrection.

A misconception seems to hang about the Hindu mind and that of his European ruler in regard to morality, law, and justice. The Hindu regards justice apart from its relation to society, whatever such justice may mean. The European however, though he may wish to build law only upon ethics, pays greater attention to private liberty and regards with comparitive indifference upon legislation and justice except where their shortcomings tend to cause any violent outbreak. Looking upon the facts in the light presented above, it becomes evident that since the [illegible] disease of immorality ought to be taken on hand at its earliest inception, it should be part of moral education to look upon Crime and Civil wrong as pronounced by law, to be graver forms of immorality and individual aggressiveness.

The sanctions.

Some philosophers regard Law and the Sovereign power as the only sanctions of right conduct; and some men again, more especially the Hindus, are accustomed to attach such high importance to intuitive or abstract morals or to the Divine law, as practically to convey a defiance to the law of the land. We have started however with a definite bond of union between the society and the individual, and are

therefore bound to give the requisite importance to human law. Thus while upon abstract grounds of morality we are justified in looking with greater reprobation on gluttony and debauchery than violence, we ought to be able to appreciate the social reason which justly evokes governmental opposition only against all forms of crime and civil wrong. At the same time we ought to remember that crime is but an outward manifestation only of what lies within the man, though there are degrees in the intensity of that inner impulse, and that according to its degree though the inner offence may not reach the limit of crime yet it may be equally or even more noxious to the offender's moral health; that is, to his personal happiness and his harmonious relation with society. Moreover human law never pretends to defy human nature; but where it does so in reality, the consequences cannot be confined to individuals; and the remedy would lie in political reforms. And thus the individual has to subordinate himself to collective rule of some kind or other; in other words man's moral conduct must always be governed by the collective rule of man.

1. The Crimes: Murder, Arson, Robbery, Theft, &c.
2. Temper.
3. Rivalry.

To enter upon a more detailed examination of the subject, individual aggressivness may be subdivided into 1. criminal misconduct, 2. intemperate behaviour and 3. self-seeking or envious rivalry. Thus we shall have to put at the top of our list the graver crimes and immoralities ranging downwards from Murder and Arson. In the next place we have to put down aggression against property which is of the nature of Robbery and Theft. At this point our classification shades off on one side into criminal breach of good faith; and on the other into exhibitions of Temper. But bad faith and dishonesty, though they are clearly enough instances of the nature of aggression upon society, would come better under the heads of candor, honesty, and justice, which will be taken up elsewhere. Finally from the comparatively innocent faults of Temper we shall pass into the more stable but less demonstrative form

of aggressive improvement, Rivalry. We must however casually refer to breach of faith, in order to bring into prominence the aggressive nature of theft and some other insidious crimes.

1. The crimes: The violent ones.

1. Of the immorality of murder, arson, assault and such-like violent offences it must be impossible to make any impression on the mind of the reader by mere argument, if he fail to approach them with a certain natural revulsion of feeling. In fact, Society has been long ahead of the moralist in this matter. All that is necessary here is to point out the logic of the facts, that the immorality is grave in proportion as it militates with the bond of union between the Individual and Society *viz.*, Sympathy; but that the penal checks are severe in proportion to the requirements of Society alone.

Suicide.

One most significant point of social morality is the immense value attached to the life and even the person of man. Between the life of a human being and that of an animal, European civilization interposes a wide distance. It would carry us too far to enter into the first principles or even the history of the subject. But the principle may be now taken as firmly established also in British India. And it is of such obvious importance for man to make the most of his brother man that we need hardly make an appeal to Hindu religious doctrines to show that the life of man is the most precious field (কর্ম্ম ক্ষেত্র) for the acquisition of merit or পুণ্য; and that as such, the human is the most invaluable of all existences, mundane or extra-mundane (দুর্ল্লভ নরযোনি). It is simply impossible to further accentuate a tenderness for human life as the first principle of social morality. But it is necessary to mention, that of all forms of murder, Suicide is the worst. The fine-spun arguments of Euthanasia are all the worse for the long thought they certainly evince. Since the happiness of the individual should be restricted by the requirements of society or those of religion, (either argument would suit) there can be no opening for any one to please himself against the wish of society by any form of suicide whatever,

Martyrdom however is different. It is because society needs it that martyrdom is moral; and it is also because society insists upon having your life's work, that human life is so precious and suicide and certain forms of asceticism must be renounced as worse than murder.

Breach of Faith.

Proceeding on the line of reasoning previously indicated, (the bond of union between the individual and society,) it will be observed that as violence tends openly to destroy the structure or organism called society, the same fatal result is virtually though more covertly aimed at in breach of faith. Society holds together by means of good faith and mutual forbearance. The two elements unite under the head of Sympathy. But the moral bond of altruism lies farther off, in the tabular analysis, than the principle of good faith. Good faith is somewhat difficult of clear comprehension and I think it comes under the category of the intellectual functions. But mutual forbearance which is denoted by abstention from violence is a perfectly safe basis for social union, human law, and that law of all human laws : all men are bound to know the law. And thus society justly looks upon breach of trust as graver than simple fraud or breach of faith. For Trust adds special solemnity to faith and is also mixed up with questions of property. Good faith and bad faith may or may not be so mixed up.

The insidious crimes.

It is this principle of good faith which makes Poisoning more shocking than other kinds of murder. So again Robbery comprises offences against property and person both, and in some cases, theft cannot be easily distinguished from it. But the one is associated with open violence and the other is generally attended with a measure of concealment. This secrecy in theft partially mitigates its aggressiveness or violence to the person of the sufferer ; but it is on the other hand fatal to the other element of social union : the confidence reposed by men upon their mutual peacefulness. Thus petty cases of Larceny though they are not repressed by punishments equal to those for Robbery or breach of Trust are

regarded by society with another sort of reprobation which is perhaps not the less severe. For instance, a pick-pocket or petty pilferer is regarded with a certain repulsiveness or disgust which to say the least, is different from the feeling against a known but undetected murderer or robber. You could not possibly live in society where your pocket knife or handkerchief would not be safe for half an hour. But except in retired places you might afford to do much of your life's business even if you had to guard yourself against a known outlaw. The violent crimes are by a natural healthy action of society confined as it were, to special places and times so that the rest of the time and all other places are left free to peaceful men. And thus it is that while the moral-educationist may leave it to the police to teach people the immoralities of breach of trust, robbery, and burglary, those of theft, dishonesty and lying have to be pointed out with greater care and attention. After all, society must be understood to have various standards of material civilization. What would be serious theft among a poor people and must be guarded against with proportionate care, may be neglected as only petty larceny in more advanced society. In the latter case it is naturally less guarded against, but all the more reprehensible from a collective or cumulative point of view.

Early thieving habit. Kleptomania.

Theft or rather petty larceny is often a result of early habit; and if such hateful habit is not put down with corresponding effort in any section of society, there would be a natural tendency, either to mark it off from other ranks, or to degrade a rare offender in the social scale. Moral education naturally corresponds with the habits of each social rank, but the cultivated educationist must try to raise every human being to higher levels of moral conduct, as well for the larger ends of society as to prevent degradation of the kind alluded to, which is always more or less threatened. There is public danger in treating it as boyish freak, when an offence of petty larceny occurs in a member of the humbler ranks, though in higher spheres, the same habit may wear out with greater

facility. But the educationist would only be keeping on the safe side to condemn such offence equally among the rich and the poor. The point must be attended to very early for the vice may be contracted even in the nursery. It forms part of domestic education; and the stigma should, I fear, justly attach to the family wherein it occurs. It is needless to add, that the same remarks would apply to what is called Kleptomania. If the offenders be subject to mania that is, a physical disease, they should have to be treated as maniacs.

Before passing to the next sub-division of our subject—Temper —we have to stop for a moment to consider the immorality of certain acts which become serious even when they do not carry an intention to injure people. They may be regarded as acts of omission. Any gross carelessness which does cause however inadvertently, as great an injury to person or property, that is, to society, as any avowed aggression, ought to make one ashamed of himself and resolve that the like of it should never happen in his life; so much so, that the penal measures provided by society far from being resented should be cordially availed of by the offender himself. And it ought obviously to be part of one's moral education to be sensible, without the help of bitter experience, of what any grave act of omission may swell up to. It is in fact only a blunted sympathy which generally leads to such negligence, and the absence of the virtue in question here verges on actual indulgence of the destructive instinct. The man who goes about armed with a loaded gun and knowingly lacks the requisite circumspection or control over his temper, certainly commits an immorality verging upon crime.

Crimes of omission.

It is also the same or similar defect which leads one into acts calculated to provoke in others, a breach of the public peace. The man neglects to take due care in the one case of his possessions, and in the other, of his speech or manner; but in both he is fully aware of consequences of the misconduct. The knowledge of the consequences

Provocation of offence in others.

and the intention to do the deed constitute the full measure of aggressiveness which aggravates the immorality into crime. So again, public criticism, the censure of friends, and the more formal condemnation which issues, say, from the pulpit or the verdict of one's castemen, are all important institutions calculated to educate the grown up mind. But they are never complete without certain conditions. It is indispensable to such institutions, that the man singled out for censure, should be given full opportunity of explaining his conduct. And when one claims to censure, but omits to look for an explanation or to other contingencies, his conduct constitutes a provocation of the kind referred to above.

Libel.

With the help of recent contrivances to extend social concert, intercommunication, and interchange of thought, it has now become possible so to censure people as to preclude the possibility of fair explanation from the censured, as also to enable the censurer to escape the responsibilities which might arise from such explanation. It hence becomes a question of morality to take such care with our speech as not to pass a censure which is unmerited; and more especially, where the injuries thus caused through mistake or carelessness can never be fairly compensated. Defamation is either intended to cause damage to the defamed person or it is only a careless utterance. But the carelessness may cause the same damage as intentional injury. In either case it is calculated to provoke breach of peace, and amounts to an act of aggression. It is superfluous to add that with an adequate regard for the happiness of others, all such acts of intentional or unintentional omission should be minimised by unceasing voluntary effort.

2. Temper.

2. Temper signifies generally the whole of our mental constitution; the word has also a particular reference to the passions and affections; and in a still more specific sense it expresses proneness to one particular passion, namely, Anger. At its best, Temper marks that equanimity of the mind which lies midway between active goodness and badness

of character. And it is noteworthy that this pleasing and useful result is intimately connected, through a certain degree of moderation in all our passions with the control over Anger alone. Whatever self-control prevents violence and breach of public peace, would be sufficient also to temper other impulses and keep them from being aggressively turned upon society. A sweet temper is thus the foundation of moral character and a truly virtuous disposition ; just as prevention of crime is the basis of social life. But its true plague-spot is Anger. At the same time this cardinal virtue must be understood to be a complex one. For its sake, every one of the self-seeking impulses has to be restrained which, when indulged is sure to bring the individual into collision with society. When again, we come to look upon exhibitions of Temper as standing halfways between crime and anger, we only mean by the word that susceptibility of the mind in which self-regard is kept down just so far as to prevent crime, but not sufficiently well to render the suavity or painful repression of temper a source of virtuous pleasure and true charity. Fortunately for human nature, the partial repression alluded to, gradually tends to keep down exhibitions of temper and then the retrospect always contributes to a measure of happiness. Experience also serves to disclose to one's self where his temper is most vulnerable. And memory comes to his rescue at moments when another struggle with temper occurs, and helps to give a better and a moral tone to the man's temper. Thus the natural history of Temper leads first of all to a certain moderation of character by which violence is avoided though with a measure of pain, secondly to a pleasurable recognition of the fact that the temperate conduct however painful is always desirable, and lastly to a retention of these two conditions so as to cause the pleasure to exceed the pain. We must dive deep into our bosoms to weed out the noxious plant. The least success is indeed of greater value than most people are aware of. Mr. Hackwood recounts five forms of this weakness: (1) Violence, (2) Querulousness, (3) Peevishness, (4) Obstinacy, and (5) Wilfulness. (Hackwood: *Notes of Lessons on moral subjects.*)

In all these cases it is to be understood that the exhibition of temper does not reach that sort of violence which characterises crime or actual breach of peace. The word violence here signifies only violent outbreak of temper. The last two forms, wilfulness and obstinacy, are sufficiently well-known. They show that all the forms of short temper gradually terminate in a condition which is closely allied to criminal perversity. Peevishness is comparatively passive, and querulous grumbling, a more active display of anger or obstructed aggression. In both cases the destructive feeling isolates the man from his surroundings, but the peevish man repels any normal social act on the part of others, and the querulous man by his complaints gives more active utterance to his dissatisfaction. In all these successive stages bad temper often causes pain as much to one's self, as to others, and thus furnishes the most powerful motive for self-control. On the other hand the violence of temper touches closely on the heels of violent crime. It is temper to violently fling back a silken handkerchief kindly proffered: but the same impulse would suffice to let fly a pen-knife or a brick-bat at an opponent and the result may be homicide. The legitimate course then is to try to put a stop to wilfulness of all kinds; but these efforts at self-control must be constant and as comprehensive as possible.

Remedies for bad temper.

Turning now to the means of repressing bad temper, it is said that Cæsar had a habit of counting twenty, before undertaking to do or say anything important. The proverb, think twice before you act, is calculated to have the same effect in governing men's temper and regulating their conduct. But those who are subject to the weakness know that the intensity of a ruffled temper may last long enough to warp all thought which occurs at the time, and its speed also may precipitate the man into harm before any thought occurred to be dwelt upon for gaining time. I would rather recommend indirect methods of grappling with anger. Other instincts should be called into play and called with the help of habit, so as to forestall the latent susceptibility which drives the poor man into intemperate conduct.

Among these resources, occupation is the first to be mentioned as being the outcome of our industrial instinct : the one nearest to the military instinct whence all bad temper arises. The short-tempered man should not brood over his complaints, but divert his mind with some engrossing activity. I am not quite sure that true penitence is easy of attainment or that every painful reflection should be appreciated as healthy penitence. The truly contrite heart should firmly meditate on the sacrifices to be made, rather than passively pine away to enfeeble the nervous system. Penitence should rather prepare the man of short temper with feelings of humility and charity, and impel him to external acts of begging forgiveness and rendering suitable redress. Even the desires of domination and praise or self-interest may be stimulated with benefit; and to that end meditation may be directed to mitigate the consequences of bad temper. It would thus be useful to recognise habitually how an unfortunate temper deprives a man of all human support, loyal, co-operative or charitable; and how also it tends to ruin one's health. The Hindu mind has been traditionally trained to look upon temper, as indeed upon all sorts of mundane impulses, as the action of an inner enemy. In a similar but converse way, the Christian invokes for noble impulses, the assistance of the Holy Spirit. The Hindu habit, though it stimulates the noxious instinct for domination over an *alter-ego* as alluded to, has been known to work successfully in gaining mastery over the passion. I am alluding to vows recommended in Hinduism about rigidly holding the tongue during meals and on other occasions. Another resource is to excite man's craving for happiness by pointing out how a bad temper is always productive of great unhappiness. And in this connection it may be useful to consider that the surest means of grappling with temper is to cultivate the habit of cheerfulness and contentment in general, and more especially to practise the art of humorous conversation.

Occupation.

Meditation.

Unhappiness.

Cheerfulness.

Humour like Temper, is itself a complex condition and calls into play all our varied functions of the heart and mind. But perhaps the best way to avail one's self of the humorous disposition would be to look upon it as lying midway between bad temper and enthusiasm. What ill temper would look with vague disparagement and in consequence, with self-seeking dissatisfaction, and what moral enthusiasm would dwell upon from elevated views about the real and the ideal, good humour would regard with comparitive unconcern, showing up the facts only in some of their odd and incongruous aspects. Where a sweet temper is not immediately at command, it would be useful to turn the edge of violence into a tempered fancy for the comical; and so, humorous conversation proves to be a valuable art. But it should not be forgotten that though supplying fair antidote for bad temper, the cynical and humorous disposition may also culminate in noxious levity.

Humorous conversation.

3. From the aggressiveness of crime and bad temper, we now pass on to that unhappy struggle between man and man which unfortunately forms a constant feature of our existence, especially among civilized people, so much so, that it has come to be regarded by many as a normal condition of social life. From our point of view however, this struggle is only a mark of unsocial and selfish antagonism; and morality should seek to get over it with the aid of benevolence. The struggle for existence from its social collision always carries with it an aggressive and a defensive side, though from its persistent necessity, it has become hard to decide where the defensive struggle ends or the offensive begins to operate.

3. Rivalry.

Those who from a somewhat indiscriminate generalization of facts omit to analyse the struggle in question into offensive and defensive acts, seem not to realise the patent truth that in man at least, the aggressiveness and the struggle are often mitigated by benevolence, and they are thus led to overlook that while neither "natural selection" nor "struggle for existence" nor even "survival of the

Certain dogmas.

fittest" comes up to a dogma suggesting any rule of conduct for every human being, these cynical generalizations are liable to be taken as ethical dogmas and mottoes for life, and on many occasions to the serious detriment of morality and social well-being.

Competition.

Letting alone the controversy involved in the foregoing paragraph, it will occur to any one that when life's struggle passes from defensive into offensive character, the man runs the risk of committing the various excesses of military instinct; such as hatred, envy, malice, injury, violence, or fraud. Now if benevolence is to be the guiding principle of conduct one must at the risk of defeat and even death, withdraw from any struggle which may be found growing into positive aggression.

Public repression of competition.

Society, I believe, aims even at public repression of such aggressive competition. I do not say that many such penal measures have been agreed upon. But freedom of contract is in some cases distinctly witheld from the individual and obviously with this aim. So, the fact cannot be gainsaid that the life-struggle which occurs in a variety of shapes, as between the rich and the poor, the landlord and the tenant, the capitalist and the laborer, the producer and the consumer, has called forth many different kinds of collective interference. Some of these occurrences have indeed attained the appaling magnitude of revolutionary anarchy,—a social calamity which is worse even than Civil War. It would be out of place here to dwell upon this aspect of the military instinct; but some idea ought to be formed of the enormous dimensions of the question, and also to realise that society would not be satisfied by relegating the aggressive activity of man merely to the moral control of our benevolent feeling.

Moral checks to excessive competition.

The benevolent would always seek to mitigate suffering of all sorts. But what is necessary in the present connection is that even the industrialist should learn to draw the line where his efforts grow aggressive in regard to entire classes of people, and get reconciled to the

social duty of abstaining from what would impair the productive efficiency of others. That I am not dealing with merely nice questions will occur at once when a monopoly is regarded from the moral rather than the economic point of view. It would be a question of industrial war for Lancashire for instance, to flood the Indian market with cotton goods in order to kill a local industry and then to recoup the loss thus incurred by some concerted action, operating as monopoly and raising the prices to the ruin also of the consumer. It is in the same way that the Rev. Mr. Prescott brings forward the question of opium trade between British India and China to show up how certain industrial advantages are aggressively pushed on to the demoralization of a whole nation. (*Moral Education*). There are many such questions which should bring home the fact that neither struggle for existence nor commercial competition is always wholesome for morality or collective happiness. And all that we can offer here is the rule that aggression of all kinds ought to be abstained from, out of regard to the needs of society as well as for the satisfaction of benevolence. It is for one's self to judge whether his activity was driving him into immoral competition. When this moral turpitude is neglected and becomes widely prevalent, causing trouble to large sections of men, society verges upon civil war ; and the moralist is bound to sound the warning note lest immoral politicians come into the field.

The spirit of rivalry in India.

Before passing on to collective aggression or defensive competition, we have to notice one abnormal fact which seems to be somewhat peculiar to this country. It is really allied to the military instinct and aggressive struggles for any appearances of contrary kind. The people of this country are known to be very litigious. To this fact I would add two others : an abnormal development of competition in some cases ; and a constant tendency to split every group of men. I attribute all these facts partially it may be to our law-abiding disposition derived from ancient culture, but also to an extraordinary repression of the Military instinct ;

so extraordinary as to drive the most angered people to seek satisfaction in law-courts! It would not be proper here to enter into a disquisition of the subject. But Society cannot hold together with such inveterately aggressive rivalry. And the moral sense of the reader ought to be sharpened to perceive for instance, when the necessity which ought to be loyally conceived for an appeal to sovereign justice, degenerates into a malicious desire to make the sovereign himself an unconscious instrument of private malice; or when the spirit of insubordination grows so intense as to lead to a complete neglect of all sense of common injury, in the assertion of a wilful but useless independence; or when again the spirit of competition grows so noxious as to put out of sight all its ulterior useful ends. The evil has so gained upon us that our very students, preparing for a competitive examination seem to forget the main purposes of their academic life. No man ought to compete merely for the sake of chance, when he recognises what is required of him for a "pass" and also that he is unequal to that requirement. No solidarity ought to be broken or prevented merely for the sake of wilfulness. There is no glory in bringing to his senses a bragging or purse-proud man, when the greatest mischief which he commits is to injure his own moral character. And no man ought to go to Court unless he had clear ideas of what deference was due to the judgment of the Court. In all these matters it is of importance to examine in one's own mind why and how far he was aggressively disposed. The individual is the indispensable instrument of social progress: but he becomes a traitor to society when instead of exerting to further the ends thereof, he insidiously encroaches upon social forbearance merely because society has omitted to take measures against the sort of aggressiveness which he may have contrived to invent.

§ 2. The aggressive propensity in the Nation.

Political morality.

Individual aggressiveness, when it occurs in well-regulated Society, necessarily takes the form of Criminal misconduct or Civil wrong. The Society as a whole, and not the injured individuals alone, are put on the defence. They both however throw their lot together, the individual acting under the control or supremacy of Society. And the control is both political and moral as we have seen in the preceding section. In collective aggression however, a common political control over aggressor and defender is absent, and a similar moral control, if it exists at all, is very weak or immature. Political morality has thus become almost a byeword, and the moralist finds himself sadly at a loss. For Religion even, throws no light upon the question of the collective conscience. And yet the question may not be slurred over. The very reason which, in scruples about political violence, throws the individual upon his own resources, renders it imperative that he should be prepared with clear ideas for his conduct, when he is pulled in opposite ways by warring Societies. The rule of moral conduct however, which would not apply uniformly in times of peace and of war both, must stand condemned for logical inconsistency. And though the moralist may not aspire to teach the politician his duties, yet it is to be hoped that the statesman who has dealt long in human nature, with crimes, wrongs and with morality, cannot be altogether beyond the reach of a truly moral influence both from within and from without.

Civil War.

Without a morality to govern the politician's conduct, he must be prepared for two sorts of opponents within his own camp: a moral and an immoral one. In the latter case the rivalry and rival conclusions would always be liable to be carried to their extreme limits and may eventually culminate in Civil War. In the former case the political leader could always count upon large numeric support, for morality as a bond of union between the individual and the aggregate would

win its way even among the followers of the immoral politician. The truth is before Civil War begins, dissension divides the social aggregate either into two well-marked units, or it works its way from house to house and from city to city spreading over all their affairs. Human solidarity fails altogether when it ceases to be localized in any specific part of the country. When Civil War works so that neither of the contending factions can lay claim to any spot of earth as its home or country, and their society gets utterly demoralized, nomadism and vagabondage together with all their economic concomitants are added to the original immorality of violent party-strife. In the other case however, when Civil War is marked not only by distinct social aggregates but also by definite geographical bounds for each of them, the question occurs whether the solidarity thus broken was at all worth the name in the beginning. Social union whether effected by love or fear at first, must eventually grow to be voluntary. Civil War generally ends either in complete severance of the society into distinct National Governments, or into absolute absorption or conquest of the weaker by the stronger group. Where Civil War leads to anarchy and nomadic barbarism, social morality becomes out of the question, society itself being extinct. Where however it sets up distinct nations, we find ourselves confronted by questions of international morality. The problem of international morality, like the relation of morality to Religion has been deliberately kept out of our study. But for the moral education of the individual it is not only necessary that he should learn to recognise that problem, but also that each man should look on himself as an indispensable factor in the event of its future solution.

War.

We have in the preceding section, dwelt long enough on individual aggressiveness to understand, what must be guarded against, after collective aggression leads to conquest. Defeat does not necessarily lead to submission, nor is submission merely a matter of formal declaration. The conqueror does not expect to complete his conquest

by the success of his aggression only. The arts of peace must follow. To continue the first act of violence for indefinite period and spread it into all affairs of life, is beyond the scope of the worst tyrant. And peace requires that the police should be maintained as much as possible by the willing submission—in other words, the morality—of the people. War then, must be set down as a great evil. And all that poets and historians may have said to the contrary effect must be regarded as mistaken or out of date. War may be necessary in some cases, but not otherwise than as a recognised evil. Its duration must be minimised with the best of our efforts. In civilized society as in all moral education, the highest importance has to be attached to Opinion ; and no man's opinion can be safely followed who has not learnt to recognise that the proper attitude towards war on the part of society is exactly the same as that which underlies a tenderness for the human life. Again, society cannot move without the instrumentality of individuals ; and even the tyrant has to guard against the natural consequences of unrestricted violence upon all his subjects. The moral check of opinion has also a practical side. Acts which would be criminal as between individuals would not be the more innocent because proceeding from the sovereign. Provocation to commit breach of the peace may proceed from the tyrant as from any body else. A sovereign's temper of mind is no less vulnerable than that of a private man. And widely ramified rivalry for power between sovereign and subject necessarily ends in revolution or civil war. Thus the limits of collective aggression are quite definite. The fighting groups must be localised. The duration of the bloodshed has to be reduced. Even if a country is conquered, the subjugated people must be won over by opinion and assimilated to the conquering power. And it remains only to examine how far individuals are to be held answerable for the event of war : where the event is noxious and being such, renders the individual instrumentalal to collective immorality and where the event may be favorable on all sides.

There can be no question whatever that whether good or bad, all collective acts must be traced to their individual sources. Where there is no convergence there must be divergence either patent or latent. And divergence or convergence cannot by reason of its being latent exonerate the individual from the responsibilities of a collective immorality. Even under the most rigid system of discipline, the subordinate has to be distinguished from the slave. And whatever casuists may urge for or against freedom of the will, the free or modifying agency of the Individual is fundamental to all questions of morality.

Individual responsibility.

The only plea which has to be considered on the other side is that opinion may change with growing experience. In collective acts the experience of all men is not of the same kind, consequently an opinion which would be quite valid according to a certain order of experience in one of the individuals, may be very reprehensible in another who is the leader. Indeed a morality about opinion is a necessary correlative to a consensus of opinion on morality. But such a consensus exists, however incomplete it may be. Even this little book has to count upon some such consensus to justify its reasoning. And a political concert founded upon incoherent private opinion can never last. It is the honest man whose lead is most cordially accepted. Be that as it may, my position is this: the morality or immorality of collective action must be attributed to Individual agency; if we look further behind we get lost in unkind suspicions and mere conjectures. Every free-man is not only free in respect of what opinion he forms, but also bound to have one and to reconcile it with the order of his experience on the one hand and his conduct on the other. When he supports his leader, he does so upon his own responsibility. And when his dissent is passive, his honesty of purpose must be evinced along with his personal loyalty to any superior, or benign regard for human solidarity.

Opinion in the generality and in Individuals.

Thus it follows, that in the matter of collective aggression, those who lead must be held responsible for the act of aggression as well as for their lead; and that those who follow must be held responsible immediately for the reason why they follow and mediately for the consequences of their following.

Responsibility of Leader and follower.

And it follows also, that where conquest leads to demoralization and suffering in the conquered country, there the conqueror as a public man has to answer for those consequences, as also for the wickedness of his leadership. And that on the other hand, his private instincts should be judged for their morality entirely from the social stand-point. That is to say, three main questions will arise : (1.) Was the conquering impulse attributable to kindness for the people to be conquered ? (2.) Was the kindness traceable in the followers, and recognised by the conquered ? And lastly, (3) was not the aggresssive impulse due more or less to desire for self-aggrandisement with the leader or leaders. The principles underlying these issues, however variedly enunciated are generally understood and appreciated in civilised society. Only the feeble minds who dare not acknowledge their immorality drift into a calculation of how far unkindness to the conquered might be balanced by good intentions in favor of the aggressors. They betake to a pitiful shuffling of the moral and utilitarian doctrines, as well as of the functions of religion and private judgment. It will be obvious that the unkindness to the conquered is part of a definite decision, whereas the supposed good intention alluded to is avowedly contingent to success; in other words, to the uncertainties of war and all future events. I have therefore as a rule nothing to say in favor of aggressive war. Indeed I am quite clear that in all cases the predominant instinct is self-aggrandisement, to which the family, the army, the party of supporters, and even a whole nation may be successively made fellow-sharers by some sort of very transparent fiction. Whoever is possessed of any honest tenderness for human life, for the suffer-

The immorality of the conqueror.

ings of the wounded and for destruction of property, would ponder long before he could venture upon even defensive warfare. But military aggression becomes simply irreconciliable with morality after a state of savagery in life and barbarism in opinion have gone by in society.

Where conquest may lead to good. 1. Determination of aggressiveness.

The consequences of military conquest are as a rule so noxious that the majority of cases in which war leads to evil may be left out of consideration, and it would be convenient to proceed at once to the few in which as a matter of exception, conquest yields a small balance of good to human society. It is only this result which may partially justify the decision of the conquering leader and the conduct of his followers. There can be only two such cases in the abstract. In the one the conquerors are merged in the conquered and the conquest ceases to be military or aggressive after the original disturbance. In the other case the converse result takes place, and the conquered people are raised into similar union with the conquerors. Practically the action and the reaction between the two peoples occur conjointly. But the growing solidarity if any, must be analysed to furnish a guide to moral conduct and true progress.

The Norman conquest.

Thus the conquest of England by the Normans ceased after a time to be upheld by any aggressiveness of the sovereign against the subject. And hence the immorality of the Norman dynasty terminated with the neutrality of Henry II, as between Norman and Saxon; with the patriotism of the lion-hearted Richard and with the final suppression of the tyrant King John. I think it was after the days of the Magna-Charta that the Norman conquerors were merged in Anglo-Saxon society and the consequences of Norman conquest became really good. With all the prior stability of the Saxon dynasty, the shades of political antagonism between the Saxon and the Celt seem to continue down to this day, whereas it is only a special class of experts who can trace a portion of the British Peerage to the followers of William

the Conqueror. Applying the same principle to the case of Alsace and Lorraine it would strike any one as singular that while the German warrior denies that he aimed at conquest and argues that he has forced only a restitution, the people of the two provinces are believed to look upon their present political submission as more or less coerced. Whatever the fact may be, in either case the abstract question of morality is clearly illustrated. Solidarity is not derivable from enduring coercion or from mere kinship, nor does opinion change by time alone; it is solely the harmonious result of thought, feeling and experience.

The case of Alsace and Lorraine.

The foregoing instances show that the evil of conquest may in some cases be mitigated by subsequent conduct of the conqueror. But at the same time they prove that the acts of conquest as they stand at first, and the individual's impulses from which they proceed, are purely aggressive; and such being the case the conduct and the policy are decidedly immoral. The subsequent mitigation of the evil was a mere accident and could not be pleaded to justify the earlier and deliberate disregard to the principles of morality. And the charge applies to the entire body of aggressors.

The only other case in which its good consequences could justify a military conquest is where the conquered are not only lifted out of the disaster of defeat but also above their earlier social condition, and eventually assimilated to the society of the conquerors. Cases of this kind are somewhat hard to conceive in the existing state of the world. In the infancy of human society, the coercive power of the sovereign was deemed equal to repress all sorts of misconduct and to redress most grievances. And thus, universal domination not being unreasonable, its morality could not be easily impugned. It took some time to discover that coercion, conflict and carnage were the consequences of the same mental impulse. Growth of opinion and activity has also proceeded in the course of ages, to accentuate the peculiarities of men's feelings. And hence the assimilation of the many with the

2. Assimilation of the conquered.

few has now become a matter of greater difficulty. However, in primitive Society at least, it is possible to conceive that other divergences being obliterated the memory of defeat and the traditions of conquest would gradually lose their sting, and conqueror and conquered become adapted to each other's ways from a common regard to the omnipotence of fate. Physical strength somehow or other was then the source of Opinion, as well in the individual himself as in those who had to yield before it.

The question of opinion.

The question of collective aggressiveness comes thus to be referred to the quality of men's opinion about the nature and results of aggressive conduct. Now, the quality or morality of opinion may be traced to one of three several sources: to the consensus of Society, to the private reasoning of each separate individual, and to superhuman agency. It has already been said that any one who recognises that his own private opinion differs from that of the rest, becomes bound in consequence to disclose at least the fact of that divergence before calling in the aid of those who are differently minded. No military leader could venture to declare that his soldiers should die in order that the enemy may be civilized by becoming his subjects. It is at best a tacit conspiracy to plunder the conquered which actuates the marauders. But it is not in human nature that the desire to rob should be confined to robbing the enemy only and never extend to criminal conduct within the conquering body. So again, when with the generality of men in any society, opinion is more of the nature of assertion and unsupported by definite reasoning, the stratagem of an appeal to superhuman agency in order to disarm opposition must be decidedly immoral. It is only when men make war from any settled conviction that they are led thereto by superhuman power, and when such conviction really prevails in the minds of the generality of the conquering body, that their responsibility could be shirked or thrown upon Divine providence, or that the immorality of military aggression would have to be weighed against the obviously deplorable consequences of all war.

We are thus enabled to deplore the destruction of Carthage by Rome, of Egypt by Persia, and of Persia by Alexander, while we are capable also to appreciate the course of events to which these misfortunes were incidental. It would be moral insensibility not to feel for Carthage, Tyre or Jerusalem, for Egypt, Babylonia or Assyria, in the same way that one never fails to do when thinking of the destruction of Pompeii, or of Lisbon. It is on the other hand obvious that Egyptian civilization could not possibly be availed of by Persia and still less by the world at large. So again Persian discipline could neither suit the turbulence of the West, nor be saved from the manifold abuses to which every satrap-government is more or less liable in the absence of adequate moral responsibility. Conversely from Roman history we judge that the institution of civil and constitutional Law, and the very structure of civilized political organization required that Carthage should vanish before Rome. The Amphictyonic Council of Greece was politically a failure. When again the Grecian Synod at Corinth constituted Alexander to be Imperator, there was no real solidarity effected there. And the Alexandrian empire was doomed from the very beginning; apart of course, from the fact that Alexander took to oriental ways. It was perhaps only under Roman domination that a genuine and successful effort was made for the assimilation of the conquered with the conqueror without depriving either of any laudable individuality. Nothing I believe redounds to the glory of Rome so much as the ring of loyalty, which emanating from the famous cry of St. Paul—' I am a Roman born"—seems still to cling in one's ears though nearly two thousand years have gone by. Under the circumstances, we must be prepared to accept that no simpler course than that which has occurred in Europe was possible for the march of events to lead to the universal growth of opinion and consequent acceptance of social morality. War makes atonement for its manifold evils only by establishing human solidarity; solidarity helps forward the cause of both individual morality and collective progress. It is only in this way that we

Illustrated from history.

can reconcile ourselves to accept of the blessings which war in the past must on many occasions be admitted to have bequeathed to posterity; while modern civilization is determined to firmly hold that to transmit similar blessings to the future, we must not sacrifice our moral conviction and responsiblity but invent and effectuate more honest, charitable and consistent designs. Some cases of aggressive conquest in the past may have been justifiable in contemporary opinion. We too may treat that supposed primitive opinion with respect, because we see some alliance between it and its actual good consequences in the present. But history must not mystify our minds so as to disturb the conviction about right or moral conduct, that employment of force by man against man proceeds from self-regard, and that as such it is always more or less to be reprehended from within and from without.

Commercial incentives to war.

It is I think unnecessary to go into further detail to show how in the majority of cases collective aggression is always allied with immorality. Allusion has already been made to the motives of personal aggrandizement which always actuates the conquering hero. The improvement thus effected does not warrant that the military instinct should be distinguished as a selfish impulse from all its other similar adjuncts whether in individual or in collective aggression. The Nutritive and Sexual instincts rather than the desire of mere Domination are generally some of those other adjuncts. Spoliation or collective robbery, degrading as it appears to be when so expressed, must be pronounced to be the chief incentive of war as of crimes and civil wrongs. But in modern warfare there is an allied selfish instinct called up most powerfully; and this section should not be concluded without some reference to that lamentable abuse of civilization. Civilization really signifies the growth of the arts of peace in place of the splendours of war. The material comforts which are often regarded as the index of civilization are only the outcome of the arts of Peace. And the growth of peaceful arts necessarily means the

decline of belligerent or unsympathetic activity. Curiously enough however, war itself is made instrumental to the acquisition of material comforts in a certain form. Collective aggressiveness now often barters redemption of the life and life's blood with the ransom of pecuniary sacrifice from the conquered. And it often happens that wars are waged so that commerce may grow, nay, that the conquered people may be depleted of their wealth. And this fact means a more insidious and disastrous form of self-aggrandisement in the aggressive nation than the personal aggrandisement of ancient heroes. Collective avarice of this sort is no more fit to be a feature of civilization, than the violence of war or robbery may be regarded as mark of heroism in nations and individuals. If there is to be any good in organised or public education and in such education comprising social morality for one of its branches, it is of serious importance that spoliation of the kind alluded to should be regarded with suitable feelings of moral aversion and treated with public disparagement.

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§ 3. Defensive Violence.

Individual responsibility in all cases of defensive violence.

Private violence is capable of being repressed as crime by government; collective violence or war is not so repressible. Aggression in private and public life had thus to be treated separately in the two previous sections. Such distinction however may be overlooked in defensive violence which as a rule, receives collective support. The responsibility of the individual though differing as between leader and follower is the same as between a man's public and private capacity when he acts on the side of defence. And the stigma that a corporate body knows no conscience can be wiped out only with the aid of the well-known truth that the good or bad name of a class has to be shared by all its members, and ought therefore to evoke all the more of suitable

individual effort. The Hindu view, and perhaps also that of all monastic life, which seeks to escape defilement by aloofness is incongruous with the importance of collective goodness and the functions of the individual as member of society. It is at best but an undeveloped form of martyrdom. The forms of defensive violence which have to be seriously reprobated by society are also repressed by law under severe penalties. Moreover, the opinion of the world has changed considerably since the time when Religion was reckoned fit to be defended or propagated by violent measures. It would have been hard to lay down a uniform rule of social morality against all aggressive war, if either defence or propagation of Religion might be pleaded in favor of any war. Fortunately the rule of universal toleration entirely removes the difficulty in question. And collective resistance to any so-called religious aggressiveness may well be classed under the general head of national defence or patriotism.

Division of the subject.

We shall dwell first of all on that Mistaken allegiance to authority which is reprehensible for impelling a man to do evil in the name of such virtuous disposition as loyalty or reverence. Afterwards, we have to enter into a consideration of political wants of the whole country as against violence or aggression of all sorts. This branch of the question *i. e.*, Patriotism, might come in another shape under the head of Sympathy. But Sympathy in its highest form of Charity had best be regarded as opposed to war and bloodshed of all kinds. Between these two principles of undue loyalty and true patriotism, we have to review the morality of Self-defence in relation to person and property. It properly comes under allegiance to law. After patriotic defence we revert to individual defence of opinion and religion,—that noblest form of moral conduct—which has really obviated all religious persecution and intolerance in the world. I allude, of course, to the glorious teaching of Christianity, Martyrdom. Finally as private self-defence stands between Loyalty and Patriotism, so between the latter and Martyrdom we have to interpose that other laudable activity

and even violence which occurs in the shape of Chivalrous protection of all kinds.

1. Mistaken allegiance to spiritual authority: Religious persecution

Personal allegiance as an altruistic and peaceful impulse must be distinguished from that servile and irresponsible self-regard which betakes to violent action, in the name of, but without any authority from, a Superior. And it is only in the latter shape of servility that religious persecution can practically occur ever since it has come to be understood that man's religion is centered within, and lies beyond the reach of human pressure from without. We are in fact bound to recognise that Religion and Religious conduct are not things to be at all upheld by violent measures. Religion is in separably connected with opinion and can never be aggressive or hostile to man. Even when on the defensive it works on the line of martyrdom alone. The Star chamber the Inquistion, the Crusades and Jehads and, above all, the internecine wars waged between Protestants and Catholics ought to prove the failure of religious persecution, together with the pre-eminence of individual responsibility in all such cases. The evil of all these matters must be traced to their human factors; and the men will stand condemned either for their culpable ignorance or for moral turpitude also. The question however has ceased to have much practical importance, except perhaps with the followers of Mahammad.

Abuse of temporal power.

The moral rule not only starts with religious toleration but it applies with equal force to certain matters affecting the policy of temporal Government. I believe, it ought to be understood that no civilized Government encourages immorality in its subjects or officers. The interests of the Government are either identical with those of its subjects or they are not. If identical, the claims of morality upon the individual stand unopposed. If they be not identical, the peculiar interests of the Government would come to be set up avowedly in opposition to those of its subjects. A hostile relation would thus be started at the outset between sovereign and subject,

and the latter would lay equal claim with the former in pushing it on to the utmost advantage. The result would be civil war. But meantime all crimes would grow to be regarded with indifference for the reason of Patriotism. Civilized Government is assumed to understand these matters in the clearest manner; and it therefore does not stand in need of that misguided allegiance which occasionally impels individual public officers to open or concealed hostility against any or all of the subjects of a country. When the despot however grows into tyrant, and his instruments catch his vice, their allegiance itself becomes culpable. The different forms in which abuses of Governmental authority occur are simply numberless. All that has to be pointed out is that violent or illiberal defence of the Government is really a self-seeking abuse of political power, quite in the same way as the declaration of a crusade is an abuse of spiritual authority.

2. Private defence. The Judge—the universal referree:

The conditions pointed out above in regard to the morality of spiritual and temporal authorities, would be incomplete without two others of a correlative kind. The questions do not perhaps belong to the subject of morality. But they govern nevertheless the duties of peaceful citizens in relation to the regulative functions of Government which are so essential to social solidarity. I can barely allude to these questions as (1) supremacy of the Judicial above all other functions of the Sovereign, and (2) the adequate allegiance which is due by the citizens to the Judge. These two conditions render it a matter of morality to repose the highest confidence in the judicial authorities of the country. If the king can be viewed severally with reference to his sceptre and his scales of justice, it is his relation to the latter which must be supremely binding as much to himself as on his subjects. This is essential to social morality, and may not be lost sight of. By "judicial authority" of a country, I mean of course the collective function of the hierarchy of judges in the country; for it must be remembered that an appeal to the higher authority does not carry with it that reprehensible disregard for the lower

authority which is technically called contempt of court. It is indeed immoral of a public officer to resent an appeal from him to some other officer to whose authority he has himself to render the most implicit submission.

As to evidence.

The confidence of the citizens upon the Judge as alluded to above, has to be cultivated in several ways, especially in this country. In the first place crime has to be shunned not only for the sake of morality and penal law but also for requirements of public justice. Justice however, requires a public trial for the repression of crime and redress of wrongs. It cannot tolerate the suppression or witholding of any necessary evidence. Crimes of a certain kind must therefore be disclosed in the ways prescribed by law. And the Hindu habit of mind ought to be assiduously repressed by which it is erroneously supposed that the injured, who is often only a witness, is competent to pardon an injurer who is really a public offender. Allegiance to Law, no less than regard for the police system of society, requires that the individual should know when he is the master of his own action and when he is no more than an instrument of collective activity. Mental reservation, to say nothing of deliberate falsehood, is inconsistent with the moral requirements of veracity; but it becomes doubly noxious if it takes a hostile bearing to society and its constituted authorities.

Hindu joint family crime.

I do not yield to any man in my respect for the Hindu joint-family system. But I must point out that its members are bound at least morally, to repress each other's acts when such acts verge upon criminality. The wife and the husband or the parent and the child may be exonerated from incriminating each other by their uncalled for testimony. This is due to the requirements of domestic solidarity without which social solidarity becomes simply impossible. But to extend the same privilege to all the members of what is called a joint family would be fatal to the existence of Society. The immorality arises from unsound views regarding the protection or defence of one's family,

The Judge's ruling as to Law.

In the next place, the individual should never take the law into his own hands, nor suppose that his own opinion of the merits of a dispute between himself and another is independent of law and justice; that is, equal to those of the legislator and the judge.

Defensive litigation. See p. 65.

Society rests upon co-operation and convergence. What disunion and divergence, unfortunately do occur at times, have to be reconciled by some contrivance or other; so much so, that not to be bound by that contrivance would be equivalent to rejecting the fundamental principle of Society; or in other words, be immoral. Such a contrivance is the constitution of a judicial forum for the determination of disputes. It may be regarded as a mere artificial contrivance, or a natural condition of social compactness. But all men must be habituated to look upon their own notions of private right and legality as being subordinate to the ruling of the judge. It is but a corollary to this principle that the Court of justice as elsewhere pointed out, should neither be made into an instrument for the gratification of private malice nor fenced with as an opponent, from motives which are destructive of the bond between the Individual and Society. It ought also to be understood that mutual disagreement between parties, does not immediately point to an appeal to the law; that our own opinion of the injustice of our opponent's contention may be biased by self-regard; that the labor imposed upon others to settle such differences, may largely exceed the sacrifice required by either or both of the disputants; and that this peacemaking business must differ widely when it is transferred from private friends to the servants of the public. The judge is not an enemy from whom we are free to extract any amount of labor either in advancement or in defence of our interests. And until litigants rise to recognise the moral calls to sacrifice imposed by facts of the foregoing kind, society is doomed to bear, and must be allowed to partially resent such evils as, waste of public time, harassment of witnesses and of private friends of the

contending parties, and occasionally even erroneous decisions and bad precedents from the judge. Magnify as you may the duties of the judge, nothing would divest the litigant of that responsibility which is no less than correlative to those duties. Indian litigation is often morally wrong both as an offensive and a defensive conduct. It often partakes of the nature of a private combat and seems also to arise from wrong notions about the judicial system recently introduced by the British rulers of India. That system certainly seeks to deprive private individuals of their power to tyrannise over their fellow-subjects. And with that object it recognises the liberty of the subject to assert the full measure of his legal rights. But it does not contemplate that this liberty—this right to defend one's self—should be abused into licence, or that people should discard all pre-existing or practicable means which are calculated to settle private differences. The subordination hitherto required through traditions about birth, caste, or rank, has not certainly ceased to be valuable in the abstract. It now stands only transformed into voluntary submission and should be rendered to whoever a man may desire to acknowledge as his superior or leader in society. This voluntary submission does not carry with it what might be regarded as hardship when imposed by traditional or hereditary subordination to private individuals. And it ought to be availed of all the more cordially, as well against impulses towards defensive violence or misconduct, as for the purposes of economy in the judicial or political system of the country.

Self-defence occasionally authorised.

The condition of society to which we have alluded above would leave little or no room for private self-defence, I mean of the kind unauthorised by criminal law. Self-defence in fact is called for in proportion to the failure of Government to reach that ideal state in which it is entirely and successfully devoted to the complete protection of its subjects against all crime. It does happen nevertheless that a Government cannot redress all wrongs to which its subjects are exposed as between each other. In any case the

redress may not come as soon as required. Hence it is, as shown before, that self-defence is authorised in certain exceptional cases.

Duelling.

Duelling among some people and affrays among others, have often been resorted to upon grounds of private self-defence. But upon the principles of morality recommended here, they must be regarded as decidedly wrong. And I claim it that the Hindu religious feeling also is clearly against all such violent outbreaks.

School boys' fights.

Some people are accustomed to think that though duel fights with dangerous weapons and consequent risk to life and person, are criminally or morally reprehensible, the same objection does not apply to smaller fights without such weapons and similar risk. This opinion occurs in connection with certain notions about social rank and injuries thereto, and also with the quarrels of boys. The claim to prestige in some private individuals against others is out of date if not quite obsolete. It is simply inconsistent with the supreme authority of society as a governing power and as a factor of life's concerns. It argues on one side an immoral desire of domination and supposes a corresponding servility in other people to make the concession. And in neither view of the case is violence justifiable to defend an individual's rank or prestige. The principle of letting boys to fight out their quarrels in some comparatively harmless way, and to do so to enable them to learn that way in early life, is known to commend itself to certain eminent educational authorities. They seem also to connect the above principle with the one that boys should learn to box as they learn to play cricket. (*Tom Browne's School days.*) This last-named rule is certainly useful in those contingencies where the power of society cannot be opportunely invoked. But that fact does not, I submit, warrant, that the art should be utilized for actual determination of mutual dispute between boys. The error arises, I think, from ignoring that society is an organism possessed of natural sanctions; and from the idea that school-boy fights

Thomas Hughes criticised.

cannot be displaced without a complicated and therefore noxious system of adjudication and police. The truth however is that the graver consequences of such fights are, if at all, prevented only by the complicated system of life which is said to prevail in such English Schools as that of Rugby. With all deference to the sanction given to these fights by the writing of Mr. Thomas Hughes, the traditions of Rugby, and perhaps the august name of Dr. Arnold, I would suggest that the same punctiliousness with which abuses of the fighting are prevented would be more than sufficient to cultivate a chivalrous impulse to protect the weak against the strong and to repress the violence of bullies by the opinion of fellow students of the same form or school. And I venture to attach a special importance to this suggestion as the traditions of a Rugby or the rules necessary to control school-boy fighting or academic society in general, would take no less time and cost no less labor to transplant into India, than what would be required to institute similar other rules, *i. e.* rules for chivalrous conduct, suited to the peaceful habits of the Indian people. I fully share in the feeling which discountenances the informer's behaviour and a constant sneaking appeal for redress of wrongs; but I contend that not only violence and injustice but even the indignity of the sufferer who had to make such appeal should be prevented by rearing up from the earliest opportunities, a cultured and decisive opinion of the kind suggested above. So again, if for the efficacy of such opinion it is necessary that school boys of equal standing should understand the extent of each other's physical strength, amicable competition might be resorted to, to determine the fact rather than that the school master be demoralised so as to look coolly on 'roasting,' bruised noses, and dislocated limbs of his boys. School-boy insubordination has of late engaged serious attention in Bengal. But it is singular that in laying claim to the unquestionable autocracy of the school-master, so little attention is bestowed on the principle that school-boy life must be modelled upon the ideal intended for the grown up citizen.

It is said that Europe owes its notions of patriotism to the traditions of Roman civilization regarding the *Patria* or Fatherland. The spread of English ideas in India has also suggested that the notions derived from Rome are identical with, or equivalent to the Hindu traditions regarding the birth-land (*janma bhumi*). But I think it would serve to strengthen the generous feeling, if due care was taken to understand that the Hindu tradition was restricted to the smaller area of a *pargana* or village whereas modern patriotism would be unmeaning except for a much larger area. It seems also that the corresponding Greek sentiment was either confined to the city-states or extended to the race irrespective of all territorial limits; and that hence it could never raise that people to the unity of a nation. Aristotle is said to have observed that "the Greeks might govern the world, could they but combine in one political society." (*Grote's Hist. of Greece* Vol. VIII. p. 472 *note.*) The defect however, was radical and inconsistent with the capacity claimed. But the saying cited by him, "cruel the wars of brethren are" (*Walford's Trans. of the Politics* VII. 7.) aptly applies to Hindu village life as observable even at this day. Our attachment to the birth-land carries at best but a tribal feeling of kinship to, whereas true patriotism derives a quite different though allied form of fellow-feeling from, the place of common residence. The Greek idea developed into, if it did not arise from, the planting of colonies. These colonies generally broke loose from the mother city (metropolis) or at best recognised some sort of hegemony akin to that of the Hindu Samrat. But it was only left to Roman Patriotism to largely develop the racial or arbitrary associations of the *gens*, and those of the *populus* and the *plebes*, or of patron and client. In any case Rome gave effect to political incorporation by citizenship. The Hindu polity retains the relationship of (জ্ঞাতি) *jnatis* which is obviously allied to the joint-family system and for aught that I am aware of, may be more primitive than that of the *gens* before the days of Solon. The relation of *jnatis* and *kutumbas* may have developed here into the

3. Patriotism.

Indian four-caste communities, but such communities are different from *Nations* each claiming a home in its *Country.*

The above observations are intended not only to help a requisite transformation of the Hindu sentiment for one's "Native Village" as it is called, into a just sense of the country, or nation and national requirements, but also to impress upon his mind two important ideas: one about the parallel running between property or property in the soil and patriotic interest in the country, and the other, about the nomadism underlying the expatriation of men into colonies. True patriotism requires something like a property-feeling for one's country and is opposed to the miscellaneous interest incidental to uncertain or varied domicile. It is only by this sort of feeling akin to ownership of land that patriotism can secure to a people "a permanent seat" for "all those moral and intellectual impressions" whose influence is as much indispensable to the formation of individual character as it forms the only reliable basis for further improvement of those impressions. Moreover, certain forms of nomadism are not unknown to the Hindus. They occur either as changes of domicile in stray individuals; or as collective movements of a whole group or brotherhood. In the former case the peregrinating individuals either keep their hold upon the parent community, remaining detached from their new domicile; or they sink into a low level in the community to which they get annexed. The latter case is a more pronounced form of nomadism. But colonial expatriation comprises various additional features deeply affecting the moral duties of citizenship. And we fall off in patriotic feeling as well from our attachment to the ancestral village to which we may have become almost a stranger, as by our aloofness from the society among whom we may have decided to reside.

Patriotism in relation to social life and morality.

These matters, it has been mentioned, might come under sympathy. But it is necessary to proceed otherwise. We should however bear the truths in mind in order to understand why violence becomes justified nay commendable for the patriotic defence of one's own

country. To confine the feeling of Patriotism to the narrow limits of the Village would not only be unworthy but positively detrimental to its growth in the genuine form. A military defence against powerful aggressors would be harder to maintain even for a fortified City than for a Country comprising many cities in political concert. Moreover, the social life which is expected to yield us all our lessons of morality imperatively requires that the bond of social union should be concentrated in the Home of one's Country in order to be eventually extended to the whole earth and its common proprietors, Mankind. Village squabbles and tribal patriotism have both to be given up for the sake of altruism no less than the calls of true patriotism.

Defensive war.

The justification for defensive war is obvious enough as against a foreign aggressor. But even in civil war against a tyrant it has to be distinctly recognised; though in this case it is a rather recondite matter affecting the relations between sovereign and subject. On the other hand there stand the considerations affecting the past traditions of a people and their future progress; and affecting also their ever-growing accumulations of the material, intellectual and moral wealth in their country. This vital conservation coupled with the requirements of collective activity against foreign aggression, it will be perceived from close thinking, results in the sentiment of Patriotism. I think I may as an Indian subject also confess a sort of delicacy in having to point out the nature of this virtue here. But it is necessary to look into the reason of the noble sentiment under consideration, in order to realize the moralist's scope and measure of its practical bearings. One must learn either to appreciate one's country spontaneously so as to be equal to making certain requisite sacrifices in its cause; or he must be prepared to make those sacrifices in order to lay claim to the noble attribute of patriotism. The sacrifices required are nothing less and nothing more than what a man derives from his country: *all* his material wealth, and *all* his moral and intellectual impressions: or in other words, his whole life

with all its belongings. A conquest means loss of all these things and that, in *all* of one's fellow-countrymen. And whoever hopes to save his own out of that common loss, fool that he is, he simply does not understand the far-reaching consequences of a political conquest, whether foreign or that of the confirmed tyrant. It is possible that the conqueror would spare some thing to the conquered out of regard to his own interests. But any thing that is thus spared for good would also go to lessen the completeness of the conquest. And then the scramble for recovery of the portion lost by the conquered would always carry with it a further risk to the portion spared. And some such strife must occur sometime or other, either from the conqueror seeking to extend the range of his original spoliation or from the conquered seeking to recover their loss. Until at last one of two things must follow: completion of the conquest into tyranny on the one hand and slavery on the other; or full reconciliation and assimilation between conqueror and conquered upon the basis of civilised Government and moral principles as discussed in the preceding section. All attempt at political enslavement therefore justifies defensive war of the most unqualified kind. And

> "—Freedom's battle once begun,
> Bequeathed by bleeding Sire to Son,
> Though baffled oft is ever won."

4. Chivalrous protection.

From patriotism in relation to collective violence we pass on to chivalrous protection calling for violent defence of and by individuals. Here too we have to appropriate the lessons of Sympathy. For a violent repulse given on behalf of the weak to any sort of oppression really proceeds from generous kindness to the party injured or threatened. The principle is the fundamental one of devotion of the strong to the protection of the weak. (*See back p.* 19). It occurs in its most ordinary form in the care and attention bestowed by man for the conditions and requirements of the woman, the wife, and the child. But it would not be quite wise for the Indian to laugh at the erratic knight of La

Mancha, when he recalls the chivalrous career of a Byron for Greek independence, of a Howard or Mrs. Fry for the relief of prison-suffering, and of a Wilberforce or Clarkson—nay of the British nation itself,—for the abolition of Slavery and the Slave-trade. If my countrymen resent the avowal that our love for our country does not impel us to vigorous patriotic action, there can be no question that similar sense of duty in respect of the Woman, outside of the family, has been most deficient in its development. The truth is, Hindu piety in its latest forms, aims at such a subjugation of the inner enemy that it hardly leaves room for a full measure of gratification of even our virtuous impulses. The very ideal of Hindu happiness signifies such a disencumberment of all our earthly connections that much active effort for public welfare becomes somewhat inconsistent with it. A man may become by his position in the country identified with, and may thus be working as any patriot or philanthropist, but the appropriate chivalrous feeling and activity seem to be feeble or dormant. War generally fails to be distinguished as between offensive or defensive, and is resorted to from angry enthusiasm, or mercenary alliance rather than patriotic feeling for one's country and countrymen. And where the impulses to just war are thus left out of control, the similar feeling of chivalry, which renders manly dignity incompatible with any apathy for the needs of the nation as a whole, for the weak as a class, and for Woman for her sex, has simply remained outside the range of Hindu life. I do not certainly mean that no traces of the two feelings are to be found. That would be inconsistent with human nature; and in fact, the Hindus may proudly lay claim to high culture in that most humanizing virtue of all,—humanity. A Hindu can therefore always point to features in his inner life which would correspond in some measure at least with the noblest manifestations of human character in any part of the world.* But that is not sufficient for the purposes of social morality. Man's kindness must be bestowed upon mankind in the foremost place, and gradually extended however minutely, from the nearest to the most distant

relations; from relief to the special wants of any, to the general wants of all or many. In regard to the lower animals we can at best cultivate a tenderness for their life or forbear giving them pain. But we can never understand much less supply their wants, for the simple reason that they are beyond the reach of intercommunication with us by language. So again kindness is not a negative virtue, satisfied with omission to inflict pain or death; but it impels the mind to make others happy in life and as they feel in fact. But here the Hindu gets lost owing to his traditional ideas of what is happiness—ideas rather of a transcendental kind, though so assiduously cherished by the commonest people, and so successfully inculcated by the Hindu scriptures. The Hindu philosophers have been most attentive for instance, to make Hindu woman the most faithful of wives. Her whole life is a grand system of Brahmanic moral conduct (brahmacharya). But the home is not a cloister: indeed even the modest comforts of a public cloister stand rejected in the true Brahmanic spirit. Life is impossible—becomes monstrous—except in society. But woman here is made to cut herself out of society, perhaps as Brahmandom has isolated itself from the world outside of India. And as the Brahman virtually overlooked the political claims of Country or State as against his Religion or Church, so woman's life is rigidly confined to the domestic world, and she is not only relieved of the pressure of mixed social intercourse, but also deprived of man's manly kindness to attend to her wants in the world at large. Hinduism however is so far beyond meriting the censure of non-Hindu society that nothing would be so praiseworthy to the genuine Hindu feeling as Roman patriotism or medieval chivalry. And this remarkable adaptability—unquestionably transmitted to us by our Brahmanic predecessors—demands that chivalry should be cultivated and cultivated with genuine Hindu predilections. We must despite Brahmanic simplicity, study the wants which are human, and though in some cases they are multiplied in society and cause much misery in consequence, yet we must study them for the sake of the more numerous benefits derived from

society. And we must endeavour to supply those wants with all our soul, with all our mind, with all our might, and with all our possessions. Brahmanic self-abnegation will thus lead us into the noblest paths of patriotism, chivalry and philanthropy.

Nothing so clearly discloses the defect of the Hindu or Brahmanic society as the fact that protection to the weak is not evoked until allegiance is declared in unmistakable manner by what is called an *asrita i. e.* the man who personally seeks protection. For such a person or such asylum, the Hindus would make any length of sacrifices. So again they would sell all they have and give away in alms—on occasions such as the *sraddha.* But no two men will unite to make their gifts a permanent boon to the needy. And it is the same defect which makes them stand by and heartlessly look on while their neighbour or their country is slaughtered or despoiled. This will never do. Brahmanism is capable, and must rise to appreciate the sanctions as well as the requirements of Society. The moral self-culture of the Hindu must be pushed farther than it has been, and comprehend what the All demands from Each (*See back p.* 20). He more than most other men has learnt to project himself into the All by applying the *sruti* (Vedic Word) — সোঽহম্ *so'ham,* "I am he." But he must also look after that All, so as to evoke his own exertions in behalf of, and with the view to secure for, that All, all the happiness that it is capable of in human society. The Hindu may have failed to rise to European greatness and to demonstrate to the weak and the feminine sex a particular sort of public service. But as he has discovered a wonderful appreciation of foreign culture, he must, though upon the foreign model, work out for himself the moral life which would shape his primitive kindliness or *so'ham*-spirit, into Patriotism and Chivalry and any thing else that Society may require of him.

6. Martyrdom.

The last and noblest form of defensive violence—Martyrdom—would obviously take us to tread on sacred ground. But there is need for non-Christians to know at least the history of Christianity and its effects upon

society and government, and indeed upon all human thought and sentiment. The principle of universal toleration—the principle which underlies the peaceful propagation of the gospel and for which the world owes so much to the wisdom of Christian society—this principle carries with it the essential conditions of martyrdom. It would however be comparatively barren of results if, as happens in Hindu Society, it left men perfectly unconcerned about the results of their neighbour's religion. The world lives by faith: faith in feeling, the large and all-comprehensive faith in God or Brahma: faith in thought—the most indubitable of all convictions,—*i. e.* the faith in truth, knowledge and consciousness: and last, not least, the world lives by faith in man,—that faith upon which man lives with man in society and acts as an individual member of it and that faith about human opinion on which the universal principles of moral conduct are to be founded. All these three several kinds of faith are sought to be united by religions, each in modes peculiar to itself. But the faith of all faiths is man's faith to and in himself: and the ultimate test of that supreme faith is its defence by Martyrdom: to die in the hands of other men rather than to incur the odium and generate the impression—that one's inner conviction belied the outer presentation of it by himself. Boast as we Hindus may, I believe the truth must be admitted that our highest abnegation fails to come up to martyrdom. And this short-coming works a most widely ramified mischief when any voluntary sacrifice of health or happiness fails to be borne and sympathised with in common, whether for the sake of a public duty or in the cause of truth and morality in the abstract. Christendom has abjured religious persecution because martyrdom inevitably creates such overwhelming sympathy, that the persecutor always comes to be defeated in the end. The sympathy in question is the result of human nature. The martyr always arouses attention to himself; his opinion spreads; his suffering is felt for, and his example is never lost altogether. The resulting phenomena are a social product; and persecution yields at last to numeric strength. What the patriot

fails to achieve by his diplomacy, statesmanship, and even a successful appeal to arms, that is spontaneously reared up by the meanest individual's defence of his opinion, when such defence is carried up to martyrdom. The man is greater than the external world; the inner man is greater than the outer man; and man's morality and religion is the greatest of all. Martyrdom seeks to defend man's inner nature as a whole, and also his morals and religion in particular. As suicide is the worst homicide, so martyrdom is the noblest form of defensive violence and the highest trait in man. The inevitable struggle between organism and environment is neither one for existence, nor that of suicide; but it is for life in its truest sense: an ever advancing ideal having for its real correlative, is the death of martyrdom.

CHAPTER VII. THE INDUSTRIAL INSTINCT. (5.)

Industry and Avarice.

The first point to be observed about this instinct is that it is the same which has always been condemned as Avarice, Greed or Covetousness. And then we should note that it is from a change in human Opinion that any difference is now made between Avarice as it used to be hated and Industrialism as it is freely advocated. This changed opinion is important because it would show how human affairs do tend to eventual establishment of morals from the real bonds of society. Avarice moves on to Industry. And setting aside avaricious industry, assiduous Co-operation ought next to advance into the purity and greatness of charitable usefulness.

The change in opinion.

In the estimation of preceding generations, Avarice stood allied to Gluttony and Lust, and was held not very far from brute-violence. The murderer and robber if he had a sufficient following used to be deified as a hero even by his enemies, while the innocent hoarder of

wealth was thought deserving of any amount of plundering violence. Even those who expected to be the miser's heirs were not quite sparing in their antagonism. Nay, by Hindus, prodigality is much valued; only as I think, to prevent hoarding, or, for purposes of distribution of wealth. And if in the West some men have, since the suppression of the usury laws, come to forget the alliance between charity and alms-giving, people are not wanting who look upon the modern doctrines of political economy as all the more fit for opposition because of their scientific pretensions. Indeed many who seem to take a strange delight in the controversy about the scientific methods of Sociology and Political Economy would be shocked to find that grave moral bearings of hard economic truths now stand disclosed in Sociology.

Wealth.

The initial point in the modern opinion is the fact of experience that as a rule, man's production exceeds his consumption, and that the surplus is Capital, constituting what is ordinarily understood by Wealth. Wealth presents varied aspects from the stand-points of happiness, morality, and social welfare. Avarice in its bad aspect bears several degrading appearances such as, of the greedy miser, the miserable beggar, and the grasping industrialist. The first of these would be least mindful of consumption and production as factors of wealth or industry, but look only to the savings to be hoarded, as an end of life. He has now ceased to be looked down upon as noxious vermin; his foolish miseries have become at best the subject of pleasantry, thanks to the providence of society in repressing crime. The second man—the mendicant beggar,—who was once honored as the opposite of the miser, while he is equally regardless of production and consumption would with a clear conscience cut down both, as also the surplus wealth or capital, to a minimum. He is now likened to the miser in making for himself those miseries which are peculiar to his mendicant condition. His conduct arises often from a disposition to sloth and erroneous notions about industrial independence. Hence even the better traits of mendicancy now fail to be appreciated. The third

man referred to above is the sore problem of the day,—the ever-grasping Industrialist who is reckless about competition, unmindful of over-production, and perhaps also perniciously determined to stretch his consumption to what may be called economic limits: pernicious, because but for those natural limits he would never hesitate to indefinitely push forward any vicious self-indulgence. All these pictures of the avaricious man are now no less within reach of the good sense of laymen than accessible from the teachings of science. And as it is easy to observe that Avarice and Industrialism are linked together by that most appreciated of social concerns,—Wealth,—so also wealth must present important bearings to all our egoistic and altruistic impulses. In its anti-social aspect wealth offers attractions to the glutton and the debauchee, the marauder and the avaricious miser. But in its social aspects wealth is instrumental to all impulses ascending in altruism above the Industrial instinct; *viz.*, pride, vanity, affection, veneration and kindness. Domination now rests less upon war than its sinews, and fame is impossible without some help from the circulating medium. It is also money which must bring a large proportion of what affection and kindness seek to bestow; and reverence the last shelter of the moral sentiment has often to vent itself in costly though unproductive memorials. Even if it devotes itself to remembrance of a more actively grateful kind, gratitude has to seek an opening in efficient and productive activity, in other words, valuable kindness. In short, as all criminality may be fastened upon the military instinct, so all sociality may externally at least, be made to hinge upon Industry and Wealth. Morality has after all only got to spiritualise industry so as to render its social aptitude recognised; but before it can do so the foulness of all violence must be purified by the help of the inner man; and men must learn to appreciate all useful industry for what happiness it brings about, even apart from the motives of the industrialist.

Divisions of the chapter.

The subject of the chapter might occur in an infinite variety of forms; but here we shall consider only a few of its peculiar bearings under the following heads: Avarice, Competition, Independence, and lastly, the two different modes of securing independence, Mendicancy and Co-operation. It will be necessary to slightly vary the order of sequence. The logic of the above division however is obvious.

AVARICE.

The characteristic feature of the man of Avarice has already been mentioned that he looks to wealth—*i. e.* the surplus of production over consumption as the exclusive object of his greed; and he looks for it apart from the human purposes to which the material subserves. The man here is wanting in intelligence, he fails to understand, that for man, human purposes are and ought to be the paramount consideration. Hoarded wealth which is not meant to be utilized is literally like the lump of gold, buried and stolen according to the fable. But before people are condemned for failing to appreciate duly that most instructive story, they ought to be informed why the banker has to hold in hand a requisite quantity of bullion commensurate with the credit of his paper-money. As civilization multiplies the activities of man, we are driven to aim at many objects which are no more than instruments after all. Indeed the test of utility, which as applied to material wealth converts the miser into a fool, may prove the student to be wrongly appreciative of intellectual wealth, should it happen to be divested of all social and moral purposes whatsoever.

INDEPENDENCE.

Before we can examine the knotty question of Competition in its defensive character, it will be necessary to understand the conditions of material Independence. Competition is instrumental to material independence, but it also goes beyond in aggressive industry. Independence is after all the neutral condition to which even the avaricious miser must attain in order to move either up to the higher morality of charitableness, or down into refined forms of unhuman

if not beastly life. It starts with that minimum of capital or wealth, which is so indispensable to save one's self from starvation. And social morality requires that that minimum must be sought for as an imperative duty. Opinions may be said to differ as to whether the minimum in question is to be secured by reducing consumption, or by only extending it simultaneously with production. So long as the individual was allowed to overlook his relations with society, what is called bare sufficiency might be regarded as independence and secured with a minimum of consumption. In other words he might live like an anchorite without detriment to society. But if the claims of society are to prevail, even the anchorite must devote his energies to the service of the community; that is, though he did not produce material wealth, he must not hoard up his spiritual treasure like the miser. Society as a whole has established a higher claim than he, to the individual's tribute of industry and industrial products. If he wants to please himself, he must not look to private charity. If he has a useful moral lesson to inculcate, he must incur all the responsibilities of the teacher. The social aspect of industry renders it impossible for any man to keep satisfied with what would suffice only for the day. Leaving aside all claims for one's belongings and the question of future provision, in order to restrict his production to such a narrow margin, either his leisure or his labor, must be frittered away in the most deplorable manner, and his mental attitude get degraded to that of the noxious class among mendicants. Moreover so great is the moral value of industry that even where material wealth is not in request, occupation has the spiritual value of preventing man's degradation into wickedness. Idleness has been long known to be the mother of all evils.

Consumption

Again, as production may not be wantonly cut down in order to shirk the responsibilities of wealth, so it would be more dangerous still to increase consumption where one is by nature or habit very reckless about the knack or craft of saving. The increase of consumption may occur merely as

waste of money or as more noxious self-indulgence. In both cases the maxim " waste not, want not" applies with full force. The provision for the rainy day is indispensable to independence. But when consumption is raised for purposes of self-indulgence, the conduct tells upon the man in several ways. First of all there is the immorality of self-indulgence in whatever shape it occurs. Then, habit serves to keep up the drain and in spite of any reduction in the production. But the worst evils are reserved for the cumulative effects of the conduct. The scale of consumption gets raised in a whole class of men, the self-indulgence of the originator being forgotten and lost by prevalence of custom. But, all men of the class may not be equally efficient producers, and what one man is able to spend as an extra indulgence will reduce the saving of some other into nothing, and the latter would have either to live at starvation-point or sink below his peer in the scale of living. The latter course would be most expedient, but human imprudence tends to spread the increased scale of living rather than to adapt the different orders of efficiency to different scales of comfort. And thus civilization is charged with multiplying pauperism by reason of its raising the standard of living. The fact must be attributed to defective moral sense in respect of consumption.

Communism.

It is of importance to consider on the other hand that the surplus of production over consumption ought to be left entirely under the control of the producer, because the acts involved are exclusively the individual's own. Society errs in seeking in any way to trench either upon his agency or his savings. To do so would be the sort of aggressiveness which constitutes the immorality and degradation of the slothful and the mendicant. I say errs, for the sins of society cannot be fixed for punishment, except upon any of its individual components; the error however tells; and tells down to the thousandth generation. Property is the indefeasible adjunct of man's control over his production, his industry, and his life's consumption. No amount of social police can displace this sovereign control. Repression cannot guide the happiness of the repressed; anp

compulsory industry is ever doomed to fail in efficiency. All communistic measures which aim at effecting a control on the Industrial instinct must therefore end only in hostilities between the slothful (*see back p.* 31.) and the industrious: between the less efficient and the more efficient. The error of communism lies not in overlooking this conflict but in supposing that voluntary idleness can be distinguished from necessary inefficiency and then put under some sort of police or control. The requisite criminal procedure is simply impossible. Property or ownership is after all the most convenient and wise form of limitation which collective man or Society has been able to devise for regulating the freedom, or individual conduct, of man in the matter of production and consumption. Communists forget that Society as it exists acts in concert no less than they themselves propose to do, and that the rules of communistic society wherever workable would in the natural course of events get divided into moral and criminal law.

Property.

Property thus bears to wealth the same relation that freedom bears to happiness and volitional activity. And all restrictions to rights of property signify so much deduction from material independence and moral responsibility of the individual. Where the individual has not full ownership or control over the wealth he comes to possess, he cannot have to answer to himself for the fruits of his industry; and what is thus practically exacted by society from him, also comes to be balanced and weighed by every variety of self-indulgence in him.

Domestic communism of the Hindus.

As a special application of the foregoing principles, it is incumbent upon the Indian people to review their notions of private property and collective ownership in joint families. The complicated legal bearings of the question exclude it from the present study. Nevertheless the moral requirements of Independence in respect of property are most imperative. And the fact remains that joint-family-ownership of property is sadly hampered either by irresponsible opposition of some, or by over-bearing conduct of other of its

members. I think very serious preparation is necessary to enable any man to fitly discharge his duties as part-owner of property in such an organization as the Hindu joint-family.

Slavery.

Before passing on to other questions, every thoughtful man ought to appreciate the collective efforts of England first, and of the rest of Europe in its suite towards the abolition of slavery; and the memory of Wilberforce ought to excite the most lively gratitude in the human breast. India has been fortunate in having been generally spared from effects of the more aggravated forms of domestic slavery. But there is still much to be done in the shape of removing unnecessary restrictions upon the Individual's activity and consequently upon his moral responsibility. And our true gratitude in this regard would be best evinced by addressing ourselves to that important work. Let us also do our best in the matter of industry, industrial independence, and co-operation and the blessings we have obtained under foreign rule would grow of themselves, or be easily promoted by suitable defensive measures.

Competition.

We have already seen that material independence requires attentive care against self-seeking increase of consumption or idle waste of wealth. It should be next considered whether production may be indefinitely extended without any detriment to morality. This increase can be effected only by means of industrial competition. The obvious answer to the question is that to indulge in purely selfish gratification of the industrial instinct can never be perfectly safe for society. But there is considerable difficulty in acting up to this principle of morality. The question arises from complications regarding the distribution of wealth. Property being indispensable to the healthful operation of the industrial instinct, facilities for its exchange are its necessary incidents. And altruism as an element of exchange is almost a contradiction in terms. Property is exclusive ownership; and whatever would be sacrificed from altruistic motives in the course of exchange of property would obviously take away something from its competitive value. The radical

difference between gift and exchange cannot be obliterated by any sort of compromise. Moreover, the competition-price determines the claims of the successful competitor as being of the most efficient workman ; and the market-rule allows these claims in effect. To prefer the offer of another selling at higher price means not only a charity to that other in regard to the excess but a wanton disregard to the claims of the man who made his offer at the lowest price. Competition therefore is theoretically inseparable from property, its exchange and its free distribution. It is largely governed indeed by custom. Nevertheless custom at best tempers, but can never entirely displace competition. And that being the case, it would be hard to say on moral grounds that production should not be extended upon similar competitive basis. Property and wealth must be allowed to grow for the moral requirements of society and the industrial instinct both. Exchange as an incident of property is also bound to be free. Free exchange brings in free competition. And after that, it becomes almost impossible to urge that society must not suffer from excessive competition.

The labor saving appliances.

The question might be set aside as a casuistical, if not actually a vexed one, but for its practical bearings upon what are called th[illegible]-saving appliances, and its theoretical bearings upon the dogmas about natural selection. Theoretically all struggles between man and man are egoistic and exception has accordingly been taken to the dogma of survival of the fittest as an incentive to aggressive improvement (*see back* p. 63). But the practical question of competition in exchanges of all kinds becomes very serious in respect of the labor-saving appliances. These modern appliances, associated as they are with other elements of social welfare, are after all only contrivances to push on competition, regardless of its latent anti-social tendencies. Their real significance is that the skilled labor of a machinist or inventor and the unskilled labor of an ordinary workman are both exchanged to capitalitists at competition prices. Suppose the skill of the machine-maker is equivalent to the unskilled

labor of a hundred ordinary workmen; but competition brings down the price of the machine to what would be equivalent to the wages of only fifty of them. The capitalist after becoming owner of the invention is enabled to discharge one hundred of his workmen. The result is that the skilled labor of the machinist is deprived of half its equivalent in price; and the capitalist appropriates that amount on account of the fifty disemployed workmen. This is only one of the many forms in which competition drives out in the direction of starvation all sorts of inefficiency in the individual's power of producing wealth. So long as this inefficiency is measured by natural powers or even by habitual activity of man no serious question is raised as to the relative merits of different forms of human efficiency. But when man's industrial function becomes a part as it were, of his property or capital, he has to stand aghast before this Frankenstein of his own creation. The reproductive power of capital is indefinitely multiplied by unlimited competition. Custom, caste or guild, communism, co-operation in its politico-economic sense, and trade-unionism have been resorted to in order to put competition under some method of check. But all contrivances have failed. And Europe has to confront the awful problems of pauperism, disemployed labor, over-production, and a competition even about the standards of leisure and comfort between for instance, the workmen of England and those of Germany or from China. I cannot pretend to know a solution of this difficulty when no one knows it.* But it would be easy to understand from the analysis offered, the general bearings of moral conduct. Material independence is essential to morality. Nothing dries up the springs of moral sentiment so much as hunger and penury. Labor and its products must be exchanged. All that can be said is that competition is only a means to attaining independence; it must not be perverted into tyrannical purposes. Avarice has given place to

* While these pages are passing through the press, I observe in the Times (Nov. 30. 1888) a leader giving an account of the system of State Insurance recently introduced in Germany for the abolition of extreme poverty and provision against sickness, accidents, and old age, " a social experiment on a vast scale which if it succeeds will form the most enduring title of the late Emperor William and Prince Bismarck to the gratitude of their countrymen."

competition, for the sake of independence. But for nothing more. Defensive competition is permissible provided it does not imperceptibly grow into aggressive competition. But how the efficiency of labour and skill should be freely pushed on, and yet made to stop at where it might trench upon the food-supply of any man lies beyond my power to answer.

Free-trade.

The question of competition between capital and labor and between unskilled and skilled labor would naturally carry us to that of industrial competition between nations *i. e.* to the morality of commerce and free trade. The question however belongs to the subjects of international morality; and we find ourselves stopped by the limits we have prescribed for ourselves. Failing to establish morality solely upon the harmony between man's egoistic and altruistic impulses, we have to check the conclusions thus derived with the consensus of public opinion and the nation's policy as expressed in law or by legislation. When however a whole nation desires to pursue a selfish end by free-trade or by protection, it would not be easy to submit the appeal of morality to the conscience of any larger group. We might do so with the help of religion and religious authority. But with society as our only resource we do not see our way outside the circle of the nation. The importance of the subject however can never be exaggerated. And we should never overlook the fact that free international competition in industry, has for its condition-precedent, a secure establishment of international peace or,—the abolition of war.

Wealth and Morality.

Whatever may be the immoralities of competition in its more intense forms, there can be no question that in its moderate aspects wealth is most conducive to man's efficiency and progress. Up to a certain extent it is indispensable to independence and it is for that important incident that property-feeling, for all its self-seeking character has a moral virtue; and it is very often the case that the pleasures of ownership and a moderate addition

to one's comforts opens the mind to the requirements of sympathy. He that does not own any property or command the comforts which property affords, is unfitted to appreciate the corresponding wants in others. The Hindoo account, legend, or parable of King Janaka and *Sukadeva depicts a fact of the commonest experience ; and yet somehow or other there is a wide feeling prevalent about the superior purity of the mendicant's temper of mind. For all the short-comings of the wealthier classes, a democracy composed of masses of the poorest population would work much greater harm than they. A nation of paupers is never likely to possess much of the milk of human kindness; nay, nor even a sense of the dignity of labor, of the conditions of leisured affluence, and of the duties and true responsibilities of the wealthy. Ownership of property is the most peaceful form in which individuality can be exercised ; the freedom which it presupposes means only a removal of checks which may be aggressive after all ; and to advance that freedom must, up to a certain extent, signify only a sort of preservation which is to the social life of the individual, what nutrition is to his animal life.

Gratuitousness of labor.

We have seen the complications which arise from competition owing to the conditions of distribution of wealth. But the appreciation of wealth is in one sense, only a recent fact arising from the industrial growth of society. Wealth would have very limited powers but for the circulating medium. It should not be forgotten however that barter or exchange is only a human contrivance by which the different wants of different men are between them conveniently supplied by each other. There can be no

* Sukadeva the greatest of the anchorites, having completed his studies asked his father Vyas if he had still anything left to learn. Vyas advised him to go to king Janaka. Sukadeva felt humiliated to find that he should be desired to seek instruction from a king and a layman. He went however, with due deference to his father's wish. When he came to Janaka they began to converse on questions of high import. Meantime the report came to Janaka that his city was on fire ; and as often as the message was repeated Janaka gave out orders to look to its suppression without forsaking his discourse on transcendental topics. At last when the report came that the next room of his own house was on fire, up jumped Sukadeva to look to a bit of his rags. And on Janaka's pointing out, Sukadeva perceived for the first time how he had failed to acquire true dispassion as compared to the king.

absolute equivalence between the commodities which are exchanged for equal sums of money. Because one pound of tea and twenty of rice happened to sell for the same price, it would not follow that they were equal to one another in the same sense that one rupee is equal to another. The equalities of numbers, lines and figures are confined to their abstract characters only. Compound quantities are availed of to attain a similar equality in various other ways; but the relation of such equality to human convention is never to be forgotten. The most weighty moral truth which is connected with these facts is that the money-value of industry is altogether a matter of human contrivance or arrangement. A labor may be of immense value to man though it could not be exchanged for a price. Indeed many philosophers maintain that all human service—including exchangeable labor—is purely gratuitous. The money paid as price and the commodity given up as in exchange for it, signify only two separate acts of gratuitous service in every human transaction. If this view come to be widely accepted the whole aspect of society or man's material economy might be changed. But even apart from such wide changes every body knows that the services of affection are beyond the sphere of money-valuation. And the value of wisdom, the useful labor of leisured classes, no less than of the exemplary dispassion of the recluse or the mendicant also comes under the same category. Thus it comes that the independence which in one line of thinking has to be traced to industrial co-operation and competition or even to avarice, will in another line, present features allied with the solitary yearnings of the mendicant, and in a third line, with bare increase of the material resources of the world and the totality of man's earthly enjoyments, quite apart from egoistic or altruistic intentions.

MENDICANCY: its merits.

Mendicancy in the estimation of our ancestors was indispensable to self-abnegation, and the aims of moral advancement. The opinion was just in its own days; and as such mendicancy will always possess a value of its own. When a man fails to identify

himself with what we consider are advanced bearings of social life, he should by no means be censured for his adhesion to the old ideal of moral life. For that ideal was not only very real in the circumstances of social life in the past, but the logical value which the ideal then possessed continues still. Unselfishness is indispensable to altruism; and a man may be very wise to aim at no higher morality than unselfishness. Now to be unselfish where one cannot spare any thing valuable for the good of others, requires that he should cut down his consumption and standard of comfort to the measure of his production however small that may be. The result may not necessarily lead to a saving and thence to charity or alms-giving. But the saving if any is never hoarded. And the spirit of retrenchment is what I regard as another characteristic of the true mendicant; and it possesses a moral value which must ever be appreciated. It is a matter of regret that we English-reading Indians are so little alive to the parallel presented by the Vishnuvite or Vedantist mendicants of India and the followers of St. Francis of Assisi.

Its mistakes.

The modern protest against mendicancy has also its moral value; and I believe a higher one. For the mendicant's intellect is sadly obtuse where he fails to see that he could never have lived his independent and dispassionate hermit-life unless there was a society in the back ground to supply his earthly necessities. The Hindu mendicant is even known to praise the householder's life. To be consistent he must. But he fails to see at all that the independence of his self-sought poverty is only apparent. And he is really wanting in just gratitude to society, to say nothing of the vanity under which he labors, the interest he feels in his little belongings, and the slothfulness which often actuates him. And nothing serves to bring out the fact into light so well as the false imitators of mendicancy who betake to it as a very suitable calling. Whether the mendicant is aware or not of the requirement, that his real service to society consists in being able to present a

glowing example of unselfishness, he is bound to see and answer for the host of wicked imitators who are evoked by his abnormal relations with society. That service would be invaluable; but the morality of benevolence is higher; and the utility, if not the gratuitousness, of labor being unquestionable, its dignity has to be appreciated over the independence of mendicancy.

It does not seem to be difficult to meet the mendicant even on his own grounds. He overlooks the simple fact that his independence if honestly imitated would not only divest society of industrial civilization and its wants, but would eventually convert mankind into a race of lotus-eaters bereft even of the charitable sentiment. Indeed, I am inclined to attribute our improvidence, and the defective punctuality and co-operation for which we Hindus have now become notorious, to the questionable ideals set up regarding mendicancy in life and dispassion in the heart and mind. However, as regards the mendicant's really valuable characteristic—dispassion—we ought now to see that Hinduism itself has sought to popularise the Vedantist requirements about abstract meditation by prescribing for the noviciate some sort of ostensible external occupation which has to be mechanically kept up till the dispassionate attitude of the mind and heart grows altogether habitual. But it is obvious that this occupation would lose nothing if it be selected for him with some attention to utility by another, say his *Guru* or Guide. It is certainly possible to contrive that a labor though dispassionately followed would yield wealth and be of service to others; so that while even the difficulty of abstract meditation was reduced, its valuable results might always serve to unite charity with mechanical occupation, and if successful, with dispassion too.

CO-OPERATION: The usury laws.

The industrial avocation even without the help of special training rises to the grandeur of utility. Its conditions—exchange and competition—necessarily develop human inventiveness in order to serve others with a view to make money. And though the money-making spirit may be degraded by avarice, the service

to society which was incidental to the industry, remains and for all time; so much so, that the laws of usury, suggested by the most charitable of motives, have had to be abolished for the very same ends. The worst miser in Europe is now made instrumental to highest services to mankind, by the simple contrivance of substituting for hoards of specie, some other instruments of credit. And it becomes necessary for Mahomedan thinkers to consider whether the religious injunction against usury is not frustrated and abused by their wealthy men being taught to overlook the distinction which has grown up between hoarded wealth and reproductive capital. After all the relation between borrower and lender is at bottom, one of real co-operation. The usurer is hard only in his own heart; and the hardness of it may work as much in hoarding as in lending at interest. Society is compelled to co-operate from the bare requirements of collective activity; and any thing that stands in the way of co-operation must therefore be hurtful to morality.

Morality of co-operation.

The question is how co-operation should be cultivated as a moral virtue. And the answer ought to be easily found from the principles of morality which have been previously laid down. Thought and feeling must both be directed to cultivate in practice the habit of co-operation. Feeling, even when it does not rise to full appreciation of other men's wants and happiness, must at least seek to retain other people's co-operation by full discharge of one's own portion of the common work. In other words, where just apprehension exists that co-operation will not be forthcoming from others, even there the requirements of co-operation become a matter of duty for the individual alone, as imposed by prior conditions. Habit indeed helps so to rear up and strengthen the feeling of co-operation, that in Western countries even the criminal concert of swindlers, beggars and other dregs of society betakes to documentary records of what has to be done and how the work should be distributed between the co-adjutors. Those who would co-operate are bound to know not only their own portion

of the work but how the remainder of it is expected to be effectuated. A measure of providence is indispensable to co-operation as indeed for all heart-felt sympathy. The religious basis of morality is so far unsuited to the requirements of society, that while duties are assigned to each in religion, the share prescribed for the rest is left to be exacted only by supernatural agency. Human co-operation, however requires a systematic, *i. e.* fully thought out, division of labor or duties and similar arrangements for supervision. And as the system is matured by the test of time and experience, it also gets settled into custom. Thus morality requires that we should always see behind a custom into its original method, concert, compact, contract or law ; and that we should cherish the facilities derived from past custom without being blind to the requirements of the present and the future. This is the very essence of social morality. Co-operation is requisite in all matters. But it is best to be studied in mutual arrangements which are of the nature of contracts. And thence we can see how the present is bound with the past or is to bind the future to itself in any sort of co-operation.

Contracts.

A contractual arrangement is the foundation of co-operation and the more detailed and exhaustive that arrangement is, the better would its purposes be subserved by its human agents. The first requisite is one of forethought and fertility of resources in making the arrangements for any sort of co-operation. The short-comings of incapacity in this respect may be—nay they always are—supplied by experience. But indolent or perverse negligence is a matter of dangerous immorality. For without the lessons of industrial co-operation even the dictates of benevolent duty would be more or less unsubstantial.

Rules.

One grave error which I have very often met with in our society is that men's duties are either left to be understood by themselves or prescribed with so much detail that little or no room is available or availed of, for the exercise of personality. The fault is one of method and

perceptible on all sides; the direction is wrong either for incompleteness or for over-doing its function; and subordination is relaxed by too much attention to the letter of a rule and too little of it to the purpose of the rule, the rule-maker and to one's own human character as an agent. The error may be traced to the moral ideal taken from the mendicant's life or various other causes, but it is so wide-spread and so deeply felt that inattention to it in one's own conduct must be set down as a mark of defect in moral education.

Custom.

But if inattention to method or the regulative conditions of co-operation is immoral, attention to the point may be abused by undue neglect of permanence. If a concerted arrangement comes to be changed as often as any of the members to the arrangement change, the labor of assimilating the changed conditions may over-balance the advantages of every new and improved arrangement. And the changeful conduct may become so habitual as to deprive posterity of all benefit from the wisdom of time-honored old customs, and in one word, traditions. Regard therefore must be had to the rearing up of customary rules which form such invaluable help to mediocre intelligence and activity. And it will be perceived that such regard is not only conducive to healthy co-operation but characteristic of reverence for the past and kindness to posterity. When the reasons, either historical or logical, of any custom are known or even postulated, it cannot long be an idol of fools, much less a plague to wise men.

Extortion, Improvidence and Perpetuities.

If now we turn to the limits of regulation and methods of contract-making, we shall be presented with certain well-known difficulties. In any contract both parties to it are expected to fully understand the responsibilities they thereby incur. But where one party fails in this respcet and the other seeks to benefit by the failure, the relations are altered in the direction of extortion or deception. And whether the fact should indicate criminality on one side or abnormal improvidence on the other, will depend

on matters beyond our present scope. But moral conduct in society obviously calls for due attention to how contractual or law-made co-operation is secured in life. The principle of morality—altruism—is safe and sound. But rules to determine its working may be abused into extortion, improvidence, love of change and predilection for everlasting uniformity. The last-named evil may also be noticed in one of its aggravated forms—Perpetuities. But the ramifications are innumerable.

Punctuality and Punctiliousness.

Co-operation is concerned with men's labor and the work they have taken on hand. The purposes of both require attention to adjustment and permanence of their contractual relations. But time is an essential element in all contracts. And punctilious discharge of one's own portion of the contract is the moral basis of that essential element. Indian people however have not only become steeped in customary rules to the neglect of contractual arrangements, but they are still almost impervious to the industrial value of time, punctuality, and punctiliousness. What can be more humiliating to the country as a whole than the fact that all payments are as a rule put off to the last moment, and that the work done by our countrymen always stands in need of a supervision and revision by superiors and that in a degree which seriously detracts from the otherwise superior value of Indian labor!

Joint capital and joint undertakings.

While dwelling upon the subject of co-operation and organization I cannot pass over one prime requisite of our days: the ends and arrangements of joint industrial undertakings. Nothing is so patent as the fact that we cannot raise joint capital. But nothing is so discreditable to us too, as the purposeless regret which is expressed in that connection. In the first place the advantages of joint-undertaking are unduly magnified with reference to those enormous associations which are possible only under the principle of what are called the limited-liability-companies. And in the next place it seems that our countrymen

do not or would not attend to the requirements of partnership-business with unlimited liabilitics. Partnership is never preferable to single ownership. European commerce has passed through the noviciate of single proprietors. The responsibilities of an Antonio could not be learnt without the practice of single-headed control over his numerous argosies. Partnerships are indeed much wanted. But the defect lies, I believe, in the matter of contract-making. Where a partnership is desirable with us, a disinclination to entrust personal direction to chosen men with confidence and wise loyalty, proves our sad incapacity for co-operation. The rules about duty and control so essential to co-operation must become matter of educated habit before a nation can venture upon enterprises adapted to a system of limited-liabilities with its immense and responsible direction. Rules must be felt for by both superior and subordinate, and never left to conjecture on each side.

Business and accounts.

As a point of important detail I think I may point out that the shortcomings alluded to in respect of partnerships, are due to defects in the Indian system of accounts and in regard to punctuality and punctiliousness in business.

Industrial and martial co-operation.

Nothing so clearly proves the steady advance of human character as the fact that industrial co-operation becomes gradually the parent of usefulness and morality. The earliest forms of co-operation may indeed be traced back to military activity of primitive barbarism.' And after all, the glories of war signify only the intense fellowship incidental to martial life and the services of the hero to his own colleagues and subordinates. War also served to rear up a disciplined army in the past, as now it envelopes itself around its sinews as they are called. But the taints of war are wiped out when the discipline derived from it and the wealth produced with the help of that discipline, are both concentrated in the co-operation of peaceful industry. Society is the widest and best of all

co-operative organisations; and morality requires that the division of labor characteristic of social life should grow into an intenser form of co-operation in every office, manufactury or other form of organized labor. Our foremost duty under the foreign rule of Great Britain is to learn co-operation. It is indispensable as much for growth of material wealth in general, as for a confidence in one's own independent efforts towards common weal in the country. The independence of mendicancy is the very reverse of what comes of staunch co-operation. Let us master that art of all arts, and every other blessing will follow each in its own good time.

CHAP. VIII.

PRIDE, OR DESIRE OF DOMINATION. (6.)

Ambition.

The desires of Domination and Approbation form a binary group, the terms furnishing us also with an analysis of what has been called Ambition. Ambition, as will be seen in the Tabular Analysis (p. 11), stands between self-seeking Improvement in its industrial or constructive form, and that description of sympathy, comprising Attachment and Veneration, which has been grouped together and termed "special" for its limited operation between individuals. Human solidarity is effected in several ways. In its most spontaneous and most durable form, it is the result of what veneration and kindness are found to prevail in domestic society; but ordinarily speaking it is Ambition which is the wide road to power and fame, and thence to extensive human concert.

Domination.

Power is the object of domination and pride; and by power is to be understood that which exacts obedience from others. Hence Domination ultimately resolves itself into the power of inflicting pain *i. e.*, pain of a physi-

cal kind. The opposite kind of pain to which we are subject arises only from censure or compunction ; of these, one is inseparable from a strong sense of duty, while the other is allied to opinion, and would thus come under desire of Approbation. Between physical pain and the praise or odium of others, man incurs another sort of suffering, namely, loss of property, and domination often works also by inflicting pecuniary penalty. But wealth being the equivalent of labor, any pecuniary loss which is imposed by power may be put in the same category with infliction of physical pain. Power in short, manifests itself as physical or brute force, as power of wealth, and also as force or assertion of opinion. Collective opinion may indeed, denote an ultimate appeal to strength of numbers and armed physical force. But individual opinion even in its most peaceful form argues a strength of volition, as well in the mental act of forming an opinion, as in the external act of giving utterance to any such. The power of wealth obviously means only strength of numbers. Hence Domination when it does not rely on collective opinion has only physical might of the dominant person for its resource. Power is thus an adjunct to the successful gratification of the military instinct, but is so far disconnected from it, that the rule of the sword, has not in general to make use of the sword, but often holds up in its stead only the fear of violence and physical punishment. Hence too, power succeeds in effecting a low description of solidarity. On the other hand, the desire of domination when obstructed, and it is one of those desires which naturally tend to discord and mutual struggle between man and man, is productive of serious social disturbance. The man in power seeks to domineer only over subordinates ; he even submits to those who are decidedly above him, but he cannot bear a rival or an equal by his side. And owing to this characteristic, Pride ranks not only as a very self-seeking instinct but manifests itself under different circumstances, in all those absorbing passions known as envy, malice, jealousy, rivalry, chagrin, the spirit of contradiction and so forth.

Leaving aside its bearings with the military instinct, ambition is allied to property or the industrial instinct in a peculiar way. For it would appear that men attach to power and fame an importance which is akin only to the attractions of property. All three are regarded as possessions; and are also held in some reprobation. Wealth, fame, and power are apt to evoke cravings which are bad from our point of view because they are egoistic. But a disenchantment about them arises when they are viewed in the abstract and regarded merely as certain *vague* possessions; and when from the possessor's point of view those possessions, and more especially fame and power, are dissociated from their human purposes. We cannot fully endorse this view of those who look on these concerns as abstract entities; for power and fame really subserve very important human purposes and in the most effective manner too. All our mental functions are valuable; for they all possess a certain utility, and their actual services to other men depend upon our own morality and good sense. And fame and power are certainly better incentives to social union than avarice or violence. But the objects of Ambition are really somewhat vague. On close examination they would all either pass down into some of the grosser self-indulgences counting from avarice downwards; or rise up to the greatness of purely altruistic aims characterised by public good and internal kindness. Property itself is known to be a considerably vague idea. But it is at least associated with tangible objects. The miser might point to something very unmistakeable in the lump of gold which when buried under ground would remain undistinguishable from a clod of earth. But the pleasures of ambition are chiefly those of pursuit, and lose their vividness as soon as the man attains to what power or fame he may have sought. His possessions are traceable only in the minds of those who render him praise or obedience. The obedience in question is often reluctantly yielded, and the praise too is doomed to be of a fitful kind when it is accorded to mere aspirants for fame or

Fame and power compared to property.

power. In the one case, the volition of the subordinate is repressed, and in the other that of the admirer is wanting in constancy. The only way in which these defects, which are inseparable from Pride and Vanity, may be removed is to secure the obedience by kindness, and to establish the praise by merit. Domination though originally founded on violence and fear can never last except through merit, and the whole question of its morality turns upon the modification of that sense of property which is vaguely associated with the possession of fame or power into definite and enduring views about merit, morality, and virtue. Obedience to dominant merit is true Veneration.

Domination and fear.

Power arises from success in striking fear into the hearts of men and it is lifted into moral supremacy and control only by exciting love in place of fear. This principle is one of the simplest kind for the purpose of moral culture. But it is impossible for any one who stands in the position of a superior, to judge whether his subordinate is being impelled by the one or the other. I prefer therefore to examine the desire of Power with reference to the various social relations to which it gives rise between superiors and inferiors.

Divisions of the subject.

We have already seen that in the rule of the sword or rod which power upholds, the actual use of either instrument becomes exceptional after might passes into permanence, such as of sovereignty. Pushing however the metaphor in the illustration a little farther, we find that the sword or rod being eliminated, power retains only 'rule'; which may well be construed as, rule of the law. In fact power is exercised in either of two ways: by a man's personality or by any rule of conduct more or less binding upon both superior and inferior. Our subject is thus divided into Personality and Law. Personality is "the state of existence as a thinking intelligent being," but it ranges from that self-assertiveness which may be partially capricious or thoughtless, to that decision in conduct, which is always swayed by reasons however slow, firm, quick or versatile, such decision may be,

Again as domination is correlated to subordination, so we have also to consider Servility and Discipline. Thirdly, between Personality and Law on the one side, and Servility and Discipline on the other, there lies the condition of Anarchy. And lastly, as the question of personality, law and discipline really comprises what is called Government, we have to consider government in the Country as a whole, in the social unit called the Family, and in the intermediate groups of Gild and City.

DOMINANT PERSONALITY.

Personal domination is very closely allied to the function of the will in the individual. And it is of importance to recognise the alliance with a view to the moral regulation of both,—*viz.*, the man's own will and his desire to rule over others.

Free-will.

The psychological question of free-will lies beyond my scope, (see p. 9.) but I may be allowed to treat every act of volition as having a previous and a subsequent history within the mind of man and more or less accessible to introspection. The previous history of a volition is however exclusively mental; but its subsequent history commences with the external action which has to be regarded not only as an exact counterpart of the volition, but also as the source of various later acts of volition, thought, or feeling. Now, if we decline to look into the earlier of these two histories, it would be very easy to maintain that our will is devoid of an anterior origin and independent of all prior control. But if we try to ascertain that history, we find ourselves more or less at a loss for defect of memory and introspective power. Morality however requires that at each step of our conduct we must go back into that early history of the will to a certain extent at least; and in doing so we have to do several things. We have to judge the character of our own impulses so far as our introspection permits; and we have also to exercise our foresight in making an estimate of the after consequences of our contemplated conduct. Thus according as thought and forethought predominates in the previous history of any decision of the will, its free, creative, and unbeginning character is vastly altered. Let it not be

understood that I am taking sides with fatalism. For I attach the highest importance to the power of the individual to modify his own character and conduct, and through these sources, the world at large. What I am here concerned with, is to show that moral principles help to raise up thought and forethought in order to enable a man to regulate his volition, his conduct, and ultimately his whole character; and that the merit of volition lies in having at command, and as the result of life-long education, all the different courses of action which may be followed on any particular occasion, the future consequences of each of those courses, and the natural or habitual capacity to choose from among the several open courses, the one which is freely approved by the agent himself. It is only thus that the Will asserts its freedom to modify itself, and proves at the same time the existence of conditions which make for its determination. Personality may be thoughtlessly rash and capricious; or it may be wisely firm, bold and persevering. But the difference between either lies in the reasons of the conduct which must count as law to the man's volition. It is the inhibitory function of a particular nerve which maintains the regular action of the heart; and febrile disorder no less than diseased volition is after all due only to defective inhibition.

LAW.

Power in the shape of personal domination over other men calls for the same sort of thought and forethought which should regulate Volition in the individual himself. The rule of the Rod must either sink into rule of the Sword or rise into rule of the Law. The sword cannot be plied for all time; much less with everlasting success. The old idea of universal domination stands condemned in consequence of man's accumulated experiences. The rule of power must be one of law. Law seeks to bind the inferior to a definite line of conduct. But it also binds the superior to desist from exacting any thing more than what the law requires. Human Law it is said, is often incomplete, and he that has to administer it has to be vested with more or less of discretion. This discretionary power viewed in the abstract, might signify only things like the unbeginning creations

of the will, and the unregulated personality of domination. But in reality, discretion does not mean the license to do any thing and everything within its province. It only means the freedom to choose one of several reasons each terminating in a particular conduct. The reasons must be definite; *i. e.*, they must be clearly enunciated in the mind, and capable of being announced to others. The man who asserts his opinion and power for the good of others may show two lines of mental preparation distinctly: the positive reasons tending in his opinion to other people's good, and the honest negations that he has no self-indulgence to seek in asserting himself. These reasons may be original, singular and instantaneously conceived. But they must be had in readiness for other people to examine. Their acceptance by others, though only held in the prospect, forms their sole justification. The reasons of a man's personal decision, where participated in by others, secures permanence to the moral law and thence arises what is technically called law, *i. e.* the law of the country. Personality therefore has always to give place to rule of the law.

SERVILE PERSONALITY.

These limitations to personality again are not confined to capricious domination but apply also to Servility. As such dominant personality would neither frame nor abide by any rule, so servile subordination discloses and renounces its capricious personality in three ways. It does not recognise any moral responsibility, *i. e.* any principle which has to be upheld till death against the commands of any and every superior. And the servile subordinate is as incapable of observing as of prescribing, any uniform rule to guide volition in himself or others. As he fails to recognise any rule or principle in the action of the superior, so he fails to be guided by one and even for himself. He acts upon the fleeting impulse of the moment, without finding the leisure to exercise his prudence or the occasion to evoke his firmness and courage. Servility is in fact inseparable from vacillation and cowardice, and cowards are notoriously as cruel as tyrants possess the power to be. But servile

personality like dominant caprice is transformed into rigidness of principle by adhesion to law and lawful conduct.

DISCIPLINE.

Both tyranny and servility are in their original condition alike impervious to reasoning and the fore-knowable consequences of conduct. The volition counts for nothing in each case; and men of such character are necessarily left either to the dominance of their peculiar failings or to the guidance of their natural virtues. In their downward career such men are actuated by envy, malice or jealousy; and betake themselves to extortion, violence, theft, fraud, deceit, cruelty, debauchery, epicureanism or gluttony according to the circumstances of their position. But natural sympathy may also come into play and call forth honorable pliancy of certain kinds. It is not easy however to maintain undefiled the purity of that disposition without suitable care. Time and circumstance are always at work to bring egoism insidiously into play. And to obviate this danger, our sole resource against infirmities of will is to call in, the aid of habitual activity or Discipline, under the agency of law. Law or rule is indispensable to man's own voluntary action as it is to the firm bonds of society binding man to man. Penalty is an essential element of law no doubt, but its sting is removed when the need for its infliction ceases, or when the punisher has not to look on himself as the source of the offender's hardship. And thus sovereign and subject, priest and disciple, master and servant, parent and child, husband and wife, in a word superior and inferior, equal and equal, man's own individual self as between the superior springs of action lying inside and the subordinate agency of his external organs, are all bound together by the verbal instrumentality of law and the logical coherence of principle and practice. And as the Word of rule works steadily and smoothly on in the mind, we acquire by habit a second disciplined-nature which rivals if it does not transcend the reign of law in the whole of the universe. The most important element in our culture is to make rules and to observe them: to make them for one's self

and for others; and to observe what rules others make for us. It is sad to observe how Hindu society has now drifted into total confusion between such distinct principles as *niyam* or rule, and *vrata* or vow.

Liberty and individuality.

But in order that we may fully appreciate the importance of discipline, we must stop for one moment to dispel certain wrong notions about the requirements of individuality and liberty. Individuality or the free modifying agency of man like what I have termed personality, is of the utmost consequence to morality and social well-being. Fear, coercion, and caprice are also like individualities, fit to be played off against each other, but the conflict is noxious to human character and society. Individuality does not mean that it is only in a man's defiance of the laws of nature, of the laws of man, and of the principles which should regulate one's own conduct, that tests should be looked for to show the quantity of liberty which he enjoys. Complete absence of restriction of the foregoing kind would be most obnoxious to morality even if it were feasible in social life. Mill's celebrated treatise on *Liberty* is I fear, apt to have a baneful effect inasmuch as its deep-seated significance for European society is lost sight of in the present conditions of Indian life. Moreover, our justly distinguished author has, apparently for reasons of his own, kept out of the sphere of his advocacy, much of the opposite arguments which would also come under individuality though only in the shape of free, and self-directed but constant, discipline of a man by himself. Such arguments would have given his readers the ethical view of liberty which Mill must have entertained though his ideal of debate and advocacy might have stood in the way. But in the present so-called transition state of Indian society, not to possess any such ethical view of individuality becomes tantamount to serious perversity of the heart and mind. It is unfortunate in any case that because any details of Hindu observances for instance, have become out of date, therefore individuality should renounce the very principle of discipline, and

thus be stranded upon what can only be called, down-right mental anarchy.

ANARCHY.

What has been said of law, liberty, and discipline is sufficient to show that in their absence, the superior and the inferior always degenerate into, either the tyrant or the coward, and in both cases, become capable of any sort of aggressiveness. In other words, government without law, like liberty without discipline, necessarily sinks into Anarchy. The worst terrors of anarchy arose indeed under the French Revolution when domination and liberty were both attenuated into their extreme limits with the disestablishment of Government. Thus whether we look to the dangers of tyranny, servility, and anarchy, or to the moral conditions of power and subordination, our safest course is to betake to Law and Discipline. Moreover it is by this means that the instinct of domination may be made to operate in the way attributed by physicians to what they call an alterative medicine: Domination carries the power to inflict physical pain, and the liberty to indulge in the military instinct together with all its adjuncts. But the relation between superior and inferior when limited by law takes a peculiar turn and is imperceptibly shaped into the nature of compacts and industrial engagements. And when again such legal requirements are regulated by mutual assent, not only does personality terminate in voluntary action on both sides, but a way is also made out to stimulate the energies of each in subserving to the wants of others. And thus the original coerciveness of domination slowly changes into natural service of a voluntary kind, one which is so closely allied to service of a disinterested kind. Certain it is that affection can command services which the worst tyrant could never hope to exact from his slave. And the conquering hero secures the most fervent loyalty only by promulgating laws which are binding upon himself and his subjects both. It will thus appear that in the extreme case of social anarchy, personal domination even in its absolute form of rule of the sword, nay the military instinct itself, has an utilitarian value. But as the inferiors become

amenable to reason and any kind of discipline, Personality and Servility should both give way to mental preparation for discipline of the self-directed kind.

Justice.

Before passing into the working of domination in different forms of society, we should stop for one moment to consider, how law serves to mould power into the shape of Justice, in the individual as also in society. Justice is allied to altruism in that it carefully weighs the claims of other people upon our attention. But it is also allied to power in several ways. Power when left to itself might lean to mercy in respect of a subordinate, but as between different persons soliciting favor, it has to become just, when it is not capricious. Capricious personality is obnoxious to the morality of domination and the happiness of subordinates. Again, the man of power and decision while he holds the balance of law and justice over his subordinates, has also to come down from his high pedestal when dealing with equals. And then he has to do exactly as he would be done to by others. Neither power nor law nor justice is so grateful to human feeling as the altruistic virtue significantly termed humanity. But justice without law is a misnomer; hence, it may be linked with the morality of domination. Justice is the right hand of Law and Sovereign power. And it serves only to verify the principle that law binds the ruler and the ruled both, when we observe that justice following a certain rule never fails to impel the judge to honesty and fairness in dealing with his equals. The motto given, at second hand* from the Talmud, in the title page,—*Be it my Will that my Mercy overpower my Justice*—should be read here to establish three several points: the supremacy of Mercy, *i. e.* altruism; the modifying agency of the Will as the ultimate resource of morality: and lastly, the true nature of Justice as lying like a mathematical point between egoism and altruism, between self-regard and regard for others, and between rival suppliants for equal protection.

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* John Morley on Compromise, p. 57.

It has been shown before that law imposed by self or others furnishes the only adequate means of moral culture in regard to exercise of power and subordination to discipline. This principle finds its simplest verification in the government of a family composed of man, wife and infant children. Here the law is enacted by the word of mouth; the convergence required for solidarity is duly supplied by the natural feelings of kindness and submission which actuate the members; and all the necessary conditions of legislation are satisfied by the easy inter-communication of ideas and sentiments between persons living within the precincts of the same house. That which is hard or impracticable is soon found out and never commanded; and personal rule has no occasion to capriciously change its attitude with duration of power or any risk of its division with subordinates. But nevertheless in some cases, fickleness of direction becomes manifest enough. This may arise, not from any perverse hostility to the subordinate, but only from that light-headed self-indulgence in the conjugal, paternal, or maternal superior, to which all personal rule is so susceptible. A child may be capriciously ordered to do or not to do a thing without regard to its actual circumstances, and the command may be as fitfully withdrawn under the least show of resistance. Such fickleness is obviously unwholesome and never fails to tell upon the character of the children and of the family generally. As between wife and husband the same fickleness is of rarer occurence but far more disastrous. A violent dissolution of solidarity in domestic society to which the fickleness may lead would work a permanent injury on the character of the members as regards capability for domestic union. When once the knot is tied there is always less to lose and more to gain in adhering to the earlier opinions of, and the original vows made to, each other. Shakespeare's immortal comedy ought to satisfy every one of what happiness may be secured in actual life even between the most ill-assorted pair simply by mutual wisdom. Only, it is not always the woman who has to be tamed as a shrew; woman and

GOVERNMENT: in the family.

especially the Hindu woman should herself seek to tame the wildest bear of a husband rather than that she should run after the bookish romance of a courtship and the impossibility of exercising her unaided discernment during any such romance. As a rule however, in spite of many drawbacks in domestic life, the superior learns moderation and regularity in the exercise of power and even the most abject subordination yields valuable discipline in all the inferior members. The importance of punishment demonstrated as an adjunct to rule is also best shown in domestic society, where affection unquestionably prevails; for infant education with all our efforts to the contrary has to be conducted with some measure of chastisement. But the rule of the birch is so much liable to be abused by the personality of the chastiser that it should never be entrusted to any one whose personal affection for the culprit does not counterbalance the inevitable harshness of the punishment. Civilized society does indeed permit corporal punishment to be inflicted by the husband upon the wife, and by the parent upon the child. But in the former case, it is well averted by affectionate kindness and humility, and hence deservedly regarded as barbarous; and in both cases outside society asserts its right to interpose in cases of criminal violence. However that may be, situated as we are the rule of domestic government is that the man shall command and the wife and the child shall obey. Allowing for one exception, veracity, the one moral virtue which every one ought to learn in the earliest childhood is implicit obedience to superiors. And domestic society and domestic government are the best schools for both virtues.

The Hindu joint-family system.

I have had to mention elsewhere (Ch. II. §. 2. p. 16.), in speaking of the domestic form of social union, that the Hindu joint-family is a complex sort of domestic organization. And the difficulty of moral regulation in respect of these families and especially in regard to domination and subordination within their spheres is considerably enhanced by changes as well in the opinions of the people concerned, as in the conditions of larger national life recently and

suddenly brought about in the country. I might pass over the subject by regarding it as a matter for collective deliberation rather than as one affecting the moral education of the country. But it is my conviction that the structural anomalies of our family-life are not well understood; secondly, that owing to those anomalies, the experiences of men living in different forms of joint-family-life are not uniform; and men's hardships being diverse, no concerted effort will arise to effect the requisite changes until the subject comes to be studied before actual experience, and is uniformly understood by all; and thirdly, what people understand still less, that these structural anomalies are all subject to one abnormal condition of law and public opinion, namely, that the conditions of domestic government and rights of property are mixed up in a way that either morality or the lawful interests of members of joint families are sure to suffer by collision. At the risk therefore of trenching upon irrelevant questions, I will try to set forth the several typical forms of our domestic society showing their peculiarities as to structure and socio-legal conditions. Only it should be understood that it does not lie within my scope either to uphold or condemn any such sociological facts. The analysis submitted below may help the cause of reform either in the direction of re-constructing the joint-family-system or in that of subverting it. But I am concerned only in urging that every man should understand his affairs accurately, and accordingly put forth his wisdom and moral sentiments.

1. First of all, there is the simple family of husband, wife, and infant children as previously referred to (p. 16). But opinion here is opposed to father and son ever parting with one another so as to let the grown up son be the head of another family.

2. Thus the will of a son who has arrived at years of discretion becomes a factor in domestic rule; and either the authority of the superior gets more or less divided, or the character of the inferior becomes more or less infirm. The result is a movement towards absence of rule where there is no misrule on either side.

In rare cases however, there arises that perfect solidarity which is characteristic of patriarchal rule.

3. In some cases, the son inherits from the moment of birth a share in the property which was till then held by the father exclusively. Thus the father's control over the son's property becomes one of legal responsibility to the minor. The fact of the minority however, renders the father's legal responsibility only one of moral kind, and should as such, be governed by harmonious public opinion. But on the contrary, when the son attains age, the law lets him reopen many matters imposed by requirements of public opinion upon the father. And public opinion now stands considerably paralysed between the claims of law on behalf of the son and those of domestic morality on the part of the father.

4. A father having exclusive ownership over property may as shown before (case no. 2.) admit his grown up sons to a share in the domestic authority. But on his death, the brothers (and in some cases the representatives of some of them) always come to share in the ownership of property as of legal right; and the function of domestic rule passes generally to the eldest brother. But both the matters, domestic authority and rights of property, become complicated. The exclusive subordination of the wife to the husband and of infant sons to the parents continues, while there is also a headman over the entire family. The government is not only divided as between equals but also between subsidiary domestic groups; while the conditions of neither are clearly understood. The wife and children of any subordinate member remain subordinate to him and consequently in equivocal position in relation to the headman of the joint-family. The property relations resemble those of case no. 3. but the subordination of the coparceners ceases here to be exclusively filial; and the moral rights and duties of the respective members arising from public opinion or domestic feeling become more uncertain still, as against rights and duties which might be recognised and upheld in the courts of justice, in some future suit for partition and accounts.

5. In some cases, woman comes to have property of some kinds. But social conditions prevent her exercising any real control. As a subordinate even her dissentient voice distinctly uttered would be improper according to public opinion for domestic solidarity. Control over her property becomes therefore more a matter of some sort of trust, than of agency in the hands of some male friends. The legal complications arising from trusts are naturally very intricate; and joint-families are no exception to the rule. Nothing is gained by judicial rulings ignoring many such trusts as illegal when the actual dealings are of the nature belonging to trustee and beneficiary owner. The moral difficulties are as obvious as they are numberless.

6. There is now a further, though occasional, movement towards the case in which the grown up maiden also would come in for a share in the government of the family, like the son in case no. 2; and then the conditions of public opinion would be all the more lax for the novelty of the change.

7. The affairs of the joint family as analysed above, are so varied that two other structural changes occur, and in a manner almost imperceptible to society. (*a*) In one of these, the married daughter, her husband, and persons who would be members of their joint-family live together with the main trunk. But the headship of this subsidiary group while it is an infinite source of trouble, has been only a source of pleasantry to the public at large. (*b*) In the other case, more distant connections male or female, mere friends even, come to live singly within the same household. These strangers have no recognised voice either in the property-concerns or in domestic regulation, but no man or woman can be completely isolated from his or her society, in regard to opinion. And morality suffers from the effects of such uncertain influences upon direction and subordination in family-life; and all the more so, when pecuniary interests are at stake.

The anomalous conditions of joint-family-property are further complicated by the fact that whereas private property in land is recognised, the facilities for its exchange are still

somewhat limited. There was a time when sale of land was prohibited by scriptural texts; and the tradition is partially upheld in public opinion. Now, free-trade in land is permitted, but the market for land is very unreliable. Consequently the complications of joint-families, so far as they arise from landed property cannot be obviated when desired, by the simple measure of putting up to auction all such property, as soon as joint-ownership becomes inexpedient. On the other hand the joint-family system helps to support the inefficient and the disabled. The great principle of piety cultivated, is familiarly known as অন্নদান, *i. e.,* dealing and doling out the bread. The more recent tendencies are to narrow the operation of this sort of charity and to throw the drones—friends or relations,—to their own fate and resources. But we should not forget that juvenile vagrancy, together with its after-growths of pauperism and crime, is an unsolved problem of the West, and one of the most deplorable kind too. The joint-family system certainly tends to prevent at least its development, in this country. Even prostitutes remember their needy relations, without revolting from the barriers of caste. And orphan beggars both male and female are often taken informally in adoption, and also married in due course; the sons and sons-in-law becoming valuable supporters to their out-caste mothers.

The anomalies of domestic headship serve only to divide responsibility without effecting any increase of order or efficiency. Authority is crippled and becomes prone to abuse. Subordination is enfeebled by lax discipline. Kindness and veneration tend to grow less and less. And theft and even criminal misappropriation of property may not be called quite exceptional. Eventually when this complex domestic society is broken up, it is only by a sudden explosion, which carries very far its demoralising and disintegrating effects.

The original conditions of patriarchal rule within the joint-family were consistent with the form of government formerly prevailing in the country; that is to say, with the hierarchical relations between the several castes in regard to industry, and

between the sovereign and a series of satraps (taluqdars, chiefs and *goshthipatis*) in matters of property and rule both. The modern notions of property, ownership, individuality however tend towards a democratic organization. But to such notions even the present political conditions of the country are unsuited. They neither supply a model for domestic rule, nor furnish an opening to such wider exercise of the instincts of domination and discipline as may be healthfully cultivated within the limited sphere of the joint-family. Authority has ceased to be governed by rules and traditions; and subordination is not disciplined either by unquestioning loyalty or by wise and cautious restraints from below. The convergence of the family in its normal condition when extended to the city and the country becomes the only sure basis of national solidarity. But the general demoralization of the country is so great that domestic immorality is left to itself and shorn of priestly guidance and almost of religious sanction also; the social sanctions to which this book appeals are seldom found enunciated; and the conglomeration of creeds brought together under an all-powerful temporal *regime* certainly threatens a serious moral revolution and perhaps justifies the scramble for larger solidarity which but for the circumstances of the case would be almost ludicrous. We should of course look within doors and set our house in order first of all. But some persons at least should also look to a complete adjustment between the solidarity of the country and that of the family. This is indispensable for the needs of social morality, viewed apart from a religious basis. What is needed however, is not so much social reform, that is, in the relations between family and family, as moral harmony within the family itself; a harmony which stands disturbed only on account of the extensive ramifications of Western influence in Indian Society. We should not however be amazed at the event; for the discordance between the East and the West dates from very ancient times. We are certainly not sufficiently wise in our generation; but I dare not say that the yearning evinced for Western culture

argues only that past traditions shall in our case, cease to operate in the human heart and society.

The domestic servant.

The question of domestic service belongs to those of kindness in the master and voluntary obedience, if not positive veneration, in the servant. But the circumstances of their mutual relation tend to the master's ignoring his own duties and to consequent self-seeking indulgence of domination. The fact that servants cannot understand the full measure of their moral duties and often do not know even all their rights, ought to arouse in the master a noble sense of duty. In Hindu joint-families the domestic servant would quietly take his position as a junior member of the family, the tie at times extending even in hereditary succession. But the recent doctrines are in favour of term-relations only, and necessarily fraught with various demoralising tendencies on both sides. And the worst of these new ideas is that the wages paid are unhesitatingly assumed to be, as a matter of course, a complete equivalent of services which not unoften exceed in quality those of the nearest kindred. Any honest son will admit however, that he has often failed to serve his own parents in the way that some of their poor domestic servants have done. However that may be, that each servant has to serve many masters in every joint-family can never be ignored without discredit to the commonest good sense. And I can never understand why no Bengali thinks of framing some definite rules, for the guidance of his own domestic servants, for the corresponding checks upon his own conduct, and even as part of his much needed education.

National Government.

Turning next to the exercise of power by the functionaries of national government, one principle of morality is quite obvious. They must all abide by the law which fortunately for this country is very explicit, even though the Government is foreign and constitutionally despotic. Undue stretch of personal authority and abject subservience

beyond the requirements of law are equally uncalled for, and disclose only moral turpitude. On the other hand, the principle of subordination must be honestly and rigidly maintained in the interests of moral discipline and political solidarity. But a special difficulty occurs at times owing to differences in the political relations; *e. g.* between British rulers and Indian subjects. The difficulty lies partly in the making of laws for the country and of rules for one's subordinates; and partly in the exercise of that discretion, which is allowed to each officer over his subordinates. And in each case, the defect is want of homogeneity between superior and inferior. The experiences and information of an Englishman and Indian in diverse matters are necessarily different; and consequently their respective actions in any case are also liable to vary considerably. And the result is injury either to discipline or to legitimate happiness. Generally speaking, the sovereign power here is so much out of touch with most of its subjects, that what is wanted by either from the other, cannot be determined by that free interchange of thought and feeling which forms the most pleasing aspect of domestic life. Penalties therefore at times, run the danger of being undeserved when they are inflicted. And at times their lax operation has a demoralising effect. Generally speaking it is always advisable to minimise the operation of minute and stringent laws, enlarging, not the limits of discretion in the superior, but only those of morality in both superior and inferior and more specially the latter. It is only when disregard for duty is productive of serious hardship that the law ought to step in and repress it as crime. And this principle demands all the greater attention when any foreign ruler labors under the disadvantages referred to before, about information and attitude of the mind. In so far however as foreign rule is liable to err from its want of touch with the people, the conclusion becomes obvious, that the people should take care to supply what rules the Government wisely abstains from prescribing. Thus a measure of autonomy in the subjects is indispensable to completeness of

government where the rule is foreign. This autonomy might occur either in the shape of government by indigenous satraps or local chiefs, or in the more democratic forms of the West. I am not, I must confess, quite clear whether the institution associated with the name of Lord Ripon is wholly suited to our character as formed in domestic life, and also our wants as aroused by the exigencies of the British rule. One obvious defect in it is to overlook the same heterogeniety in the constitution of municipalities and district boards, which makes the supreme Government itself so difficult. But what I wish to urge in the interests of morality is that any subordinate autonomy as referred to above, may not be condemned as an *imperium in imperio*, since it is needed to adjust the details of a foreign and Western Government with the habits and traditions of an oriental people.

Government of gilds and voluntary associations.

Leaving this question aside, I would next point out that similar autonomy might be granted to form voluntary associations or gilds. But as there is no legal restriction against the formation of such bodies, the fault must be attributed to ourselves that we fail to organise institutions of this kind. Nothing seems to me so very derogatory to the rank of a collective body as that it should have no effective power to regulate in some matters at least, the conduct of its members. And yet in all the professions, callings, or industries, which the British rule has helped not a little to multiply, where do we see a single effective rule in any corporate body to prevent gross immorality and misconduct in its members? The departure from the old system of society with numerous autonomous subdivisions called castes, has become so strange that we have almost forgotten the first principles of government, *viz.*, those about rule, penalty and adjudication. We would shut out the foreign Government from interfering in various matters, and never supplement Government legislation by internal arrangements. We ignore besides, the inner working of Western society, but claim for ourselves with that society, rigid non-interference of the public into the privacy of domestic, and still more of individual conduct. No better

means could be devised for the noxious growth of human immorality. To those who are most anxious about the weak points of the Indian caste-system, I would urge the appropriateness of trying to replace it by the gild system with its peculiar regulative organizations. This question comes fairly within the morality of domination. But those of technical education and spiritual government, intimately connected as they are with caste-government can be adjusted in the gild-system, only with the help of universities working directly under the supervision of sovereign power both spiritual and temporal.

Local autonomy.

From the autonomy of gilds, in which the members may be scattered in different places, we turn to the one which has become a burning question of the day—local autonomy. In this the fact of common residence within the same city calls for union for various purposes and a consequent rule of common government. I must not however dwell upon its political or even its sociological aspects, being concerned only with the morality of what powers are asked for on behalf of the City. It is easy to suppose the case of a village where a great majority of inhabitants unite to raise voluntary subscriptions for local roads, drainage, conservancy &c., and where they do so under rules definitely laid down, assented to, and also duly observed by that same majority. In a case of this kind, there would be little or no difficulty in obtaining from the provincial Government a law or charter of autonomy for the village in question. But, for the matter of such charter, the majority alluded to might even afford to do without it, as well as the delegated power it would secure, in order to coerce the small minority in respect of pecuniary contributions and for any other matters. The shortcomings, being by hypothesis of a small minority, might be borne by the majority better than an absence of the wholesome arrangements in question. Sovereign justice no doubt would require that intractable minority to be coerced. But the majority, as peaceful subjects, if they understood their interests would gain very little by seeking the coercion. And it is obvious also, that a charter of the above kind,

would work no small mischief in any place where the voluntary union alluded to, could not be widely commanded ; where in short, the minimum of solidarity did not exist. Here the so-called autonomy would be only another way of extending the operation of the criminal law of the country, when unfortunately the conditions of foreign government should rather confine such law to narrow limits. Local, functional or industrial autonomy is indeed most necessary to supplement the measures of higher government in places like British India. It is no less necessary in other places where a firmly-united people working towards what is called popular government may seek to curtail the irresponsible power of their sovereign. But the two lines of policy may not coincide. Solidarity cannot be created by law, and in its absence the delegation of sovereign power to a number of disunited people would mean only such a shuffling of that power that while it carried divided responsibility beyond the easy reach of public criticism, it would serve also to extend that power into the minutest details, causing all the greater hardship to those who differed in opinion from the few who happened to exercise the power for the time. The question of political education possesses of course very different bearings. But apart from its other difficulties, deficient morality in the exercise of power, in the observance of discipline, and in the appreciation of solidarity, is neither to be slighted as antecedent conditions, nor left to be supplemented by the vigour of some authority—provincial or imperial—to be always standing guard over the local corporate body.

Collective deliberation.

It may be of service to add a few words in regard to the principles of collective deliberation, a measure which is often required in the proper administration of government by law. Law in the hands of a single authority even, means that perfect consolidation of growing experience which characterises the superior kind of personality previously discussed. Hence unanimous consent and constancy in the adhesion to a consent once given, lie at the foundations of collective deliberation and action. It is also altogether a question

of the same unanimity, whether in the event of difference of opinion occuring, the divergence should not be made up by a certain rule of procedure. And it is only in this way that the casting vote of the president, the voice of a bare majority, or that of a larger proportion than half of the members, is unanimously accepted as binding upon all. It is obvious therefore that each question should be analysed so that the members may be divided into two sections of the *Ayes* and *Noes*; and that if the "ayes" and "noes" are distributed upon party principles, the number of parties should not exceed two. Where two or more parties are formed into well-marked groups, the very first principle of their collective action and concerted deliberation is disturbed. And this truth becomes patent when their divergence of opinion, being honestly disclosed, manifests itself in the choice of a neutral chairman. Where the object is to solve a simple difference, which is known to occur spontaneously between individuals, it would be easy enough to elect at the outset such a neutral person to vote only when a tie occurs. But where the members are grouped into parties from before and, worse still, formed into more groups than two, either the process referred to becomes impracticable; or its result becomes very imperfect. The union of distinct groups is altogether a question of federation and of the nature of international solidarity. Here the rule of a simple majority necessarily fails even if the groups are no more than two, and is always too dangerous to be frequently applied between more than two groups or between two of them with an individual for the controlling authority.

In the practical application of the moral principles of domination, subordination and deliberation, the foregoing considerations are of obvious value; but they have become peculiarly important owing to what is called the transition state of our society; a transition which is not a spontaneous product of time, but signifies only an assimilation between two widely different standards of public opinion prevailing in two far-off countries, India and England. Perhaps translation, rather than transition, would

best express the state of our society at the present moment. And in such translation of life across a quarter of the globe, the pitfalls of revolution can be avoided only by means of a very superior moral culture.

CHAPTER IX.

VANITY, OR DESIRE OF APPROBATION. (7).

"Reprove a wise man, and he will love thee." Prov. IX. 8.

Vanity, the turning point of morality.

With the culture of Power by means of law, in other words, the growth of what is called Right in place of Might, we change the course as it were, of our moral disease and then move on by slow steps to the wholesome condition of our individual and social life. The uncertainties of being able to strike fear, and the uncertain life of fear pass away once for all, and if we do not at once succeed in being baptised in Love, we certainly begin an all-important novitiate by subjecting our rule of life to the control of opinion and criticism, censure and approbation. Man is too noble a being to remain constantly immersed in violence, threat or fear. He seeks and renders help in the shape of Fame or Approbation; and thus binds himself with his fellow-citizen, if not in the peaceful union of love, yet at least by another bond which resembles it partially at least. Fame like Power it is true, is really illusive. But fame is an illusion of love. And even that illusion more than the realities of law, opinion, or pure love itself, first excites the activity of man in an upward direction. It is necessary to understand the links which bind Vanity with Charity. For there has been perhaps too much spiritual effort to break those links. Charity is real; violence is vain; but the desire of Approbation cannot be altogether an evil if ever it serves to turn into charity what is but violence, power or this illusive craving for good opinion. Violence is gratified with power: power hides itself in law, and virtually creates its own antidote—Right. This creation of

Right by power is itself an act of charity; but it rises in merit as the law seeks the support of Opinion; and eventually the law-maker finds his joy only in the welfare and happiness of his people. So also, the most burning desire to assert one's rights and take the law of others, is capable of being turned off into some sense of rectitude. And rectitude no less than the idea correlated to that of rights, promotes the sense of duty and imposes the burden of responsibility, raising a more or less clear conception of the powers—Divine and human—to whom we are bound. And all this comes of the vain desire that men may approve our conduct and be constant in their approbation.

Dispassion.

There is an error not only in undue reprobation of vanity, but also in viewing fame and criticism as apart from one another. Praise and blame are very old things; but their mixed distribution, as well as the thoughtful discrimination which in some degree becomes requisite in dispensing them, is part of that product of modern society—criticism. Nay criticism, praise and odium, are all now coming to be regarded as so many manifestations of one growing social force—Opinion. And it may not be ignored or disclaimed by any man. We can never praise nor blame a man without referring to his acts, and claiming to have an opinion of our own and of all such action. Thus opinion not only fixes us to a certain abstract rule of conduct but serves also to bind us to those who concur with us. Opinion originally comes forth with greater warmth than discrimination. But when criticism is indiscriminate and unseasonable, and grows therefore inconstant, the vanity of human effort, *i. e.* of the effort at being good in order to secure a fleeting approbation, becomes sadly conspicuous. Society however wins at last. The critic is taken into consultation before the man's Will terminates into action, and they help each other to be good when it is discovered that we are all prone to error. And then it comes that

"—We inherit that sweet purity,
For which we struggled, failed and agonised,
With widening retrospect that bred despair."

In the sphere of morality there is hope for every one, and while the wounds inflicted by unjust censure and the dissonance caused by discordant criticism, serve to provoke despondency, the very dispassion about Fame comes at last to establish the power of Opinion and Approbation, and to open the gate of virtue or merit. Vanity is self-seeking, and censorious criticism also springs from similar spirit of militancy, envy and contradiction. One result of this conflict between pride and vanity and criticism is the desire to give up one's hold on Fame and Power both. And this attitude of the mind while it may lead to a disgust as deep as that of the misanthrope or the cynic, points no less to the noble dispassion of the anchorite. It is then that society is worked up into the grandeur of opinion and a true sense of the "vanity of vanities." And what I want to impress upon the reader is the social importance of all the three factors: (1) Vanity or desire of praise; (2) Opinion and criticism; and (3) Dispassion for all things but benevolence and collective happiness.

Criticism.

The most important question therefore for the public at large is to secure the justice of criticism—an object which is attainable as well by promoting steady dispassion in men looking for the happiness of fame as by free but honest criticism in the society as a whole, in regard to the good and the dispassionate as well as to those who are blame-worthy. Criticism ought to promote a consensus of opinion so that every one may be enabled to avoid adverse criticism by adequate forethought and praise-worthy conduct. And sound public opinion obviates alike the sufferings of those who care for something higher than approbation, and the egoism of those who look for praise and adhesion of men to the neglect of their own duty. Man yearns for approbation; and it also requires an earnest effort to suppress that yearning. Fame too speaks in trumpet sound. The moralist however has little to do to invigorate any of these forces. They are growing of themselves. His work lies instead in the direction of fame and criticism being set in harmony with

that still small voice, the voice of conscientious volition, which guides the man within into right conduct without. Vanity and criticism should converge. Not so much he that looks for approbation, as he that dispenses praise and blame now demands the greatest share of public attention. Nay, as life is to be a life of action and not mere dispassion, and men's errors are equally inevitable and intolerable, criticism must seek to guide the future rather than rake up the past. The principles involved in every act rather than their misguided application in past practice, form the legitimate province of the critical function whether in the public at large or in any specially qualified individuals.

Opinion: "Judge not."

Praise and blame is rendered by all; but we all are apt to forget the deeper social ends to which we subserve by expressing our opinion, and expressing it in our lighter moments no less than in our graver ones. As we must not encourage despondency in commending dispassion, so we may not entirely disavow criticism by any extreme rigour about the rule—*Judge not.* Yet that is the right rule for all moments of our life when we could not venture to ascend the pulpit, read a temperate expostulation in simple Reproof, demand a requisite Explanation, or pronounce a solemn Censure according to our honest judgment. An expression of opinion has always one or other of these several bearings. And while it is a fault to have no opinion on important matters; it is culpable to condemn without an eye to correction and explanation, and to be biased for or against an action without understanding the requirements and difficulties of judicious Opinion. Critics lacking the moral sense are the greatest misfortune of the day.

Censure.

We have already seen in chapter VIII. that domination when impelled by morality must betake to discipline and law: law to bind superior with inferior, or equal with equal; and law or rule to regulate the conduct of each from within. Law is the foundation of Justice. But the rule of one's own conduct which works from within is equally the basis of his private opinion of himself and others.

Opinion regulates conduct; private opinion becomes public opinion when it is accepted by the public; and thus one's inner judgment and rules or principles of conduct, *i. e.*, the private criticism of self and others, form the ultimate resource of social morality. Hence conduct in society must be regulated by strict rules about how we form our opinion and express our judgment on men and their actions. It is necessary when we pronounce our judgment that we should also possess an enduring opinion consistent therewith, and that such opinion again is built upon facts and principles. But it is not easy to fufil these requirements; and we should therefore be at all times sparing in our criticisms. Moreover there is a distinction which is fit to be observed between pronouncing a solemn and a light judgment. The Civil and Criminal Law is never quite sufficient. Society cannot subsist without having to pass on occasions solemn censure upon men's immoralities. But the germs of evil had best be cut down at the earliest available opportunities. Mild reproofs are therefore most desirable. Morality should seek to accommodate the individual to the double function of receiving and dispensing sound and honest criticism. Censure should be regulated, not prohibitted.

REPROOF.

A solemn judgment ought to be punctilious about the facts and evidence of the case. Opportunities must also be given to the accused to defend himself. But the light-hearted opinion which we are all so prone to express, serves a peculiar purpose of its own. On such occasions the Reproof is presumedly moderate, and the facts and evidence of the case are more or less incomplete. Consequently the judgment also ought to be understood to carry the qualification referred to. It is only an expostulation or mild remonstrance. It seeks to forestall the heavier work of Censure. It serves more to lay down the principle governing the supposed facts than to mark out the man as deserving of grave Censure. The accused is told as it were: "you are supposed to have done such acts: you do not seem to understand that those acts would

constitute a positive immorality: do not repeat the offence if you have committed it." A serious explanation is not in such cases, invariably called for from the accused; and that is only because it is not generally needed, whereas insistence about it on either side can tend only to cause acerbity of feeling and give rise to avoidable friction. No one may claim as a right, immunity from either Censure or Reproof.

EXPLANATION.

In cases deserving of grave Censure however, we are bound to suspend judgment and call for an Explanation. But first of all, we must here suppose the state of things to be normal and that the principles of good conduct are duly respected on both sides, the facts of the case only requiring serious examination. As in matters of law and justice, the morality of criticism requires careful attention to trial and evidence. And it should be remembered that we Indian people are peculiarly prone to mix up fact, opinion and conjecture. Civilized society cannot stand the strain arising from such confusion of ideas. The rule—judge not—has been given subject to a qualification about the ends of criticism, and the corollary of that rule is—hear before you condemn and prove before you praise or blame. It is simply immoral not to be able to suspend judgment for the purposes indicated; and, not to know when the critical function was being exercised in the form of serious reprobation, discloses an infirmity which though intellectual is still more degrading. On the other hand, this principle should not be regarded as if it required in all ordinary men the talent of an expert to understand the nicer principles of evidence or the correct procedure of a trial. It would indeed be good for society if even these matters could be at the command of every body; but in any case the critical function must be left free. Only it is unpardonable to censure without a sense of the fact and responsibilities of criticism.

A graver question occurs when the individual criticised questions the soundness of the rules which would regulate the critic's judgment, praise and blame. No such liberty is allowed against any law which is the authoritative law of the land. And I consider that the accepted rules of morality too do not admit of open revolt. Public opinion may be demoralised by men in power being reckless of criticism. Society may be working by the friction of divergent individualities. But neither friction, divergence, nor license is or should be the rule of life. The individual is bound to society by law to keep the peace; and by morality to be faithful to his society, to make for social peace rather than mutual discord; to be true and sociable and even to lean towards charity. All that the individual can be allowed by society as between the claims of public order and private good sense, is to work upon opinion instead of by defiance of opinion. The difficulties of the task do not take off its responsibilities. When a man claims to have arguments to impeach any existing rules of morality and discipline, he had better announce his opinion and get it accepted by the public, before asserting it in his acts and thereby causing social anarchy.

Independence of opinion does not carry independenceas to conduct.

The last function of criticism is to pronounce judgment *i. e.* any solemn expression of Censure against conduct. If there is a morality or immorality in the formation of opinion there must be one also in its utterance. We form our private opinion mainly for our own conduct, but when we express it, we virtually insist upon others to observe our private rule; and the question of morality will then turn upon how far we do mean such insistence. When a man says "your neck-tie is a superfluity," he means a reform in dress for his fellow-men. And before he led the reform practice, he should allow his opponents to be heard on the other side. But if he means neither reform nor discussion, his criticism is uncalled for and his conduct comes under the old maxim "speech is silver but silence is gold." This maxim is wise not only because

Speech is silver &c.

it would save the man himself from consequences of unguarded speech, but because altruism must govern speech and reticence both. Language is for communication with others; it is neither for concealment of ideas, nor for infliction of pain. Candor and veracity is never to be confounded with rudeness and libel, nor is a man's veracity with what is true knowledge.

The Press.

The printing press has become the centre of so many important industries, that its agency in the expression and transmission of Opinion has dwarfed all other similar agencies which have existed from before its origin. But a little attention will re-call that what is called the fourth estate of the realm in England, presupposes the existence of three others which are at bottom only so many platforms or organs of Opinion. Indeed these older organs for the formation and expression of public opinion may be regarded as representing the (1) spiritual and judicial, and (2) legislative functions of (3) one same executive or sovereign power; and the public press can supplement these functions only by carrying responsibilities of corresponding kind. Censure should not be passed except with due regard to the nature of an offence, the facts of the case, and the defence of the accused. The worst aspects of the power of the press are that while the critic is enabled by it to speak before a large audience and with serious effects, he can keep himself concealed and avoid all the responsibilities of his function. From this point of view anonymity is more or less immoral. It is one thing to withold the name of the author in order to enable his writing to be judged upon its own merits, and quite another do so in order to censure any one from behind a screen.

Motives of men.

One most important safeguard against the immorality of expressing immature opinion is to abstain from discussing the motives of men. As a rule motives of men are beyond the reach of evidence. Even where a man expresses his own motives it is not quite certain that he fully knows his mind. And we often expose ourselves to disappointment of sorts by counting upon any such utterances or by making there-

from any forecast of the man's future conduct. But when from any presumable motive of another man, we endeavour to form a theory of our own to account for different portions of that man's conduct, and when we proceed to dispense praise or blame upon the basis of such theory, our action becomes questionable to a degree. We first err in taking a theory to be fact. We overlook the weakness of the theory as arising from the series of presumption involved in it. And then we become positively wicked in putting forth as we often do, only a fragment of our own reasoning, keeping back perhaps its most important part, namely, some hypothesis or foregone conclusion which was mixed up in our theory. It is no doubt often necessary for the sake of prudence to make some such forecast of the characters of men with whom we have to deal. But in such cases we should keep our opinion to ourselves. We may count upon it for our own conduct, loss, or gain. But we have no business to run into an expression of our opinion upon the groundless assumption that it is wanted by others, or that it is quite complete in our own judgment. To suppose all men to be honest until the contrary is proved by indubitable evidence, may not be quite safe in life when one has to deal with men as they are. But in dispensing blame at least, it is certainly due to the man charged with any fault, that we should observe some discreet reticence, and remember that our opinion may be unsound after all.

Modesty.

What has been hitherto said about the responsibility of uttering opinion refers only to opinion which is seriously and honestly, though it may be erroneously, held. The immorality must be proportionately great when the opinion expressed is thoughtless, incoherent or dishonest; and worse still when flattery and slander are indulged in for special purposes of gain, mischief, or malicious self-indulgence. Now the danger which obviously lies in exposing one's self to the wickedness of flatterers and slanderers clearly suggests that one cannot be too careful in covering his conduct with becoming modesty. The show of modesty and the meaningless speeches

which neither convey any modesty nor repel any miscreants are subjects concerning a man's integrity of character and speech. But the safeguard lies in feeling modesty in the heart. And that is requisite even upon grounds of selfish prudence. To have to praise and blame people with a due sense of one's own responsibility is obviously correlated with looking for responsible opinion from others. But since the requisite standard of public opinion has not yet been attained and we have to adapt ourselves to society as it is, we must beware of the manner in which we look for people's praise, and indulge our desire of approbation. It is not however a question of only etiquette and prudence; a modest deportment is required of all by society, for it is reasonable to have some doubts even about our real deserts. True merit is never established till after a lengthened trial of time and experience. A man's merit is never a matter of axiomatic truth, and one's own opinion about it must always be heavily subject to that drawback. Humility and forgiveness are however the true altruistic goal of modest deportment.

Wealth, Law and Opinion.

In conclusion, a review of the morality of the last three self-seeking instincts which we have considered, the industrial instinct, the desire of power, and that of approbation, will show that where primitive society indulged most in violence and avarice, modern society seeks a modification of the latter, by the attractions of useful wealth, and of the former *i. e.* power, by the claims of right and law. Moreover Wealth and Law have come to be subjected to the still wider influence of Opinion—a factor of immense consequence to morality in its social aspect. Of the seven selfish instincts (see p. 11) the grossest ones have indeed been so far kept down by society that Gluttony and Lust have now ceased to demand much public attention. Those which count so low in the Tabular Analysis, as matters of the worst egoism or Interest, have in consequence of social opinion and social expedients at last come to be tolerated more or less as matters of Private interest. The instinct which injures society by tending towards abnormal growth of population, has

come to be abused probably in consequence of the institution of marriage itself which is so much needed by the Public against unrestrained Sexual indulgence. Public interest now hangs around the instincts which impel the individual towards his Improvement, and Ambition ; and thus after political safety and protection from crime are ensured as against the Military instinct, it is Wealth, Law and Opinion which come to be the great concerns of civilized society. And of these concerns again, the greatest and the one connected with the last of these seven instincts, is certainly Opinion. Social morality has to bestow special attention to industry, domination and fame or criticism. But in power and usefulness both to the individual and society, Opinion stands next only to Religion. Society in fact is doing its work slowly but steadily and vigorously, considering the natural weakness of the altruistic instincts. And the individual if he will be wise and tractable will best advance that work of social welfare and the cause of his own progress by a sedulous attention to his private morality.

CHAPTER X.

ATTACHMENT, VENERATION AND KINDNESS. (8, 9, 10.)

The three instincts named above, will be considered together. They really prompt the individual to action of of the same sort, *i. e.*, to make Others happy in place of his own Self. Only a slight difference in the action occurs owing to the Others being either his Superiors or Inferiors, or even Equals. But these relations are often variable, also as between the same men. So that Altruism fairly covers the several feelings as well as the human relations in question. Besides, this regard as solely confined to Others, is also more or less fleeting ; altruism is never the permanent feature of a man's emotional character. It is the grandest reality in human

Why the three instincts are viewed together.

nature, but for the pure virtue it has to be looked for only in the ideal state; the egoistic feeling being always present in life though occasionally latent. The three instincts are only different forms of the one essential human virtue, Benevolence.

The fact which has to be first of all recognised in altruism and sympathy is that others are like ourselves: that they have the same cravings about pleasure and pain as we. And the next fact is that with the likeness referred to between Self and Others, there exists also a certain difference. A third remote question could also be raised from these two facts: namely, what is, the limit of sympathy as between man and brute creation. Leaving this last-named consideration aside, the other two points will show, that sympathy cannot deserve the name where the individual claims as an anchorite for instance, to have no selfish cravings whatever and to be quite unlike ordinary men. In our regard for others we have to recognise the wants which are common to us all, and to exert ourselves in order to supply those wants. At the same time we may not magnify the wants in question so that sympathy should pander even to the vices of others. When men's notions vary as to what is virtue or vice, their sympathies also change accordingly. From our point of view, men's altruistic dispositions should always excite our sympathy. But our sympathy with other men's egoism requires a discrimination. No egoistic propensity in another which causes divergence and strife in the group composed of him and others like him may deserve our sympathy. Such fellow-feeling has to be excluded from the range of altruism.

The social group—its unit and limit: family and nation.

The group referred to above should not be an arbitrary group changing with the fleeting calls of the moment. The society to which we are to adhere in the way recommended must be a permanent one. Its exact limits may be open to question, though even that uncertainty should gradually cease to be. But continuity must be joined to solidarity. For the present we have assumed two conditions—the domestic and the national—to regu-

late our sympathy. Both are as compact as they are permanent. One marks the unit, and the other the limit of society, in respect of our moral conduct. Within the family of the primitive couple the homogeneity is complete; the ideal and the real are most close; and each member is perfectly free to guide his altruism by the egoistic wants of the other. The sacrifice and its attendant happiness in either should rise along with the wants of the other. And where the internal impulse to make such sacrifice happens to be enfeebled, either the comparatively external sense of duty or even mechanical habit should sustain the requisite standard of conduct. But if both impulse and conduct fail, the continuity would be threatened, and the quality of solidarity would also suffer; the result being what is called vice. Even when this group of two increases by the addition of children, the homogeneous condition is maintained for a time at least. The altruism of the conjugal society becomes common in respect of the infant children. Each vies with the other in being kind, and in contributing to the happiness of the child. And in the child too, Veneration and subordination become undistinguishable in practice. Love and fear are united in a way which practically excludes logical analysis. The question of continuity or the permanent relation between parent and grown up children is however a moot point as we have seen in Chapter VIII.

But the present question is whether the duties and pleasures of domestic life are sufficient for the altruism or morality of the individual. Charity should no doubt begin at home, but it cannot end there without harm to all the families which constitute the nation, and live under one common political ruler. Our assumption is that the family is the unit of human society, but many such units must collect together in order to furnish the individual with the rules of morality. And it is only when the conditions of each such unit are co-ordinated with those of all that we are enabled to arrive at those rules. Thus the National society controls Domestic life in several ways: by law, by industrial conditions, by public opinion, and above all by the fundamental

principle of all these social forces—morality. And we have to regulate our feelings as individuals so that while our altruism finds an unlimited play within the family, the training should not have to be varied when our dealings are extended beyond the family and to the country at large. It may be added that sympathy, as the principle of morality, admits of international application, *i. e.* of a whole nation having regard for other nations. In so doing a priority for the patriotic feeling has indeed to be maintained, just as domestic sympathy has priority over public sympathy. But in all other respects, domestic love, patriotism and philanthropy are rendered logically harmonious by the principle of altruism. For in all these cases the original sense of likeness between self and otheis is fully maintained in thought, feeling, and activity and to the exclusion of vicious concert. And the gradation too is regular because the extension and intensity of feeling varies in one same inverse proportion.

Inequality of superior and inferior.

Sympathy however also recognises the difference between Self and another. Within the same group there are inequalities as well as homogeneity which sympathy can never overlook. Take for instance the case of a child sympathetically asking its parent to partake of a lump of sugar, and that of a parent refusing to allow the child a share in some high-flavored peppery dish. Both act upon the same sympathetic impulse. All men are alike enough to rouse a uniform sympathetic feeling and to lead to solidarity in their social life. But no two men are perfectly alike so as to dispense with all discrimination in regard to sympathetic conduct. This difference is best simplified by recognising a dual relation in men as to superiority and inferiority. Each man is then furnished with a double or triple guide for his altruism from that one dual relation. (1) When A recognises B as his superior, he is also enabled to understand (2) that with C his inferior, he is only like B, and that C is like himself. Again (3) if D is equal to E there is no very new relation to consider; for we have only to suppose that E looks on D at one time as A on B and

at another as B on A. Perfect equality between men is a fiction. Equality only means that the inequality is not uniform or constant, but occurs alternately between the supposed equals.

Thus the three feelings which form the subject of this chapter are shown to be quite akin to one another. The dual relation alluded to, serves to excite in the superior what is called Kindness towards his inferior. It also excites in inferiors who benefit by the kindness, the feelings of gratitude, Veneration, submissiveness, loyalty &c. And among equals too there is really nothing essentially different from kindness and its return; only there is an alternation of those feelings on each side. At some moments E does a service to D and D is the recipient of the favor, and at other moments that relation is reversed. And then the feeling between them bears the name and character of Attachment. But in each case the impulse is to make another happy; and hence Benevolence is characterestic not only of the superior in regard to the inferior but also of the inferior to the superior and of equals to one another. Kindness turns to the inferior first of all; but it works on all sides. In other words it possesses a universality which obviates the necessity of another term to distinguish the special feeling of goodness in the superior to the inferior, from the general feeling of Benevolence to all, whether equals, superiors, or inferiors.

Unity of altruism.

The experience of life however shows that this mixed feeling of Attachment occurs oftener than pure Veneration or Kindness. The predominance of egoism in man, sinks the disinterestedness of Attachment into a craving for reciprocity. The alternation of actual service between the attached persons fosters the egoism. The regard being mutual, mutuality is often insisted upon as indispensable. The insistence is against the ideal purity of the mental function, but it makes Attachment between two and the consequent solidarity, of easier occurrence in real life. The general egoism of the reciprocity between any two attached persons is further intensified in the conjugal relation by the intenser egoism of sexual instinct and

ATTACHMENT.

desire for progeny. Or it may be said that the instincts of race-preservation and ambition are so tempered down by domestic altruism that the result—home—becomes at once the unit and the type of social life. Nevertheless a reciprocal egoism is far from being essential to Attachment; it is in fact quite foreign to its true nature. Reciprocity is characteristic of the industrial relation which is formed by contracts and then becomes a moral corrective of avarice. The egoism of that relation is also rightly coupled to its terminable character. It must not be confounded with the domestic relation, the altruistic solidarity of which is further testified by its unmistakeable continuity; in other words, by the long memories which are retained and cherished in this latter relation. Volition it is true, rules contracts and in some shape also the marriage vow. But volition is not necessarily egoistic. It may also be decidedly altruistic and unconditional. Society however wisely makes the well-known distinction between contractual and conjugal relations. And if marriages have to be distinguished between one another in respect of continuity, distinct names will also be employed to express that difference,and distinctions about solidarity will follow as a matter of course. The institution of marriage, it will be perceived from the above, realises a very lofty ideal of morality. Its darker associations only prove man's animal nature. But we have discussed the subject earlier in order that the coarser realities of life may be fully recognized in moral culture. (see. p. 37). I shall pass it over now mentioning only that this was the proper place for its consideration.

Attachment being essentially altruistic, its analysis into Veneration and Kindness will facilitate the culture of all three forms of altruism between the special individuals affected. For where inequality is not uniformly continuous, between any two persons whatever, the recognition of superiority in the Other and of inferiority in the Self will help to obviate much of that friction which is generated by assertion of equality and the egoistic rights thereof.

The altruistic feeling of the inferior for the superior presents other complications, and is also subject to certain practical drawbacks. It spontaneously arises on receipt of favor from another who is thus placed in superior position. A return for the favor is then the natural indication of altruism in the inferior. But such return is either practicable or it is not. In the former case favors are naturally interchanged and the relation passes into Attachment. In the latter case the inequality of relation becomes pronounced, but the desire to return the favor and if possible to multiply it many times over ought to exist in the inferior, or he becomes degraded for deficient altruism. This unfulfilled desire characteristic of gratitude, in other words this unsatisfied altruism, flows over in many uncertain directions. But its legitimate course lies in trying to anticipate or further the wishes of the benefactor. And the altruistic Veneration of the inferior towards the superior is thus presented in the shape of obedience, docility, loyalty, &c. It extends even to the dead as will be shown later on. Gratitude and admiration are however, incomplete as sentiments for they do not disclose the fitting external action. For thanks are often only words, and admiration may be praise of very immature kind. The feeling to be moral must tend to active virtue. One may not justly admire a man whose example is not meant to be recommended for imitation.

VENERATION, gratitude, obedience, loyalty.

There is a resemblance between the gratitude or veneration of the inferior and the conduct enforced by the superior through fear of power or the rigor of law. Only in the one case the obedience, loyalty and submissiveness are egoistic and uncertain, and in the other case the same condition is voluntary and more enduring. A sincere gratitude to the past or the dead, should always be manifested by kindness to the present and the future, that is, to contemporaries and posterity.

The type of the virtue occurs as in the case of Attachment in domestic society and filial feeling, where subordination to power, veneration to superior, and

Filial obedience.

gratitude to serve the benefactor, are united in the happiest and most intense form both spontaneously and by sustained effort. Morality points to its culture as well with the instrumentality of parental control as without it. Dutifulness to one's parents and ancestors is required as well by the domestic group as also for the sake of all those families which constitute the outside society. And the requirements do not cease when the grown up son becomes the head of another family in that society.

Just as stupidity leading to deceit is the most incorrigible form of intellectual failing, so the irreverence of the scoffer is that pernicious form of moral depravity which arises at times from sheer ignorance of the nature of veneration and the true means of gratifying that feeling. The error arises first of all from vague or depraved notions of domestic veneration and eventually from loss of touch between kindred families in general society. On the one hand men forget their duties as arising from old ties. And on the other hand their hearts are distracted by having to venerate the governing powers in the country at large. Voluntary obedience is however simply invaluable to those more developed conditions of social solidarity in which violence having passed into government by law, the sanction of opinion requires to be invigorated by every legitimate means available. And veneration in public life must be guided by the domestic model. Where one fails to admire his superior in his heart, he may at least render voluntary obedience in his conduct.

Organization.

One of the foremost requirements of life is to be quick in following up the directions of the superior for purposes of organised co-operation. Attachment may await slow demonstration; benevolence is uncertain for the very endless extent of its manifestation; but when time has to be taken by the forelock and the energy, skill and large-heartedness of one man has to be multiplied by numerous instruments, the good offices of subordination can be effective only, as with the increase of hands there is also a steady advance in the ministering agency. Domination is egoistic and arouses opposition.

Equality between men also tends to increase social friction ; but the value of subordination in inferiors is so great that where voluntary effort omits to call it forth, the strong hand of power has to minimise the friction in any possible way. And where immoral men fail to appreciate this condition of human life, coercion has to uphold solidarity and social organization even at some sacrifice of tenderness. The requirements of continuity at last open the eyes of mankind. Reverence of the weak for the strong becomes the dictate of wisdom as of true morality. It is prompted by physical nature as it also conduces to the converse virtue—devotion of the strong to serve the weak by disinterested kindness. And as civilization advances, the greater magnitude of intellectual as compared to physical strength, and of moral strength in relation to both, comes to be appreciated to the glory of morality and furtherance of collective happiness.

KINDNESS.

Kindness or Benevolence is completely divested of the special conditions referred to before. It does not look for the reciprocity of Attachment, and is not limited by the sense of favors received. The superior is freely devoted to the wants of the inferior. There would, it is true, be a corresponding reverence on the other side binding the two into solidarity. But on the side of benevolence the heart is as free from a craving for gratitude in the inferior as it is often quite unconscious of the individuality of those whom it serves. Social solidarity enjoins reverence in the inferior and kindness on the opposite side. But the humane feeling is like that of the parent to the child; it looks to the happiness of the inferior alone; only outside of the domestic society the feeling is not confined to the particular relation of the inferior but extends to all.

Parental affection.

Parental affection is at once the type of benevolence for all and imposes on one the most onerous of domestic duties. For all that a man has acquired from his lifelong experience; all that he misses of past wisdom, and all that he yearns for from any teachings of the farthest future, all that constitutes education, in its widest signification

has to be distilled out of the parent's heart, head, and hand in order to train up the child in the way he should go. The child has to be educated by the parent; human nature prompts him to it; but who shall dare to instruct the parent? And social morality may not aspire to supply a loftier model for benevolence than that of maternal affection.

As Veneration always remembers the services transmitted by the dead, so Kindness is impelled towards the happiness of the unborn. Human nature is moved in this direction as well of itself as also because such conduct is the most fitting acknowledgment of those services. Thus while Attachment points to an alternation of the other two altruistic feelings, these again disclose by their mutual relation the supreme importance of Kindness alone. Deeds must testify true altruism. Thought or its exchange by words can at best indicate only the facts of our human relations; our relations to the family, the country and mankind; to equals, superiors and inferiors; to the living, the dead and the unborn; and to the present, the past and the future. Social morality while it would utilise intelligence to the full, counts still more upon the union of all emotions through altruism, and upon that of altruism with activity.

Superiority.

The dual relation between superior and inferior which governs the three feelings and relations of men considered above, suggests questions as to what constitutes superiority and how the dead and unborn are related to us. These questions might drag us too far into the domain of sociology, which is at best an imperfect science yet. We have to remember however that the present attempt, feeble as it is, seeks to establish ethics upon sociology. And thus we may assume that the superiority of man to man may be one of (1) age; (2) of social rank founded upon considerations of tradition or parentage; and (3) of natural merit of the individual himself. Moreover the last-named point—merit—may be variously regarded as due to physical, pecuniary and mental qualifications. And mental superiority again may be one of altruism, intelligence or practical energy. Into

these distinctions we must not enter in further detail. But they will occur in considering whether our altruism should be confined to contemporary relations or it should extend even to the dead and unborn. The dead are superior to us as we are superior to the unborn, in age and for transmitted service at least.

The dead and the unborn.

The type for the benevolent feeling being taken from the parental relation, we become imperceptibly governed by our concern for the unborn. So that no kindness is genuine which entirely overlooks the claims of posterity in the public or of descendants in the family. Our relation with the dead however gives rise to some difference of opinion. It is obvious that if our intentions have to be reduced into action in order that our conduct may be called moral, reverence for the dead would labor under permanent inefficiency. The grateful desire to return the service of a superior, barren as it is in comparison to the reciprocity of Attachment, becomes infinitely more so in the case of gratitude to the dead. Fortunately however we have a way out of this difficulty in a logical connection between the dead and the unborn and between our altruistic feeling for the one class and the other.

Gratitude to the past ought to evoke kindness to the future.

Reverence suggests gratitude and loyal adhesion to the superior. But as directed to the dead it also calls up the fact that our ancestors were kind like us, and desired to serve us and our posterity both. And we also see that in our services to the present and future generations, we not only gratify our own benevolent desires but even those of our ancestors. In point of external conduct then the logical connection alluded to, is thus secure enough. But there is difference of opinion about the manner of connecting reverence with kindness intellectually or by conscious volition. We may seek to do good in our own way or in that of the person or persons whom we do or wish to revere. In the former case we could be only kind; in the latter, our kindness though not the less genuine, would also be tempered by reverence. There are indeed some who attach so great importance to past

judgment that they would have none left as their own in particular. But true wisdom is never so suicidal; and the disposition alluded to would show only intellectual degeneracy. The danger in fact becomes real when in our efforts for present and future good we forget or ignore the kindred labors of the past. It is very serious because it has been widely prevalent in European revolutions, and because it tends to unsettle all human experience. If we can do without the guidance, experience, or prescience of the past, the future may also do without those of our own. But human wisdom is really open to conservation, and therefore social solidarity always fosters an adequate attention to precedent or past experience. And the result would become all the more satisfactory if we deliberately seek to unite the teachings of the past with our own providence for the future. In other words, the impulse of veneration or gratitude as directed to superiors, to the past and to the dead, should be strengthened not only by means of spontaneous kindness, but also by an intellectual appreciation of these facts.

Conscience, Enlightened Self-interest, and Altruism.

We have over and again observed that altruism is not the only rule of social life. Egoism is a most potent and important factor. But egoism can in no case be let alone; it must be governed. And the one governing principle requisite for all our varied emotions is altruism. Altruism or rather Benevolence furnishes the guiding principle of duty. Its impulsive character renders it also a source of happiness like the egoistic impulses; and finally its bearings upon human solidarity serve to impose it upon the individual as a duty required by society. In itself benevolence may like any of our natural impulses have no claim to moral eminence as it is certainly inaccessible to all men and at all times for practical guidance in life. Unmixed altruism in all men may not even be good for society as it is certainly impossible in life. But as the proverb says: "Aim high and you will strike high." And upon the whole altruism is good as THE rule of moral duty. It is good as compared to the egoistic impulses; for benevolence does not seek to destroy any kind of egoism whereas egoism is virtually intolerant of

all benevolence. Benevolence is good again because society checks egoism and always encourages altruistic conduct. Besides, benevolence is also as good as, if not better than, the directions derivable solely from what is called conscience. Nay it also affords room enough for the culture of "adaptability" in regard to the so-called law of natural selection. Conscience like altruism calls together all the knowledge accessible to the individual; but it leaves him then to himself alone. So far as the subsequent guidance of his will is concerned conscience may omit to name a test which could be applied to the decision of the will. But altruism serves the cause of responsibility better by suggesting these further questions: "What is your decision, do you decide for your own happiness or for that of others? which portion of your decision is for your pleasure and which against it? and which again would you in order to make that other man or men happy?. Beware of the temptor—egoism?" Thus the principle of altruism is in full accord with, and in fact furthers the purposes of, the free and supreme decision of conscience and conscientious volition. The principle of adaptability too carries a similar purpose. But adaptability as the rule of compromise between egoism and altruism or as enlightened self-interest may carry the man to the opposite extreme of uncertainty as compared to arbitrary conscience. It leaves the judgment of the individual or the decision of his will oscillating over the compromise to be made, and between opinions about goodness and badness of the contemplated act 'till time discloses its effects upon the well-being of society. Experience is an indispensable aid. But we have to work only with past experience such as conscience has always had to take cognizance of. Altruism carefully cherishes the past and remembers that man has always had to adapt himself to society by being good to others.

Altruism as the modifier of egoism.

Upon the view that altruism is the common feature of attachment, veneration and kindness, and that it forms the rallying point as it were, of what has been called enlightened self-interest, we hâve considered the seven egoistic instincts and shown how they may be turned to

the good of society. We have also seen that the three altruistic instincts have a living type in our domestic relations, and how with that type the moral transformation of egoistic instincts can be effected and made to spread into wider social relations. It is only necessary that in place of the conjugal, paternal, and filial relations, we should set down the relations of equals, superiors, and inferiors, and of contemporaries, ancestors, and posterity. And the rule of altruism will be sufficient for the morals of all and every man.

Miscellaneous moral principles and their classification.

It now remains for us to show how the many other well-known virtues and principles of moral conduct can be referred to the principle of altruism. The task seems to be superfluous, whereas if badly performed the result may even be damaging to the doctrine expounded. Moral questions do not certainly admit of anything like chemical analysis; for opinion is unfortunately divided as to what are the elementary phenomena of human nature. We have started with assuming some eighteen functions of the mind. But there is no great consensus about our analysis and it is uncertain in consequence how others would desire to analyse these mental phenomena and any virtues which have to be referred to the altruistic principle. But at the same time I should not shirk the question entirely on the present occasion. And to save labor in the definitions of the virtues discussed below, I shall follow the lead of Mr. Hackwood.*

Honesty and Justice.

First of all, the two foremost virtues Honesty and Justice have to be accounted for. Mr. Hackwood defines Honesty as "that proper feeling which prevents us from taking or using any thing which does not belong to us, when we have no right to do so;" and Justice as "rendering [giving] every one his due." The words *right* and *due* in the passages quoted would at once suggest the bearings of law upon human rights and duties. We have consi-

* Notes of Lessons on Moral subjects, by J. W. Hackwood referred to in letter No. 120, dated the 29th September 1887 from the Secretary of State to the Government of India.

dered elsewhere (see. p.p. 82, 119, 124, &c.) law as the binding tie between domination and subordination, and we have also put in the same category self-made rule to bind the inner man with his outer conduct in the form of discipline. In order to repress their egoism, men must have recourse to law in all these forms; and honesty and justice would both come under observance of law whether self-made or made by the sovereign power. Honesty may also be looked upon as a moderately intense form of attachment between contemporaries, which nobly suppresses the egoistic desire of benefitting by the loss of other people's labor or property. Justice transforms egoistic domination by law into a moderate degree of sociability, but it cannot advance as far as mercy. While Honesty may be regarded as moderate attachment its commendation as the best policy, shows the bearings of social morality even in its coarse egoistic aspect. The proverb means only that the most selfish man should, if he is wise, be also honest. The wisdom coincides with policy, as well because policy, polity and society, are cognate matters, as for the patent fact that dishonesty and bad faith in any form, militatė with the solidarity of human society. And the altruistic basis of morality is also all the better confirmed by showing that honesty is the only royal road to happiness and success in life.

Magnanimity and Forgiveness.

By the side of honesty and justice we should place the virtues of Magnanimity and Forgiveness. Mr. Hackwood says Magnanimity never stoops to artifice for the accomplishment of a purpose; soon dismisses anger; and does not easily take offence but makes allowance for the motives which actuate others. And Forgiveness is said to be pardon or overlooking of injuries; and it is also added in the same connection, that mercy begets mercy. Here then we have the highest forms of altruism and disinterested sympathy but only in different names; and a word only is necessary to point out that the reverse of Magnanimity *viz* pusillanimity has been already considered as the most self-seeking form of servile personality. (see. p. 120.)

Forbearance is placed by Mr. Hackwood beside forgiveness and defined as the power of restraining our passions when provoked. In other words it is only the repression of anger or the military instinct, which is further methodised by lawful domination.

Forbearance.

The question of Forgiveness with its correlative Forbearance, admits however of a deeper analysis, and as it is also fundamental to the entire problem of morality, it should not be lightly passed over. Society has decided to reject the principle of retaliation in human law. Compensation is all that can be awarded by society to meet the most vengeful spirit. Morality requires however, that we should carry this lesson home into our bosoms; and when we set about doing so, we find ourselves furnished with important guides of conduct. The question hinges entirely upon man's proneness to error. It is because we are so subject to error that we have to seek forgiveness, to render reparation, and also to always carry ourselves with a feeling of humility. On the other hand, the moment we come to look upon ourselves as erring mortals, we have to enquire about right conduct, to be circumspect in observing such conduct, and to be constant in our self-examination and self-questioning. We must prevent or rectify our errors. Hence the importance of forgiveness and humility. Society however is now troubled by reason of somewhat lax notions about individual liberty. And we should beware of the evils which have thus become apt to be lost sight of. Many would justify even their erroneous conduct. They would do so at times in the way of the servile subordinate who was afraid of any arbitrary justice. But the commoner occurrence now is, a plea of justifiable individuality upon the grounds of freedom, and that both of action and of criticism. Men forget that the function of criticism is not tolerable as between an injurer and the man who has actually become the sufferer. The critic must be like the judge, a third or neutral party. The conditions of error and rectification are the same as ever they were. There can be no liberty to hold a wrong opinion knowing it to be such; much less to do an act of our own sweet will and examine its

errors afterwards. To err is doubtless human. But to be accustomed to overlook our errors is depravity. We cannot lay claim to being forgiven as a matter of course, much less without a determination to cease from our misconduct. We may not forgive ourselves until we have forgiven all who were like us instrumental to the particular error we happen to deplore at any time. The principle of altruism requires that we should take on ourselves the heaviest load of self-condemnation, and exonerate others to the utmost available limit. And herein lies the correct indications about the rules of asking and rendering forgiveness. It is not enough that we should exercise every possible precaution against error; but we should be most forward in giving redress and confessing our fault. We may have to be our own confessor; but to be such we must relax the secrecy of self-confession. No humility is genuine which seeks to shut out the light of public criticism upon itself. Apart from its effects on character, a frank avowal of fault before the injured person at least, is needed in order to ensure our determination to beware of its repetition in the future, and to honestly render an adequate reparation for the past. Self-examination is obviously the only means to attain this result. But mere self-examination is not enough; even with the deepest contrition it fails to be efficacious without active effort at reparation. Reparation is requisite in each particular case; but a sense of humility also has to be entertained constantly for all cases as it should be carefully called up in each. It is only thus that we can realise our relation to the world around us, and to time in the past and in the future. Each particular case of our error ought to point out to ourselves what practicable precautions were neglected, and also to humiliate us in view of all possible bad consequences of the event. And then as we come to forego the right to justify ourselves, we are enabled to recognise our insignificance: our subjection to the powers of society at the outset, and to the still higher *i. e.* the religious sanction, which each one of us may acknowledge according to his creed. Lastly, as we take into consideration the

distant bearing of our general and constant need for forgiveness we shall slowly advance in our ability to forgive others for their faults. That ability comprises not only a rejection of the vengeful volition, but also the more arduous task of forgetting the wrongs which we may have suffered. Forgiveness as a giving up of the law of retaliation may be learnt from even the judicial spirit of the times. But the proverb runs—"forgive and forget," and its full meaning does not come until we recognise the the extreme difficulty of what is given as the sequel of forgiveness. To forgive is said to be divine. It may not be attained by any volitional effort over memory. What then shall we say of that higher trait of forgiveness—cultivated obliteration of injury and error committed by others? It is I think, in order to alter the course of our vindictive memory that we have to cultivate a general spirit of forgiveness in the form of earnest humility.

Courtesy and Good manners

To return to Mr. Hackwood : he passes from kindness or consideration for others into Courtesy and Good manners. He says "courtesy is that right feeling which makes our behaviour show that we consider the wants and wishes of others." It springs from a sense of justice or a desire to give others their due. And three several phases of courtesy are given as Good manners, Civility and respectfulness, and a Good tone. They would all come under altruistic feeling in respect of all those who are fellow citizens, fellow countrymen and fellow men. Courtesy and good manners should in fact be backed by a corresponding feeling which is only self-abnegation; and where the requisite feeling may not be at command, the suitable conduct at least should not be absent causing pain to others. It is a sadly anarchical opinion which would regard courtesy and good manners as allied to hypocrisy and opposed to candor.

Modesty.

The question of good manners and good tone is not only a part of courteous regard for any member of society however remotely related to us; but it is really connectd with a man or woman's entire deportment in life which by the name of modesty, comes under regard for opinion or approba-

tion. (see p. 147). Modesty and good manners may be only conventional. But the conventions of society are rules founded upon human good sense. We have already shown that rules of modesty may not be defied in prudence or even from a due sense of one's own worth at its highest pitch. Its relation with humility and forgiveness has also been pointed out. And even if old, the conventional rules of society hitherto employed as tests of modesty, may be spared excessive criticism till fresh rules are successfully supplied by the critical public. Modesty thus becomes imperative as a moral duty. And its greater importance in the conduct of woman arises only from another convention which is still upheld in this country at least; I mean the one, that man alone Rules, and woman at the best Advises. And children must hold a still humbler place.

Fraternal as compared to conjugal affection.

Before concluding the chapter it is necessary to mention that in this country the altruistic feeling of attachment might be said to have its type in fraternal rather than conjugal affection. This view of our domestic life may be justified considering the nature of our joint-families. And it would not disturb the principle of morality here laid down except in so far as the joint-family system itself clashes with the requirements of sound domestic organization, which is a very large and pratically remote question. Moreover the conditions of our society are such that conjugal attachment does not manifest itself in supporting the wife with praise; neither before herself nor before others. Secret approval and a good understanding in the minutest details are the essential requisites. The wife's support to the husband has to be more demonstrative, in view perhaps of the example of Siva's wife. It always takes the form of loyal obedience. This inequality between wife and husband if carried to excess may be injurious to domestic solidarity and still more to the education of children. But it would be far more dangerous to run to the other extreme and to destroy all government in domestic society. In any case it is consistent with the conditions of fraternal relation as shown above.

CHAPTER XI.

TRUTH. (11, 12, 13, 14.)

Truth: the moral side of Conception and of Logic and Science: the way to veracity and candor.

We are again going to take up several mental functions together in one chapter. But in the present case the object is not to disclose any latent unity between them but to recall only the one that is, the moral side of the four intellectual functions numbered from the eleventh to the fourteenth in our Tabular Analysis. (p. 11.) Perhaps it might be justly argued that as Education and Morals are substantially co-extensive with one another, each of our intellectual functions has some utilitarian aspects, no less than others relating to its moral influence upon the individual's emotional character. But to discuss the moral side of human intelligence in any such aspects, one must first take into account the entire field of intellectual activity and then judge how far the innumerable forms of man's intellectual labor are moral, pleasurable, useful or indifferent. This is obviously far beyond the scope of this book. It could never be expected that we should discourse on Synthesis, Analysis, Generalization and Systematisation, that is, on questions of formal logic as well as on the virtue and utility of all philosophic or scientific ideas, though for aught I know, they certainly might come under Conduct in Society. However, all these four functions have also been grouped together in the Tabular Analysis under the single head of Conception, and as such distinguished from the next function of Expression. Conception precedes Expression in the mind of man, and when morally sound suggests only that commonly talked of, though recondite matter, which is most appreciated as Truth. At the same time True Conception leads the way to that other aspect of Truth which is known as Veracity and Candor, and which comes under the head of Expression. Veracity and true knowledge are most intimately related. Candor, it is true, has a certain bearing upon Prudence and courage that is, our practical functions or activity in general. But

nevertheless it would be better to connect it with Veracity immediately and mediately with true knowledge.

Relativity.

Unfortunately for us we live in an age, when the question of Truth and true knowledge happens to be surrounded with the greatest of difficulties. There is first of all the endless diversity of experience and scientific Truths, and then there is the almost universal recognition that all our knowledge is derived from the outside and is more or less uncertain for its relativity. Truth is therefore not only difficult of attainment but harder to be retained with firmness. And the only solution available is to look, not for absolute Truth but for what all men do or are disposed to believe as true. The moral aspect of mental Conception occurs however not only in laying hold of abstract Truth which slips away as it were into the region of absolute Truth, but it presents itself with all the greater vividness in Veracity. On the other hand, the reverse of Truth is not always a result of defective candor; and while hypocrisy and intentional mendacity are always such, Inaccuracy in observing facts and events, is never regarded as serious fault; not even when it is traceable to emotional bias or rhetorical requirements. But on the other hand these matters may not be left out of account in our moral regard for Truth.

Inaccuracy: discrimination between fact and opinion.

He that has learnt to appreciate Candor and Veracity can never forgive himself for Inaccuracy in observation. And true knowledge has to be sought for, if not from any innate craving for unknown Truth, yet at least from man's love for man and the consequent necessity of candor and accurate information. Truth is perplexing in its search; and yet no man has ever ventured to suggest that we should be satisfied with falsehood, error, or self-delusion. The fact is, that all the difficulties about Truth arise from man's own imperfections. Conception is the result of observation, that is, of a certain internal nexus between the mind and the observed phenomena. And the morality of thinking imperatively requires that the two processes which respectively precede and

follow the fact of observation should be kept as distinct as possible. To observe accurately, we have to forego all mental bias. But then, when we come to express what we have observed, we cannot leap out of ourselves so as to be divested of all our natural bias. Again, our observation, however accurate we may have been able to make it, has also to be expressed exhaustively. In order to express our mind duly and to give out all that we have got within, we may not withold even that unfortunate bias. And we have to disclose therefore the view put upon our information by ourselves. It is only thus that we can veraciously put others in possession of any bias that we may have been unconsciously subject to. The dogma of veracity is, speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. And accuracy requires that we should also observe the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. But this is simply impossible. Hence the limitations of our power and the duty of doing all we can to supply the defect, require that we should fully disclose what lies within the mind by adding separately to the information we furnish, and as a summary of it, the opinion or conclusion which we may have formed from our observation.

Opinion: value of its consensus:

The distinction made above is one between fact and opinion, and it is of great importance in morality. Many may supply facts and information. Very few are competent to guide the opinion of others. There is first of all, the wide question of a consensus of human opinion as the foundation of all Poetry, Philosophy, and Politics. In this question philosophers have more to answer for than ordinary people. And though I am for reverentially enduring the proverbial disagreement of doctors, yet the freedom of disciples which is thence invariably brought about, may permit of our saying that this want of consensus is a thing which ought to be cured. There is not only a duty about it, but a most imperative one too. Not that there should be no doubtful questions and corresponding liberty to hold peculiar opinions in such questions. But in matters affecting the feeling, judgment and conduct of many men, there seems

to be some room for increase of harmony and charity between thinker and thinker, as the world stands to-day. The Roman Catholic maintains that to interpret the true sense of the Christain scriptures, it is necessary to obtain "the unanimous consent of the Fathers". The Hindu also is bound by certain similar conditions. And in any case, the due limits of the right of free inquiry have been well expressed by what has been called an axiom of the Catholic Church: "In necessary things, unity: in doubtful things, liberty: in all things charity". It is obviously the first requisite of all human organization.

Opinion has often to be suspended.

Secondly, in the humbler matters affecting our feelings, experience or judgment, and mutual co-operation in every day life, our duty is easier of performance, but of the very same nature with that of philosophers in general or of poets, scientists and statesmen in particular. Opinion has not only to be distinguished from facts, but also held in suspense for the decision of others who are more competent to form them, *i. e.* for such approximate consensus as may be requisite and feasible in the circumstances of each case. Opinion gains in value as well by the numeric strength of supporters as by the special qualification of the expert or authority who forms it. But there is always valid reason when sound opinion fails to receive numeric support. And it is simply due to moral obtuseness that one assumes his observation and opinion to be equivalent, and would not bear his opinion to be challenged, feeling as if his veracity was impugned.

Fact and opinion are at times hard to separate. When a man says he has observed a bird, he really means that from his observation he came to the conclusion or opinion that what he saw was a bird. In such cases opinion it is true, certainly goes for fact, but that is only because there is such a wide consensus about what animals are to be called birds. It is a moral requirement of accurate observation that the observer is bound to remember what opinions are known to him to pass for facts and what are not; and that both in reporting and in ob-

serving his facts, he ought to put his own experiences of any novel kind to the test of other men's experiences. When a man has to listen to or report a ghost story he may not shut his mind's eye to the weak points of the narration; and if again he is a believer in ghosts he must not deprive others of the light of that fact. He must not be a witness and an advocate both; at least not at the same moment. When one man has to report to another a conversation held with a third, the exact words employed, and their sense as understood by the man reporting are both important. And when one acts upon information recieved through secondary source or sources, the circumstance involves intricate questions of fact and opinion. Lastly, in Hindu and I believe, also in Mahomedan families, where one has to deal with zenana women and that through one or more intermediaries, the difficulty may become simply bewildering. Life is founded upon experience and true knowledge, and if men are to benefit by each other's intelligence and good sense, altruism must debar as much as possible all recklessness in acquiring and transmitting information.

Rhetoric and Sophistry.

The immorality of inaccurate observation and speech gains in gravity I think, when an utterance rises to the eminence of Rhetoric. Truth and knowledge are so difficult of attainment that we must always be most grateful to all our teachers and all our useful informants. All the arts of expression are indeed of inestimable value to man. Language, logic, poetry, rhetoric and even special pleading deserve our appreciative attention and regard. But rhetoric without conviction is such an abuse of the linguistic art that it does not seem to stand condemned sufficiently well by being touched by the slight stigma of Sophistry.

Emotional obliquity.

The use and abuse of rhetoric brings us to notice another mischief. I dare not call it an immorality. But it is perhaps owing to that mischief that the abuses of rhetoric are so largely tolerated in society. Ordinarily the rhetorician is expected to present facts and opinion in such a way as to rouse the particular feeling and

conduct which he intends to evoke in the audience. And the morality of the action depends upon the altruism of such intention in each particular case. Where again the rhetorician knowingly departs from his conviction, his conduct is presumably due to some interested motive, and is impeachable accordingly, apart from any theatrical displays of false sentiment. But the mischief alluded to occurs when facts and opinions are at the outset approached, observed, or studied, with feeling and conduct of a culpable kind. The conduct may or may not deserve to be classed with abuse of rhetoric. But the fact to which I am alluding is well-known; and the evil is graver than intellectual idiosyncracy. It may be even attributed to natural obliquity of the human emotions. But the foible is of exceedingly wide prevalence. Throughout the entire range of our observation and reflection we are governed by our peculiar biases. Biases are emotional, and even egoistic. Indeed biased benevolence itself must be supposed to have an egoistic origin. And in combining our ideas too, we may be connecting our emotions with a bias. And error often arises from fault in the links occurring between ideas and emotions, between emotions and ideas, and between emotions and emotions; as also it is known to arise from unsound logic, that is, from wrong links between ideas and ideas. Error of the last-named kind is condemned only as fallacy, but it receives every attention in any education worth the name. Errors however of the other and co-equal description are often sadly neglected. They are partly unavoidable with certain minds but they are not always or uniformly so; and thus even when they do not carry grave immoralities they may beget serious mischief. And it is necessary that an honest mind should not overlook the fact. The evil is patent and has much to do with subordinating our egoistic desires to altruism. Let us go over the ground rapidly for a moment.

Illustration. The angry mind might pass into ideas either of the sword, of litigation, or of legislative reform: but he is morally bound to reject the first-named idea. The proud man in power might think of making any kind of law to gratify his domination

any sort of strife to suit his envy; or he might recognise the numeric strength of his opponents and thence the requirements of justice between them and himself. Moreover he might allow himself to be swayed by anger into violence at times, and by envy into guile and cowardice at others; or he might be moved by either in the direction of equal justice. Thus it appears, any two different emotions and the varied ideas corresponding to each, may work convergently or divergently, and do so considerable variety also. But they should converge and do so, so as to bend the more intensely egoistic passion towards the less intense one. Moreover the moral considerations ought to occur spontaneously or independently of much laborious reflection. We might prolong this illustration to show also that the hungry man should turn his thoughts from robbery to industry, and then moving along with the avaricious man pass on through usury and trade, into law and honesty leaving dishonest trade aside. So again the man yearning for fame would be wise in rejecting the thought of false display for the sake of honest merit. And thus ultimately, the thoughts of wealth, of law, and of opinion, should culminate in charity. This illustration would serve to show how the moral culture of men's biases and emotions ought to be regulated with reference to their mutual bearings and their alliance with truth, knowledge and moral conduct.

Be true to thyself.

It is not always the case however that our very egoistic desires are capable of any such emotional unity in order to guide our ideas in the right path. Moreover where mercy or justice is necessary for that purpose it is not always that we can command the suitable emotion in order to attain the desired conduct. But we are here concerned only to say that to be true, a man should first of all be true to himself. Self-delusion is not only the worst of all delusions but becomes also very great immorality when it is not, though it may be, shaken off from ourselves. Emotional obliquity may be natural. But it may also result from habit and false education. If the sophistical rhetorician is a traitor to his

trustful audience, the conduct of the casuist who works himself up into fraud—a fraud which runs deep into his whole life and out of it into society—richly deserves to be known to himself and to all, in the true measure of its turpitude.

CHAPER XII.

CANDOR AND VERACITY. (15)

Expression and communication.

The fifteenth function of the mind and the fifth of the intellectual functions according to our Analysis (p. 11.) is Expression and Communication. Under the former name this function is opposed to Conception; and under the latter we are also presented with its social aspect. What is regarded as the duty of Candor and Veracity affects only the manner of exercising the function in question. It will be perceived both from its position in the analysis and its general nature, that though the subject of this chapter is somewhat closely allied to activity or the practical functions of the mind, nevertheless taken as a whole, it is essentially an incident of the intellectual function of Expression. Expression may be either active or passive. In the active form candid expressions of the face, gestures &c. are obviously allied to veracity in speech. But in its passive form, Expression of the mind or mind's conceptions is indeed very obscure. Between physiognomy and introspection it is often hard to say which is the less unreliable. Passive expression of one's own mind is certainly something more latent than even thought itself. This sort of expression may take the form either of candor or that of simple reserve and taciturnity. But reserve can never grow into uncandid simulation or dissimulation without thought. And where thought does not furnish the cloak, the inner man comes spontaneously out into the external world, according to the man's talent for making himself intelligible to others.

This spontaneous nature of Candor leads to a widely prevalent opinion that children and primitive people are possessed of a virtue which the highest culture and civilization often fail to attain. And though it is not our business here to dwell upon the confusion of ideas which underlies the foregoing opinion yet we cannot pass over two patent questions. In the first place, it is somewhat hard to account for why preference is shown to candor as compared to simple reserve. I think it to be owing to the spontaneity of candor which has been referred to above. Or it may be, that candor as the basis of good faith promotes sociability and is therefore justly appreciated. But on the other hand, candor may be overdone, thus affecting the durability of social good understanding. A measure of discreet reticence may after all, be the golden mean between too much candor and too much reserve. In the next place, we have to bear in mind that the duty imposed by society in regard to candor is always negative. It is untruth, concealment, and even reserve, which are prohibited or condemned. But candor of the highest quality is more or less difficult of attainment. There seems to be what may be called, a neutial ground between hypocrisy and candor: between absolute falsehood and indispensable veracity. I am decidedly opposed to allowing any such neutrality of character in the momentous moral question before us. But situated as we are I feel bound to recognise the truth about it. I think we come accross the fact in three forms : Some seem to have especial standards of candor according to their respective opinion or sentiment; the standards themselves varying with individuals, classes, or nations. But the result of such diverse standards is only mutual recrimination for lack of scrupulous honesty, and consequent breach of human solidarity. Some again contract such deep-rooted notions of what they call decent appearance that they are driven in consequence to conduct of more or less questionable kind. And finally immature intellects are not wanting, especially in childhood, to which the distinction is more or less imperceptible, between

Spontaneous and cultivated candor.

what is positively desired to be concealed, and what creates a false impression in other minds because some thing is inadvertently left undisclosed. And in view of facts such as these I think society is wise in imposing only what I have called negative rules about candor. Education; censure, and public opinion must be adjusted according to the circumstances of our life. Reserve we know, may or may not be hypocritical. What is appreciated as undisguised artlessness by some, may be distasteful to others as being gratuitously offensive to men's intelligence or delicate sensibility. Hence for the purposes of censure and our opinion about men's candor, and even for imparting instruction, it would be desirable to allow people some latitude in the neutral ground referred to before. The rule should be "do not be uncandid to me in matters in which you have taken me into your confidence; do not tell me an untruth, but tell me the whole truth as far as you can." It should not run as I fear it is at times practically made to do, thus: " tell me all that you know ;" or " be so candid that my knowledge of you may be as complete as your own." The latter rule would I am sure be an exhorbitant demand about the expression " whole truth." I think we might very well take the standard set up by the courts of justice. What is received as true utterance and straight-forward conduct in a witness on oath, ought to exonerate a man from the charge of hypocrisy in ordinary social life. Similarly what would be perjury on the witness box should not be one jot the less reprehensible in social life, because there was no oath or affirmation. To prevent misunderstanding I should add that on the witness box a man should be allowed to tell the whole truth in his own way and not in the way of those who desire to distort his free utterance. Unless we allow some latitude of the kind referred to, we run the risk of driving simple reserve into positive hypocrisy and falsehood, for lack of intellectual keenness. Subject to the stricter conditions for the general requirements of candor we may I think, leave the feebler intellects to work out their character by themselves in regard to the neutral region alluded to. To help them on

farther they can only be treated to sympathy and good example, but instruction falls flat; and fear I think, does more harm than good. For children too, the same principle will apply. In clear cases of positive untruth, duplicity, or concealment, there should not be any laxity shown at all. But upon the neutral ground, affection and example should inculcate far more than verbal direction about truth and falsehood. Above all children should be constantly watched and guarded from falling into duplicity rather than punished for want of candor. Candor, being duly cultivated in the more unmistakeable cases, should be left to spontaneous growth for the higher sphere of morality in the neutral region between studied hypocrisy and incomplete utterance of truth. All average men ought to get out of this slough at some stage of their life. But for society as a whole, similar progress must I fear be a work of time.

It thus becomes of comparatively greater importance to understand candor and behave candidly than to seek to impart to others the lessons about it. Here introspection is indispensable; and men must take good care of the words they use and the language they employ. They must know their own minds first of all, and say only what they mean. Those who do not know their own minds are simply incapable of true candor. But there is a still higher sacrifice to be made for the sake of candor, and through candor, for that of altruism and solidarity. Civilised men create strange miseries and invent shameful subterfuges in order to keep up false appearances. It springs from serious discordance within the heart and mind and between the inner and the outer man. The evil is largely due to those who connive at it and those others also who insist upon mere appearances. But as it is the individual who must work out the reform for all, we must condemn only the morbid desire of the individual who would not courageously acknowledge his material or intellectual poverty as compared to his peers. Equality of men is more or less fictitious as we have seen. But it is in order to aspire to an equality with some superiors or to retain an

equality against apprehended fall, that men resort to shades of dis-ingenuousness in the manner referred to before. What is desirable therefore is to forego that furious race between the ranks of society which so unfortunately prevails; to betake to humility and gratitude in recognittion of all shades of our own inferiority; and to enlarge our charity where any sort of superiority enables us to extend it to others. Candor will thus generally cease to bring any slur on us; but if it fails, we ought to resign ourselves to our lot with what peace we can command. It is only thus that mind can unite with mind; and truth and charity be conjoined to promote the growth of morality and civilization.

Fidelity to self, indispensable to happiness.

If a man could imagine himself cut off from all his fellow-creatures, and freed from restraints imposed by them, he would still find it painful to accommodate himself to a within and a without which were inconsistent with one another. Integrity of character as between the inner and the outer man is as much a condition of happiness as it is also the only true answer to the vexed question of what is called personal identity in Metaphysics. He who was really sceptical about his personal identity could not stop with disavowing only duty and experience, but would have to forego also his desire for happiness, peace, or *nirvan*, one or other of which so constantly concerns the inner man and yet has to be sought out chiefly in the outer world. Society would not mind, if the outer man always took care to exactly reverse 'the inner man. Any such irony would altogether lose its point. But to doubt who and what I was at the preceding moment, and to claim to be divested of all connection between the inner and the outer man, would not be only intolerable to society but this self-distrust and pretended self-delusion would never endure long when the individual has uniformly to eat if he is hungry and to reject food if he is not. The individual cannot disencumber himself of duty and happiness both at the same time. It seems to be a lucky accident however, that while advocates have come forward for all sorts of absurd positions like those noticed above,

no one has yet preached the vanity of candor and of fidelity to self in social life. Indeed candor seems to be the only virtue which is capable of being established without the help of divine revelation, intellectual training, or interposition of society. Sincerity is so good a thing that its worst enemies can never replace it except by a spurious imitation of it. Self-delusion is perhaps the nearest approach to that imaginary but extremely foul doubleness in which sincerity might be sincerely disclaimed. Let a man be true to himself and he cannot be false to any man.

Good faith.

However that may be, society cannot subsist without good faith; or in any case, the universal understanding that good faith is indefeasibly the normal rule of social conduct. It is impossible to enforce veracity and candor or to prevent mendacity and hypocrisy by law, though the extreme cases of perjury and cheating are justly made punishable. The oath or affirmation required of the witness in a judicial proceeding should be understood only as a caution imposed upon him in respect of his moral and social duty, and by no means as a promise in respect of a particular act. The moral duty of good faith and the legal injunctions about false evidence are in fact only different forms of the same condition of social solidarity. Even when one deceives a beloved person in order to protect him from the justly apprehended consequences of some painful truth, the balance of evil and unhappiness may not eventually stand in favor of the deception however shortened in its duration. No two men can afford to question at every step the honesty of each other's utterances and deportment, however well-intentioned. And the proof of the principle is not far to seek either. People who speak only different languages are very much in this predicament, and never do live together in any place, howsoever honest they may be. Nothing is so intolerable in people who come together for any short while even, as that some of them should break off in the midst of a conversation by speaking in a cypher as it were, *i. e.* in any tongue or symbols unknown to the rest. These instances are offered to show how deeply necessary it

is to society that men should be honest, candid and truthful, in other words, to show the bearing of veracity and candor on social morality, quite apart from any doctrines of mental purity in the individual taken by himself.

Fickleness and suspicion.

Where the breach of these conditions of solidarity exceeds a certain limit, the offender becomes liable to punishment; in narrower limits, his misconduct exposes him to grave consequences of social and even domestic censure; but no such censure can secure sincerity. And he that does not think meanly of himself for his want of integrity in matters beyond the reach of any such censure or opinion, is the monster distrusting and disregarding his own utterances of whom we have had to consider in the preceding paragraph but one. Let not people think that such extraordinary cases of men who deny their personal identity are to be found only among the honester and the philosophic portion of mankind. Fickle-minded men are to be seen in abundance in every community, who stultify themselves and change their attitude to society without ever accounting for the change in their mind. Such men are in their behaviour if not by their professions, devoid of personal identity. And they escape the charge of deceit by shamelessly acknowledging their inconsistency. Moreover, perverse people are not wanting who tenaciously stick to their positions against the most complete break-down both from within and without their minds. I do not know how such human aberrations should be characterised when the very brutes are incapable of ignoring what poor memories or judgments they may be supposed to possess. If the fickle-minded men are each like a number of heterogeneous souls rolled into one, they have their converse type in those suspicious characters who cannot unite with any one, whatever the degree of his honesty and good-faith. Human solidarity is effected only by union of mind with mind. A measure of confidence is as much required as integrity, to win that confidence. And failure of either qualification has about the same result upon society. After all however, the fickle-minded and suspicious

men are punished by society in more ways than one. They are both held at arms' length; and they are both also duped by all unscrupulous persons; for the fickle and the suspicious are also the most noted for their credulity and gullibility.

A confiding disposition.

The purposes of good faith in society require that men should be candid in behaviour, that their utterances should be credible and their promises reliable. On the other hand, it is also necessary that men should be treated with a corresponding extent of confidence. An infidel or atheist may take a strange pleasure in doubting everything; but the man whose incredulity attains to that climax of suspicion that he would put all men to tests of honesty in all his dealings with society, is sure to make of himself a veritable pest in spite of the most unimpeachable honesty. It is in fact necessary for us as members of society to expose ourselves to some measure of risk from the corruptible nature of man. And earthly gain even will be found to lie rather on the erring side of credulity and confidence than on that of inordinate caution The golden mean in respect of this necessary confiding disposition lies in fact in that wisdom of the serpent which is associated with the innocence of the dove.

Veracity

We have hitherto spoken of candor and hypocrisy, of a suspicious and a confiding disposition, and of the wisdom of being cautiously trustful and scrupulously trustworthy. These questions indicate the moral condition of the function of Expression. It is obvious that it should be all the more accentuated when Expression concentrates itself in the act of Communication. This is effected by means of language whether articulate or inarticulate. And language carries responsibilities and functions which can never be belied with impunity by the man who uses that most civilizing instrument.

Reserve.

It may be necessary to condense language into symbols and mnemonics, and even to confess the failure of all language and utterance by availing of sighs, cries, or lamentations. But we must not forget that in these

and all other contrivances of the like kind, the act of Communication must involve some person or persons other than the speaker. Altruism requires the latter to consult the happiness of those other persons. And the obvious duties to which the fact points are to avoid garrulity as well as deception. The golden value of silence as compared to speech arises not only from the wisdom of cautious reticence but also from the importance of saving the listener some loss of time and patience, and that of protecting the interests of third parties from being affected by the communication. Open living is of the highest value in social life. But as you are compelled to keep your street door shut against thieves, you are bound to beware also, lest by loosening your tongue you put knaves in the way of doing injury to you or at least to third parties. Every man has occasion to keep some sort of confidence from any others in safety, and no one should run into the false position, in which an exceptional reserve being distinguishable, the fact would disclose any secret to the detriment of other people's interests. The Hindu mistrusts the reserve of the European. In his own society also his conduct serves to secure considerable publicity of life and the valuable social checks thereof. But in all these things he has to incur considerable loss or sacrifice. Secrets are at times very unsafe with us; and on other occasions they impose such closeness that the circumstance seriously interferes with our social intercourse. Candor unquestionably helps to develope attachment and altruism in the direction of true social progress. But where between any given persons, the impulses of attachment are feeble there is no chance of their solidarity advancing merely with the growth of candor. Veracity is by no means an easy virtue, nor are all men capable of realizing in every juncture of circumstances that mendacity is never the royal road to safety. Those who are too stupid to observe the strict conditions of veracity and too slothful to count and foresee the far-reaching evil effects of a falsehood, almost inevitably decline into the suppleness, as well as the insensibility of the slave, the coward, and the liar. Mental consistency and personal identity unites the inner with the

outer man ; and candor unites the individual with the society around him. But the state of unity thus brought about results from union of the men who by their personal efforts consolidate together in social life. No abstract rule of unity has any innate power to effect the solidarity. It is sympathy which is the true social cement. True knowledge, veracity, and candor are but indispensable aids to sympathy and altruism.

Politeness.

What has been said before might be sufficient to show, but nevertheless it would be safer to repeat, that candor does not call for rudeness on any occasion whatever. One may not have the patience for what euphemism may be requisite to counteract the attacks of folly or wickedness, but it would be a mistake to forget that even for defensive purposes, violence and rudeness have to be minimised in all cases. Generally however, it is only the too pliant disposition which being nervously sensitive to its own weakness, is apt to seek the protection of rudeness in the shape of a too candid utterance. But it is not at all in the interest of fools and rogues that society imposes on all the duty of polite and even ceremonious speech and behaviour. For rude candor is not only apt to hurt honest and innocent persons it never fails to react upon the honest offender also with a most painful compunction. The world too is really not so full of the milk of human kindness that we can afford to eschew that humbler substitute for virtue which goes by the name of politeness. Where one does not find the way to politeness except through hypocrisy, he certainly does well not to tempt that grand enemy of human nature and society. But then he must know that in having thus to quarrel with the tool of his language, he proves himself to be a bad master of that art.

Immodesty.

We have elsewhere discussed the question of politeness in connection with good manners, courtesy, and modesty. But it is necessary to notice here an immodesty with which as a mark of candor some people are given to flaunt even some of their vices. The depravity is equally great for the disregard thus shown to public opinion and for the ab-

sence of moral compunction in respect of the vicious conduct which is displayed. Nay, the man certainly becomes all the worse for the craving which also simultaneously occurs in such cases for the undeserved reputation of honesty and candor. The self-delusion lies in the make-belief that there is a vicious honesty, which if not quite as good as virtuous honesty is at least better than vice or concealment of vice. The truth is, insincerity is bad enough of itself, but its only mitigation is that insincere men subserve the moral purposes of society by at least offering a nominal adhesion to virtue. False affectation of vice and any shameless disclosure of it are both unpardonable. I should prefer concealment of vice to any such foolish perversity. Indeed as all virtue is really harmonious, so, that sense of degradation, which would pretend in any cases to feel relieved by an immodest display of vice, ought to be directed rather to an honest struggle to get rid of the vice itself than to perpetrate the shameless mockery of candor.

White-lies, chaffing, hyperboles.

Immodesty of the foregoing kind lies at the bottom of what is called a white lie ; as if the metaphorical blackness of a lie could be variously availed of to image forth the absurdities of a white-black and a black-black. And the enormity of tolerating such nonsense becomes manifest when we remember that it is these habits which serve to deaden the human conscience in respect of half-truths, diplomatic inanities, and that hypocritical banter which going by the name of chaff is really characteristic of high-life-vulgarity. It may be necessary to overlook misconduct of this kind in our personal relations, but all defence of such conduct is noxious to society. In these cases the mental reservation is all the fouler than out and out mendacity on account of superiority in the ranks of society in which it really prevails. Indeed in view of such abuses I am disposed to pardon the stupid people who from dearth of words fail to express their mind except in the way of saying that somebody vomitted three black crows. The hyperbolic style of expression deserves however a somewhat stronger condemnation than the far more culpable vice of hypocritical chaffing, because the former

happens to be more widely prevalent than the latter, in our society. It really springs I think from the imperfections of the vernacular tongue. I would not venture to look for a genesis of the hyperbolic style in the Sanskrit language, but the impact of English society if nothing else, now requires that particular attention should be paid to the morality of accurate speaking. When the infant gradually acquires his vernacular tongue he has often to begin with words rather than their meanings. But when a people claiming to possess a copious diction like what comes to us from the Sanskrit, do not care to observe the synonymous differences of words, their treasure becomes dust or quicksand, despite all its sterling value.

CHAPTER XIII.

COURAGE, PRUDENCE, AND FIRMNESS.

(16. 17. AND 18.)

Psychology of mental Activity.

Ethics as a science rests upon Psychology and Sociology. In the psychological side it is concerned with the regulation of what is called the Will. But psychology labors under certain disadvantages. It can not do without introspection, and that control of the Will which is required of all by society, is apt to conflict seriously with the results of the introspective process. Moreover man's convictions do not rest exclusively on judgments derived from introspection. We not only introspect our mind on occasions, but have oftener to communicate our observation and inference, both internal and external, to others. We do so for purposes of verification. And by doing so we start a process of ordinary or external observation. And when our judgments thus receive a confirmation from within and without, our introspection results in definite convictions. Thus as a rule it is only our growing consensus with men which really invigorates our belief and knowledge. That consensus is a

sociological question, introspection forms a small though useful part of it, but the external check forms an indispensable complement to the introspective function. It often becomes a doubtful gain to be able to distinguish between results of introspection and other people's opinion in any matter, for we may be lost in consequence, in certain mysteries of the most inextricable kind. For example, we may want to separate intuitions from the innate impulses, or volition from its invariably uniform antecedents and sequences, and to compare these with mens' opinion of our conduct. If there are no innate ideas, it may be almost unnecessary to check introspection by means of the external sources and results of any idea. If there are no intuitions, how are certain impulses correlated only to specific forms of gratification ? If the impulses are in any measure intuitive, when and where are we to draw the line between intuitive and ideational impulses? These, it will be perceived, are of the nature of vexed questions. A full analysis of the Will is another of the kind. These questions may or may not be capable of ever being satisfactorily solved. Social growth and ethical principles however cannot be stayed till their solutions are made and widely received. It is with an eye to this difficulty that in the data of morality and the Tabular analysis, I have ventured to give an independent place to the practical functions of the mind. I have preferred to make an arbitrary assumption about certain well-recognised conceptions. I have grouped together Courage, Prudence and Firmness separately from the emotional and intellectual functions. But I could not afford to discuss at the outset all the psychological questions which are involved therewith. If the foregoing chapters have been of any use in showing the value of our Tabular analysis for purposes of practical ethics, I may deserve the indulgence of the reader for the short psychological disquisition which follows on the subjects of the present chapter. Psychology treats of the Will as a distinct faculty of the mind. Our Tabular analysis gives us instead, miscellaneous forms of mental Activity ; and three of them are taken as typical for the heading of this chapter. But I have hitherto avoided saying that

those are only so many forms of volition, no matter what the nature of the volitional faculty may be.

Volition and Activity as Courageous, Prudent or Firm.

Action follows the Will, and volition recurs also to repeat the original act of the Will. Will is always attended by thought. But action may occur even without, or in spite of, conscious volition. In such cases the action is presumably due to other functions of the mind, for instance, the emotional. Hence when action does follow the Will, I mean at the first instance, it would be easier to assume that emotion is not altogether absent, but that it is in some form or other conjoined to the thought which is admittedly present in order to lead to the action. It is thus in the recurrence of our action only *i. e.* in what is called Activity, that room would be exclusively left for volition. In other respects it would seem, thought and emotion are sufficient to do duty for the Will or volitional impulse. External action comprises a multitude of very simple movements of the limbs. But their mental genesis before the growth of any infantile exercise is such an obscure question that it may be overlooked in the present connection. So far as my own convictions are concerned it would be immaterial to say, either that Courage, Prudence, and Firmness are specific forms of volition, or that they are only those of recurrent Activity. But in the former case, the language would have to be forced in some measure. Will—unbeginning, self-generating Will—is believed to have only two qualities weakness and strength. Morality however, having to regulate the Will has to look into some details of the volitional phenomena, like those under consideration, though the analysis is so delicate and it may be unsatisfactory.

Variability of phenomena.

The law of invariability of succession in phenomena has always to be slightly corrected with reference to duration and durability of the antecedent phenomena and those of their sequences. The duration of an antecedent phenomenon would modify the speed, and even the durability of its sequence. The durability of a phenomenon

also governs its duration, and in more ways than one. When the speed of a sequence is accelerated, the duration of the antecedent may for that very reason be cut short in spite of its durability. Its character in such cases however would be better indicated by the term intensity. Thus invariability of antecedence and sequence is qualified by variability respectively in the intensity and speed of the phenomena involved.

Variable intensity and speed in the intellectual and emotional functions.

When an impulse or emotion is very intense, the corresponding action may follow too speedily for the intercession of thought. When thought intervenes, either from its own superior intensity or from emotional feebleness, the action would be not only tardy but may become also subject to regulation by thought. When again thought is either inert or concurrent with the impulse, the action is proportionately expedited.

Mental *vis inertia.*

The intensity of thought not only affects emotion and action, but also governs the recurrence of thought in the form of what is called memory. There is perhaps a similar susceptibility in the emotions too, in respect of their own recurrence in the life of a man. A *vis inertia* of the intellectual and emotional functions would fully account for Activity as a whole in its inception, for its recurrence without thought or definite volition, and also for the strength and weakness of the Will.

Habit.

The recurrence of external action follows the Activity of thought and emotion, and is only another name for some of the effects of mental *vis inertia.* This activity or recurrence is however also allied to that other function of life which is common to physiology and psychology both— viz., Habit. Use strengthens and disuse tends to obliterate or deaden all our functions. Habit as a function may be internal, and external and also spontaneous as well as voluntary or self-directed. Spontaneous habit governs spontaneous mental activity, That is, it leaves emotion and thought to spontaneous action. counteraction and recurrence, Self-directed habit may be re-

garded as thought and emotional activity subordinating itself to definite conditions, for instance, to the laws of physiology, psychology or sociology. Habit *i. e.* habitual conduct may indeed, in this sense be partially coerced instead of being voluntary or perfectly free. Furthermore, it may be mechanical instead of being more or less conjoined to thought and introspection. In some cases the conflict of emotions and in others, disuse of thought supervenes, affecting the efficacy of habit. To fully utilize the law of habit in practical ethics, it is necessary to have an idea of how the conflict of emotions may be obviated if not eliminated ; and also to sedulously conjoin to every disciplinary conduct, the reasons thereof as may have been thought out before entering upon the discipline or habit.

Love, candor and regularity: Method, truth, and progress. Zeal and energy in love.

We have seen that altruism, sympathy or Love is capable of removing the natural conflict of the impulses. When Love or the whole heart is helped by thought, the result is regularity or method in conduct. Thought furnishes rules to guide within us our thinking and emotion, and without us, our conduct *i. e.* of the outer man taken alone and also conduct in our social life. To furnish such rules, the intellect depends upon true knowledge, accurate and candid interchange of ideas, and the consequent consensus of opinion between man and man. Thus truth and candor serve to bind love with regularity or method, yielding moral culture in the individual and civilization in society. This moral culture is of endless growth. Love, and the faith of being beloved, create a social solidarity which is obviously open to endless development by means of rule and method, provided the rules are sound and the faith is well-founded in candor and true knowledge. Rule, or the punctilious observance of it, when habitual, becomes a second nature in the individual. And when rule is collectively observed, it never fails to effect a corresponding change in society also. Neither the individual nor society can long endure the operation of rules which are incongruous with the nature of man and human society or with truth in the sense of true knowledge,

On the other hand, the intensity of emotion, thought and candor is productive of zeal and energy in Activity. And zeal and energy wisely operating in the cause of Love may be expected to effect wonders in the advancement of human affairs.

COURAGE and its varieties.

The Activity of thought and feeling has been examined above as a whole. But it may be further defined or analysed for purposes of regulation or moral culture. The intensity of an emotion tends to precipitate the man, into the corresponding action or even to accelerate it in various shapes of daring, rashness, bravado, and any sort of bravery. Action or volition in that form is denoted by the fifteenth function of the mind. When however in such action, the emotions are harmonious, and as such conjoined to thought and forethought, and to prudence and a sense of responsibility or preparedness for consequences, the bravery alluded to becomes morally good and takes the name of true Courage, whether moral or physical. I say 'true' courage, for when the soldier faces danger and death not from sober calculation but only from insensibility of the body or mind, his intrepidity is really of a different kind. It is then perhaps more valuable to his employer than to himself. It is also wanting in durability and thus it may not in the end be true courage. Physical courage incurs physical pain ; moral courage is similarly impervious to mental distress ; in both cases we have ultimately to face death.

Patience and fortitude. Relativity of happiness.

When Courage, true or false, is durable and enduring, it rears up patience and fortitude ; the pain incurred by the action is neglected ; and some other object is magnified—either an idea, a will, or feeling,—and mental satisfaction is made to rest thereupon. Courage, patience and fortitude are indeed capable at times of entirely reversing all the previously known conditions of happiness. Action which is ordinarily associated with the greatest unhappiness may thus be made the only source of yielding the truest and the best happiness. In any case, patience and fortitude tends to a measure of peace, contentment and cheerfulness, in which however credit is not

always given to the three forms of human activity, Courage Prudence and Firmness which are invariably involved with them.

Likewise, deficient intensity in our emotions together with a comparative preponderance of thought in the shape of prudential calculation tend to hesitancy and cowardice. When thought is intense, and particularly when it is incoherent, *i. e.* illogical as between judgment and judgment and between experience and judgment, or incongruous as regards the corresponding emotions, the result is hesitancy of disposition. A man may take time to collect facts which are available to him, and to consider and hesitate long over doubtful issues ; but a demoralised or habitual indecision arises I believe mainly from absence of method in the mind and habitual disregard to method. By method I mean here, desirable adjustment of thought and feeling with faith and love in respect of activity. Cowardice argues only capricious infirmity of the will, that is, utter discordance of, and consequent fitfulness in, thoughts and emotions.

Cowardice and indecision.

When thought is coherent and far-reaching, the resulting mental action is Prudence forming the seventeenth in our list. And true prudence can never overlook those emotional conditions which are real; in other words, altruism. In any case however, Prudence always tempers rashness as well as pusillanimity respectively into courage and discretion. But when thought is feeble, thoughtless activity, being swayed by the various egoistic and altruistic emotions, becomes capable of everything, good, bad or indifferent.

PRUDENCE.

Acts of Courage and Prudence may not recur in life, in exactly the same measure of the virtues, in which they occurred before. Either experience helps to suggest a variation in conduct or memory fails to connect the past with present experience. And thus the variability of conduct may be so great that it could not on accurate comparision of different parts of a man's life bear the uniform name or character denoted by courage or prudence. Habit alone forms the royal road to retentive wisdom both courageous and prudential.

Habitual courage and prudence.

A measure of habitual uniformity in conduct is indispensable to each of the active attributes, Courage, Prudence and Firmness. Reasoned habit again, is as conservative in regard to acquired facilities as it can be made progressively alive to altered circumstances requiring a prudent change of conduct.

Hope.

The habit of zealous but intelligent activity is the real secret of modern civilization; its phases are as infinite as its results are incalculably hopeful. Hope is the necessary outcome of the essential conditions of human wisdom and volition in cognizable human affairs. Both are capable of infinite expansion and variation under the natural laws accessible to man. Hope for the successful application of those laws, quite apart from Religious guidance, can only be a question of time in the history of human Society. If the mechanical habits of the Hindus have done so much to form their character, it is impossible to say what the addition of intelligent zeal to their methodical habits may not achieve. Thus even pessimist fears may not withstand the optimist hope resting on human solidarity.

Firmness.

Intensity of thought and feeling not only accelerates the speed of courageous and of prudent conduct, it also evokes in the inner as well as the outer man, a constant or enduring uniformty of action, which forms the eighteenth and the last of our mental functions, and bears the name of Firmness or obstinacy, according as the corresponding action is either good or bad. Firmness habitually occurring in requisite intervals of time, is expressed by the word Perseverance. And unreasoning intermittence of thought, feeling and habit—whether they are feeble or intense—leads to fickleness; a foible which it thus appears, is not beyond the reach of habit and voluntary increase of intensity. The strange aberrations which ensue from excessive fickleness of thought and probably also of feeling—for instance the denial of personal identity and various other forms of stultification, have already been noticed. And we find here a genesis as it were, of such aberrations of mental action.

To sum up : man's Intellectual and Emotional functions are sufficient to account for all mental phenomena. But their incidents are several. There is first of all, the question of pleasure and pain, incidental to gratification of and resistance to the impulses. Then there is a joint action between thought and impulse bearing the name of Volition. It has been proposed here, to regard volition in the different degrees of its continuity; to express by the term Activity, a moderate degree of continuous Volition ; and to refer man's external acts to the Practical functions of the mind. The activity of thinking and feeling in its moderate form manifests itself in Courage, Prudence, Firmness, &c., according to the intensity and speed of that activity. In more continuous form, the Activity occurs also as Habit. In other words, continuous thought, feeling and activity grow by the instrumentality of habit. Impulses and thoughts are again, either coherent or incoherent. The coherence of intelligence is logic ; but the coherence of all the mental functions is wisdom. Even so wisdom has that unity or singleness of character which makes the human being humane, individualised, social, and sociable all at once. And thus Love is the basis of morality. Love displaces fear, acquires knowledge and prudence, establishes faith, that is, faith in truth and faith in man ; it also infuses hope and courage and becomes tenaciously firm and persevering, in the development of life and society.

Summary.

The next chapter will show how morality even in its social aspect has its connections in Religion. But before passing on to that higher and, according to my limits, extraneous department of my subject, I may make the following reflections on Hindu Society. Our need is great to cultivate the Practical functions of the mind. Early Indian literature shows a profusion of feelings and imagination but deficient experience about the works of man, society and external nature. Our actual life also presents the same features of character. Not that empiric knowledge is wanting, but knowledge is not methodised for popular, much less universal acceptance.

Reflections on Indian Society.

Until knowledge is thus methodised it may not be called Science or demonstrated science. Our very methods are more imaginative than experiential. The success of ancient Hindu civilisation, I claim to be unquestionable. But I attribute it in particular, to the culture of feelings having been exceptionally sympathetic. The unity of the heart rectified the aberrations of imagination. The teaching must have been sound, though imagination filled up the blanks of physical and historical knowledge. The real superiority of the ancient Hindus ; the success with which they inculcated among others, the principle of veneration ; and the incompetence of our modern Brahmanic priesthood to maintain the continuity of their past, have served to make Hindu teaching very vulnerable to criticism. The weakness however lies only in the weak imaginative links with which their wise lessons have been held together. The Brahmans too may be charged with a sort of obstructiveness in omitting to pick out the ancient but wholesome lessons, and in neglecting to replace the old and fanciful reasoning by which they may have been held together. The methods of the Hindus are more or less arbitrary : not exactly suited to all sorts of intelligence. They did not much cultivate popular support. Their rules of conduct are as dogmatic as they are punctilious ; and the habits developed have been very mechanical. The room for variation of habits has been much narrowed owing to silence about intelligible reasons for the best of our religio-social habits. There is no reason why this state of things will be perpetuated. The emotions and thoughts of the Hindus do not seem to be wanting in intensity or speed. Only their social solidarity does not keep pace with the times. The Brahman of to-day will not guide the modern intellects of India. And Indian intelligence of to-day will not follow the ancient reasoning diffused in literature of Sanskrit origin. But this disorder can not last. The practical functions alone are thus shown to be defective. The objective sciences of European origin too are not being speedily utilised. And our Courage, Prudence, and Firmness are a little too wide of the facts and circumstances of our existing life and society. If our Prudence had been

comparatively great, the deficiency of Courage might be attributed to some defect more radical than that of unreasoning habit or habitual short-sightedness. I cannot admit that any moral courage would ever be wanting in a people, of whom even the feeblest have required severe legislation to put down the *sati* immolation. I really shudder at the moral courage of the Hindu mendicant and the *sati* of old. But the Hindu widow's example infuses in my mind an irrepressible hope for our innate strength. The remedy then is clear. It is idle to think of an unreasoning courage or intrepidity, like that of the mercenary or drink-invigorated soldier, when the people have aged so much ; when in fact the continuity of our very literature counts from the Rigveda; and Sanskrit texts of immense wisdom might be heard in the streets from the lips of the most illiterate. We must cultivate our Courage afresh, and do so to form newer habits. And the same principle applies equally to our narrow Prudence, our tenacious attention to trifles, and above all, to the thoughtlessness about our habits and our habitual disregard for new rules and self-directed method. I have elsewhere dwelt on law and rules at considerable length; it is only necessary here to direct attention to the importance of Hope, Habit, Courage, Prudence and Firmness in that connection. We are a contented, peaceful and easy-going people. Thanks to Brahmanic teaching, our efforts at dispassion have kept our craving for the egoistic gratifications subdued to a considerable degree. There is then fair capacity for that moderation in self-indulgence which is so indispensable to meek observance of duty. It would be the fault of the present generation only, if Western teaching has the fatal effect of driving us back to the violence and insatiable craving of more ardent nations.

CHAPTER XIV.

CONCLUDING WORDS: RELIGION.

Religious and Social Morality.

I have two words to say by way of conclusion: 1. Morality is connected with Religion; indeed until very recent times it was never treated apart from it. 2. If however, it has now to be learnt and taught by itself the work must be comparatively complex and difficult.

Religion is a higher and at the same time, a simpler study than morality. All religions look to a final Power over the human being. And to derive morality from that Power is, as an intellectual process, simple in the same measure as the character or mandate of that Power is easy of understanding. But as derived from human wisdom, the principles of morality must necessarily carry all the difficulty and intricacy which are involved in sound human experience. The student of what has been called here social morality, must therefore incur all the drawbacks of the study. The study has become requisite in recent times as part of what is called secular education, which itself has risen in importance along with the appreciation of education and character, as contra-distinguished from religious life. The social moralist cannot certainly hope to attain to the enthusiastic simplicity of the priest with his religious dogma. But it would be unjust on the other side, to hold that his reasoning signifies a rejection of the Religious sanction.

The truth is, the sanction of society and that of any particular religion have been looked upon here as being mutually concurrent. And the position thus assumed signifies that if in any case a religious sanction seems to disagree with social sanction, the fact might be attributed to our defective judgment in interpreting either or both of sanctions. It is well-known how, where one man is apt to charge an opponent with superstition, he may be charged in return with sinfulness, and how all

the while either or both of them may be laboring under some serious misconceptions about the dictates of religion or common sense. But this divergence certainly ought not to be the rule. And in any case, it should not be supposed that because the social moralist seeks to avoid any just or unjust charges of superstition, therefore his reasoning or his reliance on common sense means a disparagement of Religion and Religious dictates about sin and merit. On the contrary, it should be understood that the teachings of common sense and social experience are available in a different manner from the results of Religion. To argue by way of analogy, the social moralist has as it were, to peruse a writing which is in cipher, but without having any access to the key thereof. He may or may not commit mistakes. But if his deciphering has been correct, the work need not be rejected as being independent of the key.

The case would be better understood perhaps by the secular educationist than by the priest. The task of the former is really more difficult than that of the latter, but it would be facilitated by the labors of the social moralist. The secular educationist has however one special advantage. He is enabled to compare the labors of both the others. And that comparison is of great moment. Besides, as a *public* educationist, the secular teacher has to bear in mind that the parents of his pupils have reserved to themselves the work of religious instruction. His own religion, and more particularly his religious ratiocinations may materially differ from those of some of these parents. He may not go across domestic teaching in either of these matters. And he has therefore to work on independent lines, and utilise the labors of the priest and the social moralist. Though it may not be easy for every one to forget his peculiar creed, yet when social morality is compared with that of religion, every point of agreement thus established would be of great value.

For the purposes of social morality or secular moral-teaching, the materials must be less debatable, though more complex, than those of the religious teacher or priest. But neither has

Religion to be put aside, nor should agnostics and atheists be shut out of Public Schools of the country. Religion has rather to be looked upon in the abstract, in view of the numerous creeds of the world ; or even freed from the extremes of scepticism and superstition. It is firmly upheld nevertheless. Only it is left to come in after social morality is fairly appreciated ; or, all apart from the work of the Public School.

Unworldliness and monastic life.

A fact of a quite different kind may also be taken into consideration. Not only has morality been taught until recent times, as easy inference from Religion and its first truths, but the mode of life adapted to either in pre-monastic days was understood to belong to what may be called the hermit-life, that is, a life outside of Society. And that sort of life is entirely beyond the province of the social moralist of to-day. It is plain that the word *unworldliness* means a life of this sort when interpreted literally, and discloses the external circumstances which were at one time considered needful for a life of morality. The current acceptation of the word however seems to agree with social morality inasmuch as it expresses nothing more than a spirit of self-sacrifice. This difference in the meaning of the word, is I believe attributable to historical growth. And this and other expressions of the kind, *e. g. worldly-mindedness, worldly man, man of the world,* clearly suggest varied views of what is now required by society for inner morality and what was formerly required by religion to prevent external defilement. Now, in so far as these external circumstances of religio-moral life have undergone a change, the student of social morality has also to modify his external attitude and internal preparation in a suitable manner. The full measure of his punctilious efforts at leading a pure life, even according to the precepts of religion, cannot now be put off until he became able to renounce the world. He may not even attain an imperfect purification such as would be possible if he regarded the hermit-life and its moral purity, as presenting him with a most praiseworthy ideal though lying

beyond his immediate reach. He has given up all such old models of practical ethics. He must do all he can for his religious and moral purity both, while facing fully the temptations of social life; and in place of half measures and small beginnings towards the hermit's purity of life, he has to set about his work with all possible earnestness as soon as he comes to appreciate the nature of morality. His judgment must therefore be framed with reference to the facts of social life howsoever complicated, rather than from the religious example and circumstances of the hermit.

Three codes of religious morality.

As a further illustration of the nature and difficulties of social morality, I shall lay before the reader a few ethical codes which are avowedly founded upon Religion. At the same time they will serve to strengthen the private religious feeling of each man. It will be perceived from even a cursory examination of these codes, that though faith and the means of salvation against unrighteous conduct, are various according to different religions, yet the nature of righteousness, merit, and sin, that is so far as these matters relate to social life, is generally the same as between the religions mutually, as well as also with social morality as discussed in this book. In the second place, though I shall have to avoid all discussion on the point, the moral precepts of two of these religious codes will show that simple as they have been, it was the hermit-life which would after all be the best suited for their observance on the most rigid lines. Whereas for the third code, the question of monastic life has been only a most complicated one. And in the third place, so far at least as the three codes cited below are concerned, their completeness is in some cases at least, left to be understood from the round number of the precepts rather than realised by their exhaustive details as in the case of any human legislation. We must each work up the codes in various ways in actual life, in order to attain any sort of exhaustiveness. Consequently social morality would not seem to be inordinately complicated in comparison and may be very helpful to the private religion of each.

The Hindu Code.

Let us first of all, take up the Hindu Code.

অদত্তানামুপাদানং হিংসা চৈবাবিধানতঃ।
পরদারোপসেবা চ কায়িকং [শারীরং] ত্রিবিধং স্মৃতম্॥
পারুষ্যমনৃতঞ্চৈব পৈশুন্যঞ্চাপি সর্ব্বশঃ।
অসম্বদ্ধপ্রলাপশ্চ বাঙ্ময়ং স্যাচ্চতুর্ব্বিধম্॥
পরদ্রব্যেষ্বভিধ্যানং মনসানিষ্টচিন্তনম্।
বিতথাভিনিবেশশ্চ ত্রিবিধং কর্ম্ম মানসম্॥
এতানি দশ পাপানি প্রশমং যান্তু জাহ্নবি।
স্নাতস্য মম তে দেবি জলে বিষ্ণুপদোদ্ভবে॥

Translation : "Taking things which have not been given; injury done except in accordance with legal injunction*; and criminal intercourse with another's wife †; these called the threefold sinful acts of the Body:

Abuse; untruth; back-biting of all kinds, [tale bearing ?] ‡; and irrelevant, incoherent speech§; these fourfold sinful acts done by the Voice:

Pondering how to get the property of others; thinking with the mind of what is undesirable||; inclining to notions of things as things are not¶; these threefold sinful acts of the Mind:

May these ten sins to which I am subject be extinct O! Goddess, the daughter of Jahnu! by bathing in your waters which spring from the feet of Vishnu."

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* Injury to animals except at authorised sacrifices; injuries to men when not inflicted as legal penalties.

† Widow not excluded.

‡ Speaking ill of one even truly in his absence. Compare Kulluka's Com. Manu, XI. 50.

§ As, news &c. of king, country, or town which does not concern one: so illustrated by commentators.

|| As, the slaughter of a Brahman &c. according to commentators.

¶ As, non-existence of life after death, or of transmigration, or that the body is the soul, &c. according to commentators.

The original verses are given above from one of the commonest sources *viz.*, the Hindu Almanac.* But they are to be found also in one of the *Smriti*-treatises by Raghunandan†; and the first three of the four couplets with their order reversed even in Manu's Code‡. The verses have to be recited by the pious Hindu when he bathes in the river Ganges on the occasion of the Festival called *Dasahara* or Ten-destroying. It virtually means a solemn resolution to renounce the ten sins. I do not however venture to offer any simpler list of them, than in the translation given above, from a comparison of Dr. Burnell and Sir W. Jones' English-rendering and Pandit Mathura Nath's Bengali version of Manu. The principal analysis into three classes, sins of the Body Voice and Mind, is no doubt quite exhaustive. But the subdivisions are hardly so. And I do not think that every body is enabled by the code to judge of all immoral acts of his body, tongue or mind; or that complete success in observing the rules is possible anywhere but in hermit-life.

The Buddhist Code.

The Buddhist Code is often noticed in English books. For the sake of convenience I give its substance from an English version according as I find it. It prohibits :—

"1. The taking of life. 2. The taking of that which has not been given. 3. Sexual intercourse¶ (অব্রহ্মচর্য্য). 4. The saying of that which is not true. 5. The use of intoxicating drinks that lead to indifference towards religion. 6. The eating of food after mid-day.|| 7. Attendance upon dancing, singing, music, and masks. 8. Adorning of the body with flowers and the use of perfumes and unguents. 9. The use of high or honorable seats or couches. 10. The receiving of gold or silver.§

* Gupta Press Panjika for 1295. B. S. under date the 6th of Assar. June. 19. 1888.

† Tithi-tattwa.

‡ XII. verses 7, 6, & 5.

¶ It may be understood to enjoin absolute celibacy or to prohibit only unlawful act of the kind referred to.

|| The original wording if compounded of Vikala and Abhojana might perhaps be rendered into the eating of food *except* after midday.

§ Hardy's Eastern monachism p. 24.

Here the ethical teaching is unmixed with supernatural power unlike the Hindu Code, but the leaning for hermit-life is most pronounced. The fact is also in accordance with the known history of Buddhism. But we are concerned only with seeing how little the code could suffice for the purposes of modern social life; and how besides, our social morality compares with Buddhist ethics.

The Hebrew Code.

The Hebrew Code of ethics is also that of the Christian community; and it is called the Decalogue *par excellence.* "The number ten" however was according to Dr. Smith* only "a symbol of completeness"; that is, no more than a round number. The text as given in the Bible is much lengthier than in the well-known formularies used by the Roman Catholic and Protestant Christians. It will be convenient to analyse this Code into twelve subjects, as named below:—

1. The source of the revelation. 2. Monotheism. 3. Prohibition of idolatry. 4. Oaths. 5. The sabbath day. 6. Duty to parents. 7. Murder. 8. Adultery (fornication ?) 9. Theft. 10. False witness. 11. Coveting the neighbour's wife. 12. Other forms of covetousness in general.

Of these twelve subjects, the first does not count towards the number ten, being unconditionally accepted by all believers. And the second and third with some sects, and the eleventh and twelfth with certain others, are according to the above-named authority, always severally coupled into one commandment; and thus the Code makes up the number ten.

It would seem as if the Hebrew Code did not at all contemplate any kermit-life for its adequate operation. And this view would also be strengthened by the fact that this Code is understood to comprise two important divisions: one, of the Duties to God; and the other, of the Duties to man; or in other words, Religious and Moral duties. There is by the way, some difference of

* Concise dictionary of the Bible. Art. Ten Commandments.

opinion as to whether the duty to parents should not come within duty to God rather than within those to man. The fact shows a source of the difficulty of trying to distinguish the social from religious morality even in a purely scriptural authority. But even if a hermit-life was not contemplated in the Mosaic Code at the beginning, it is well-known that at about the time when Judaism was followed by Christianity, the Essenes had become an important Jewish sect, and that they did lead a monastic life.

Christian ethics.

The Hebrew Code as given in the Bible also contains the following verse.

"Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the LORD." (Lev. XIX. 18.)

And at the time of the New Dispensation it seems, the above verse came to be regarded as the very essence of the Decalogue. That is to say, the Hebrew ethics of social and monastic life were at some date or other reduced not only into a twofold Code but also that the two principles of the Decalogue, religion and morality, were avowedly resolved into the single harmonious doctrine, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. As will be seen from a passage quoted later on, this simplification of the decalogue occurs, among other places, in the writings of St. Paul; who as the apostle of the gentiles, was especially concerned in the social as opposed to any hermit-life of the gentile world, that is, the world affected by the Roman civilization. Whatever then may be said of the Hebrew Code drawing a line between Religion and Morality, it is quite clear that Christianity helped to refer all ethical precepts to the single commandment, Love thy neighbour as thyself.

Universal Love and the spirit of Holiness, according to Christianity.

It will be shown later on, how this simple doctrine had to be supplemented with a list of the seven capital sins relating to social life. But it will be desirable now to follow St. Paul in his arguments in the passage quoted below, the celebrated thirteenth chapter of his first Epistle to the Cornithians.

"If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, but have not love, I am become sounding brass, or a clanging cymbal. And if I have the gift of prophecy, and know all mysteries and all knowledge; and if I have all faith, so as to remove mountains, but have not love, I am nothing. And if I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and if I give my body to be burned, but have not love, it profiteth me nothing. Love suffereth long, and is kind; love envieth not; love vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not its own, is not provoked, taketh not account of evil; rejoiceth not in unrighteousness, but rejoiceth with the truth; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things. Love never faileth: but whether there be prophecies, they shall be done away; whether there be tongues, they shall cease; whether there be knowledge, it shall be done away. For we know in part, and prophesy in part: but when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away. When I was a child, I spake as a child, I felt as a child, I thought as a child: now that I am become a man, I have put away childish things. For now we see in a mirror, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as I also I have been known. But now abideth faith, hope, love, these three; and the greatest of these is love."

Perhaps it would be too venturesome to urge, that the doctrine of universal Love and Spirit of Holiness as preached above, is more ethical than purely religious. But in any case, Religious men of all Creeds will agree in assenting to the altruistic bearings of the doctrine, however much the question of the nature of the Holy Spirit may be dissented from. Moreover this principle of universal Love, or Charity appears to be not only a development of the Mosaic revelation, Love thy neighbour as thyself. We find in St. Paul's writings even a far wider support for our logic of social morality. Says St. Paul:—

"Ye, brethren, were called for freedom; only use not your freedom for an occasion to the flesh, but *through love be servants one to another*. For the whole law is fulfilled in one word, even in this; *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself*. But if ye bite and devour one another, take heed that ye be not consumed one of another." (Galat. V. 13-15)

Again:—

"All things are lawful; but all things are not expedient. All things are lawful; but all things edify not. *Let no man seek his own, but each his neighbour's good*" (I Cor. X. 23-24)

An analysis of Christian charity.

In the last two quotations, the passages italicised do, I think, furnish us with fair definitions respectively, of the terms Veneration, Attachment and Kindness as discussed in Chapter X, (p. 148.) They also recommend

suppression of egoism where 'it is said—"Let no man seek his own good." They even point out that where society is maintained through the varied actions of self-regarding instincts, the social relation tends to mutual struggle, discord and ultimate breach of social union (see before : p. 21); in other words, to destruction of solidarity. If men bite and devour one another, they are liable to be consumed of one another. This, whether it be a religious doctrine or not, is certainly a common-sense view of the importance of restraining egoism.

Further analysis: Faith and Merit. The seven sins.

But this simplification of the Mosaic dispensation was, I believe, at last found to be somewhat insufficient. For the Roman Catholic Church came to insist pretty strongly on doctrines about justification by Merit, and on moral life as viewed apart from religion, thus attaching considerable importance on the analysis of vicious conduct into the seven capital sins. Now whatever may be the nature of the Protestant and Catholic arguments on this abstruse subject of faith and merit, our analysis of human nature into the three forms of altruism and the seven forms of egoism, obviously stand amply supported by the Christian religion. Also, it will appear, that while Hebrew ethics went through a stage of monasticism immediately before and after their simplification by St. Paul, the social life of Europe came to require a culture of Merit or morality, as distinguished from Faith and monastic purity of life.

Social morality in Europe: its heterogenous condition.

It is true that the seven capital sins are not now considered to be of much importance, and that inner purity is held instead as allied to what is called justification by Faith and to a general spirit of unworldliness in ordinary social life. But simultaneously with this tendency of European opinion, other difficulties have cropped up. The principle of universal toleration affects in some measure, the catholicity of the Christian creed, and leads to the recognition, and even appreciation, of social morality

among opposing sects as well as among non-believers. And altogether, European social life has had to a considerable extent to shift the foundations of morality from Religion to Public Opinion. Public opinion however is liable to change, in many questions at least. And social morality while it has to be as exhaustive and systematic as religious morality, has to lay its foundations upon that portion of public opinion which is thoroughly rational and coherent and also so enduring that it may be regarded as everlasting for earthly human purposes. But how far the principles of morality, as governed by European public opinion and independently of religion, are firmly upheld in European life, is a question of considerable obscurity, since the general prevalence of Christianity among the Europeans is an important factor in the study of that question. And how far again the principle of toleration and the authority of public opinion as transferred from Europe, are acting as a solvent to morality as founded on the Indian religions, are still more delicate questions. In any case then it would be awkward at the present day and in India in particular, to wish for the simplicity of St. Paul's ethics when the monasticism of medieval Christianity, and the mendicancy of every form of the Indian religions, are entirely out of the question; and secular education has to confront not only sects of Christianity, but also the more deep-rooted and long-standing divergences between Christianity and Christian society on the one side, and almost all the rest of the world's religions and religious views on the other—not excepting modern agnosticism and various forms of Eastern and Western atheism.

Hindu analysis of sinfulness or the inner enemy.

The analysis of human nature, which has been adopted here, for the purposes of social morality, is however in accord with the principles of Hindu Religion, no less than with those of Christianity. Reference has been made elsewhere (see p. 62) to the inner enemy of man or *ripu* as it is called in Bengali and Sanskrit. There are in fact six such enemies according to Hindu traditions; but they might all come under one great *alter-ego*, inimical to the altruistic

Self. Hinduism, however, it should be remembered, does not recognise a being of the nature of Satan. And I will now compare these six Ripus or enemies with the seven forms of egoism or capital sins. These six are 1. কাম, 2. ক্রোধ, 3. লোভ, 4. মোহ, 5. মদ, and 6. মাৎসর্য্য. Of these, the *ripu* no. 1 is Lust; no. 2 is Anger; and no. 3 comprises Gluttony and Avarice both. *Ripu* no. 6 like Envy, signifies impatience of another's success or prosperity; in other words, it is a complex feeling, connected with the sense of rivalry and desire to dominate over others; and that means Pride, as that term has been used here. The fifth *ripu* is usually rendered in English as Arrogance which is allied to Pride and Vanity both. But when Envy gets classed as Pride, Arrogance should fall under the head of Vanity. The fourth *ripu* means primarily the state of being in error, and as such it might I think, come under the word বিতথা, "notions of things as things are not," in the Hindu code of ten sins. But the Vedantist philosophers have employed the term *moha,* to express also their peculiar doctrine of universal illusion. In any case, the subject comes under the head of Truth as considered in chapter XI. The Hebrew and the Christian codes have got over this question of the ethics of error and truth-seeking by specifying the source of their Revelation and of all true knowledge; and the Buddhist code has utilized the Hindu principle in condemning the use of intoxicants. And thus taking the analysis of the six *ripus* as a whole, it is shown to be fairly in accord with the line of reasoning followed in this book. But it is simply hopeless to arrive at any sort of reconciliation between the absolutism of the Mosaic revelation and that of the vedantic illusion. So again, if St. Paul's universal Love as an ethical principle has to be held distinct from his supernal but friendly Spirit of Holiness, it would be a matter of delicacy to suggest that the enmity of the *Ripus* carries nothing more than an allegorical meaning. But the doctrinal difference between the friendly or gracious spirit and the inimical *alter ego* referred to above, would also come to be simply insoluble.

Universal love according to Hinduism.

At the same time however the *so'ham* spirit of Hinduism (see p. 92) when regarded as a question of ethics and as apart from the cognition of a certain transcendental truth, seems to be undistinguishable from universal Love. And thus the social moralist who relies upon the logical comprehensiveness of Benevolence as the ultimate principle of altruism and morality, should be the last person to make light of the concurrent dictates of the Hindu or the Christian Religion in this regard.

An analysis of Hindu morality.

If however the parallel between the six *ripus* and the seven capital sins discloses no more than a happy coincidence, it may be useful to examine another coincidence of the same kind as regards the three forms of Altruism.

দুঃখ-দৌর্মনস্যাঙ্গমেজয়ত্ব-শ্বাস-প্রশ্বাসা বিক্ষেপ সহভুবঃ। ৩১।

তৎপ্রতিষেধার্থমেকতত্ত্বাভ্যাসঃ। ৩২।

মৈত্রী-করুণামুদিতোপেক্ষাণাং সুখ-দুঃখ-পুণ্যাপুণ্য-বিষয়াণাং ভাবনাতশ্চিত্তপ্রসাদনম্। ৩৩।

প্রচ্ছর্দ্দনবিধারণাভ্যাং বা প্রাণস্য। ৩৪।

31. Pain, Distress, Trembling, Inspiration and Expiration are the companions of distractions.

32. For their prevention let there be exercise on one principle.

33. The cheerfulness of the thinking principle, through friendliness, compassion, complacency and indifference in regard to happiness, grief, virtue and vice.

34. Or by expulsion and retention of breath.

Yoga aphorisms of Patanjali with English Translation, by Dr. R. L. Mitra. Book. I.

In the above quotation, attention is drawn only to the 33rd Aphorism which could not be conveniently divided. It mentions and prescribes certain ethical principles, but their full bearing

upon my argument comes out only when we connect* the principles here given with the doctrine of the Vaishnavas in regard to their culture of "the five Sentiments" for the universal All: namely: শান্তি (dispassion), দাস্য (subjection) সখ্য (attachment) বাৎসল্য (parental kindness) and মাধুর্য্য (sweet sentiment). What is called উপেক্ষা, or Indifference by Patanjali is the same with শান্তি or Dispassion of the Vaishnavas, and it is also equivalent to non-egoism. And (মুদিতা) and sweet sentiment (মাধুর্য্য) are also identical. So also are friendliness (মৈত্রী) and Attachment (সখ্য). Of these five sentiments we are told :—

পূর্ব্ব পূর্ব্ব রসের গুণ পরে পরে হয়।
এক দুই গণনে পঞ্চ পর্য্যন্ত বাড়য় ॥
গুণাধিক্যে স্বাদাধিক্য বাড়ে প্রতিরসে।
শান্ত, দাস্য, সখ্য, বাৎসল্যের গুণ মধুরেতে বৈসে ॥

Chaitanya Charitamrita II. Ch. 8.

Translation:—The merit of each previous feeling exists in the one next succeeding, and thus the feeling grows from the first to the fifth; with increase of merit, increase of relish grows again at each step, and the merits of dispassion, subjection, attachment and parental kindness are all merged in the sweet sentiment.

The term বাৎসল্য or parental kindness is expressive even of the domestic type of Kindness as shown in our chapter X; and as such it coincides with করুণা or compassion of Patanjali. The Vaishnavas have added however the term দাস্য or subjection to the list; which is practically identical with Veneration. And our analysis thus comes into still fuller accord with their doctrine.

Analyis and Synthesis.

These facts as said before may show merely some stray coincidences. But they may also be regarded as imperishable truths of human nature manifesting themselves in all parts of the globe. There is however no doubt that the Synthetic and Analytic views of

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* My hearty grateful acknowledgments are due here to a venerable friend who I know does not like that his name should be given to the public in this connection.

morality must be reconciled. The Synthesis may be presented in Religion; and an Analysis may issue therefrom. Or, the Analysis may be made by a scientific study of man and society; and a Synthetic aspect such as that of Altruistic ethics, may be drawn out of that analysis. The result ought to be all the same, if the secular educationist proceeds upon human wisdom and seeks in Religion only the verification thereof; or, if the Priest unfolding his first principles from accepted religious sources proceeds to demonstrate their soundness to his peculiar disciples, with reference to ordinary human experience. This work of Analysis and Synthesis, demonstration and verification, may not be neglected in these days of intense and endless criticism.

But till that work is accomplished, the practical directions of the Sufi and Parsi scripture would be exceedingly apt. And the Indian soil no less than the purposes of State-education here, are also peculiarly suitable for the lesson, so far as I can judge :—

"If thou art a Mussalman, go stay with the Franks; if a Christian, join the Jews; if a Shiah, mix with the schismatics: whatever thy religion, associate with men of opposite persuasion. If in hearing their discourses thou art not in the least moved, but canst mix with them freely, thou hast attained peace, and art a master of creation."*

*Conway's Sacred Anthology. p. 33.